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


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FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

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VOLUME XXXV

NUMBER 1



COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE

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A FIGHTING HEART FOR THE ARMY'S NEW LOOK

Colonel Richard W. Whitney, *General Staff*
Executive, Office of the Comptroller of the Army, Department of the Army

The views expressed in this article are the author's and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Command and General Staff College.—The Editor.

AS WE STRIDE breathlessly and enthusiastically from the age of atomic weapons into the thermonuclear era, let us pause just long enough to devote some overdue consideration to our greatest potential weapon—the morale of our fighting soldier. Without this weapon all others are impotent. If we devote the same measure of effort to developing this weapon that we expend in developing others, we shall be invincible. Is that worth pausing for? If you agree that it is, then join me in some soul-searching and watch out for the chips, because we shall let them fall where they may.

Each officer and noncommissioned officer in today's Army who deserves the title of leader or commander carries in the upper strata of his mind a constant awareness that the morale of his subordinates is the key to success in any military endeavor. Recognizing this, he strives, within the limits of his capabilities, to improve morale. All too frequently his efforts are

remedial rather than preventative. In many cases his capabilities are restricted by inadequate training and experience or by his lack of one or more of the principal attributes of a successful leader. Often the morale of his troops is influenced by conditions which are beyond the leader's control.

Morale and Esprit

My purpose is to examine those agencies, activities, and conditions which influence the morale of the soldier, and which are within our Nation's ability to control, in order to evolve recommended measures for improving the standard of morale in our Army. Combat is the real test of a soldier's morale, and so it is toward the attitudes and reactions of the fighting soldier that my treatment of this subject is oriented. Nevertheless, my approach is influenced by the fact that a soldier's behavior during the ordeal of combat can be greatly influenced by the attitudes he acquires before he arrives in the combat zone. Because the two are so highly interrelated and interdependent, it is impractical to talk about morale without also discussing esprit de corps. How does morale compare to the other elements which go to make up the might of a na-

The Army must eliminate from its precombat training and orientation programs all of the nonessentials which detract from our principal objective of ensuring the battle-readiness of the individual and the team

tion's army? Napoleon paid tribute to the importance of morale by proclaiming, "In war, morale conditions make up three-quarters of the game; the relative balance of manpower accounts only for the remaining quarter." The great military leaders of more recent warfare appear to support Napoleon's theory. Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery has stated, "High morale is a pearl of great price. The more I see of fighting, the more I am convinced that the big thing in war is morale." His colorful contemporary, General George S. Patton, Jr., said, "My theory is that a commander does what is necessary to accomplish his mission and that nearly 80 percent of his mission is to arouse morale in his men."

Innumerable examples could be cited wherein an upsurge of morale and esprit has turned the tide of battle or predetermined its outcome. Tolstoy, in his *War and Peace*, very aptly pays tribute to these intangible weapons which so frequently represent the balance of power in battle.

In warfare, the force of armies is the product of the mass multiplied by something else, an unknown "x." Military science, seeing in history an immense number of examples in which the mass of an army does not correspond with its force, as in which small numbers conquer large ones, vaguely recognizes the existence of this unknown factor, and tries to find it sometimes in some geometrical

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disposition of the troops, sometimes in superiority of weapons, and most often in the genius of the leaders. But none of these factors yield results that agree with the historical facts. "X" is the spirit of the army, the greater or less desire to fight and to face dangers on the part of all the men composing the army, which is quite apart from the question whether they are fighting under leaders of genius or not, with cudgels or with guns that fire 30 times a minute.

Leadership

Leadership is the greatest single influence on morale. Let us teach all potential leaders how to exercise that influence.

Even the most cursory examination of the causes of high or low morale among combat troops reveals the predominating influence of the leader on morale. Our service schools continue to emphasize the technical rather than the human aspects of combat leadership training. Leadership must encompass an acute awareness of all elements—tangible and intangible—which affect the morale of troops. What is more, leadership must embrace the capability of dealing with all of these elements in order to improve the morale of troops. In addition to providing inspiration by means of personal example, the combat leader must provide understanding, a respect for the dignity of the individual, security, relief, justice, body comforts, training, and an almost unending list of contributions which directly influence morale and esprit. Therefore, it follows that we who would be leaders must be taught not only what a leader is, but what he must do and how he can do it. Nearly every official act of a leader during combat influences morale directly or indirectly.

No single condition, agency, or activity possesses the potential of exerting direct, immediate, and widespread influence on morale and esprit which is possessed by the combat leader.

I am confident that our top commanders and the custodians of our personnel records will agree with me that a complete inventory of qualified combat leaders in the Army or its Reserve components is an impossible task. I am equally confident that they will agree that the supply—could it be established—does not, nor ever will, meet the demand. True, we can point out a relatively few among all ranks who have proved their leadership qualifications. Others have attained a hold on this distinction by a single feat or through the medium of publicity—some deservedly, others perhaps not. But where the true combat leader is most sorely needed, where his influence is the greatest, and where he is needed in the greatest number, the shortage is the most acute. I refer to the lower echelons of the combat elements where the influence of leadership on the soldier, who is undergoing his greatest ordeal, is the most direct.

Many officers and noncommissioned officers assigned in recent years to positions of leadership in combat have demonstrated their technical and tactical proficiency. However, a far smaller number displayed any degree of awareness of their power to influence morale and how to wield that power. Many of the latter would have been outstanding leaders had they possessed a knowledge of the rudiments of human leadership and an intelligent respect for the human factor.

The mere fact that our great American combat leaders in recent wars have stood out in such sharp focus is not only a tribute to them, but also a startling revelation that their number was small in proportion to the American forces involved. Perhaps even more startling is the fact that the demand for good combat leaders could not even be satisfied in the localized Korean conflict. If the deficiency was so acute for such a limited engagement, how painful will it be in any future global war? Nevertheless,

with the present human resources available to the Army, we can increase significantly the output of both acceptable and outstanding combat leaders if we approach the training problem realistically.

Training

One certainly cannot say that the average senior Army officer, who is in a position to make or influence decisions, policies, and plans, is not acutely aware of the importance of training in leadership and of the value of high morale among troops. But it can be claimed that little more than lip service is paid to these highly important and related matters in our Army school system and unit training programs. Leadership and morale are unquestionably subjects which, based on psychology, do not appear to fit smoothly into the orderly and practical regimen of military training with such ease as do rifle marksmanship and close order drill.

Many of my contemporaries feel that we acquired in combat an understanding of a soldier's attitudes and reactions and how to influence them. How complete our understanding is we cannot know. The fact remains that we acquired this learning the hard way. And so have thousands of officers and noncommissioned officers in recent years learned about the human factor in the harsh atmosphere of combat. Much of this knowledge has been acquired at great cost to the individual, to the Army, and to the Nation. How much better armed would be our country if its military leaders of all ranks went into battle forearmed with this vital knowledge?

The following thesis governed teaching at the Canadian School of Infantry during World War II:

War is won by morale, fire, and movement in combination. They must, therefore, be studied together. Morale, which expresses itself in the aggressive spirit, is the only motive power in the face of the enemy—at least in a forward direction—that the war machine possesses.

Without it, tactical conceptions are just academic wishful thinking, for they will not be implemented on the battlefield. Without it, your men will not move forward. The maintenance of our morale and the breaking down of that of the enemy, therefore, requires to be our first task. . . .

Now, let us examine briefly the emphasis placed on morale and leadership in the training of combat leaders in the United States Army. More officers are trained at The Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia—to occupy positions of leadership in combat—than at any other Army school. The present Program of Instruction for the Infantry Officer Candidate Course reveals that out of a total of 968 hours of instruction, only 18 are devoted to the subject of “Military Command and Leadership.” Only in this brief period is any instruction directed specifically at morale and leadership—and part of this time is given to such remotely related subjects as “Public Information” and “Problems of Training.” Although other periods of this 18-hour block are indirectly related to the combat situation, only 2 hours are devoted directly to “Command and Leadership Problems in Combat.”

By way of comparison, the same program assigns 24 hours to instruction in “Drill and Command,” during which the student is taught close order drill of the platoon and how to develop a good command voice. It is perhaps facetious—yet nevertheless pertinent—to recall that one of our greatest combat leaders—General Patton—attained that distinction more as a result of his devout interest in the individual soldier than as a result of his good command voice.

The Infantry School Program of Instruction for the Associate Infantry Company Officer Course allots 12 hours out of a total of 660 to “Command and Leadership,” while 29 hours are given to per-

sonnel administration and 37 hours to logistics.

The 1,496-hour Infantry Officer Advanced Course allocates 20 hours to “Command and Leadership,” as compared to 37 hours for personnel administration.

Admittedly, a military leader must be proficient in the technical aspects of his profession. He must know weapons, their characteristics, capabilities, and limitations. But more important, he must know men, their characteristics, capabilities, and limitations if he will be a leader in every sense of the word. Ask a few questions—as I did—of officers who have led in combat; ask them what proportion of their time during combat was devoted to the morale, esprit, and welfare of their men as compared with other activities. Without exception, the proportion is far greater. Ask them, now that they are out of combat, if they have since thought of measures they could have taken—but did not—to improve morale and esprit on various occasions. The only answer I received was “yes.” Why must we learn the hard way and often too late?

Finally, ask them if anyone has ever solicited their opinions, experiences, and solutions relating to morale problems in combat. The answer is “no.”

The Army is remiss in its failure to assemble and use the volume of valuable morale and leadership lessons available in the experiences of combat veterans.

The Army's research agencies spend large sums of money in conducting studies of vital interest to the service. But there is very little evidence that the Army has ever initiated research in the field of combat troop morale. We constantly seek new weapons and new methods for waging war. To this end we spend millions of dollars annually in research, development, and testing. Yet, we all but ignore the fact that the weapons and methods we seek can be no more effective than the men who must employ them.

Type of Training

Instruction in morale, esprit, and leadership in all Army service schools and unit schools must be given the emphasis it deserves, from the standpoint of time allotted, direction of effort, and quality of instruction.

Such instruction must be oriented toward combat. Combat is the end toward which all activities of the Army are oriented—directly or indirectly. A more equitable allocation of time to these subjects can be attained by a redistribution of time among other subjects in the curriculum. Such a redistribution can be based upon a survey among experienced leaders to determine where emphasis is improperly placed. Find out from them how much time and effort they have devoted to the various activities and duties in which they have received instruction. Determine from their testimony whether they spent more time in morale activities than in filling out personnel forms or in exercising their command voices. Also find out which of these activities contributed most to the successful accomplishment of their missions.

Training in morale, esprit, and leadership should not be restricted to the junior officer, officer candidate, or noncommissioned officer. New lessons are learned from each conflict and even during peacetime. As an officer advances in the Army and proceeds from combat to noncombat assignments, his knowledge of the human aspect requires refreshing against the day when he will again assume the role of combat leader. It must also be remembered that as an officer advances to higher command, his influence on the soldier is exercised more and more indirectly through his subordinate officers. All too frequently, in our ardent attention to the morale of the soldier, we are prone to overlook the morale of our subordinate officers. Morale is contagious, be it high or low. In a unit, morale and esprit depend

greatly upon confidence in the leader. Thus, good leadership involves not only the influencing of enlisted men, but of all subordinates. Therefore, the highest commander must possess the same attributes as the good junior leader and must apply them throughout the chain of command.

Nor should training in morale, esprit, and leadership be restricted to the combat arms. The human factor is present in all Army activities and, more important, in any future large-scale conflict, modern weapons will extend the battle area so that more and more of our support personnel will be subjected to the stresses and morale effects of the combat environment. Not all of our potential leaders in the Army enjoy the advantages of formal training in one or more of our service schools. Therefore, this instruction must be injected into our unit training and our unit schools such as we choose to call "leader schools" or "noncommissioned officers' schools."

The Human Factor

Having determined the fair amount of time to be devoted to these "human factor" subjects in our training programs, what are the next steps in establishing a realistic and profitable course of instruction? The first task is to assemble the wealth of available instructional material pertaining to morale and esprit which exists in the form of surveys, texts, and in the experiences of combat veterans.

During World War II, a civilian and military group in the Troop Information and Education Division of the War Department undertook an extensive, worldwide survey of the attitudes and reactions of individual American soldiers and junior leaders and the effects of these attitudes and reactions on unit accomplishments. The volumes of this survey, together with such valuable texts as S. L. A. Marshall's *Men Against Fire*, possess a store of proved facts and recommenda-

tions relating to the human factor in warfare. Here are men who, with adequate time and singleness of purpose, have recorded the information which we in the Army need. However, this is not enough. Still unrecorded and unevaluated are the thousands of experiences, situations, solutions—good and bad—conclusions, and recommendations which rest in the memories of soldiers of all ranks from Korea and World War II. We must act before these memories fade.

Operations Research Office should be charged immediately with undertaking a comprehensive survey and study designed to assemble, in usable form, the mass of information relating to morale, esprit, and leadership which is possessed by combat veterans of all ranks in the Army.

This agency, with the wholehearted assistance of our service schools and major commands, can do the job if given the priority this project demands.

Next, from this recommended Operations Research Office study and from other recognized works on these subjects, we must glean all pertinent facts, conclusions, and recommendations and use them as the basis for a realistic and profitable course of instruction for all leaders and potential leaders of all ranks and branches in the Army.

What must a leader know about the human factor in combat? I shall not attempt, in the limits of this article, to answer that question completely. But, among other things, he must learn how soldiers react to various combat stresses and what can be done to prevent or minimize adverse reactions. He must learn that men can actually fall asleep in the middle of an intense fire fight. He must be acquainted with the attitudes of thousands of World War II soldiers and junior leaders before, during, and after combat and how these attitudes were reflected in the accomplishments of their units.

Believe it or not, this knowledge is available.

The potential leader should know that thousands of Korean combat infantry veterans chose as the most significant common denominator of a good fellow squad member that "he contribute to unit motivation in such ways as shouting encouragement during a fire fight or by joking or singing when things looked dark."

The student must also learn the value of respect for the individual soldier and his dignity; that discipline in today's Army is based upon mutual confidence and respect between leader and subordinates and is not purely a manifestation of authority. He must learn the meaning and application of morale courage. He must learn the indices of changing morale and how to recognize them. He must be given the advantage of the thousands of actions already taken by imaginative and resourceful leaders in combat to improve morale and esprit and to provide motivation. These are only a few isolated facts that a future unit leader could employ to ensure the most effective training, orientation, and organization of his unit for combat and he should acquire this knowledge before he assumes his first command.

Such courses of instruction, to be interesting, must avoid the technical. It is not necessary for us to learn what mental or physical processes, glands, or brain cells cause a soldier to react in a certain manner to a particular stress, depressant, or stimulus—leave that to the scientists. We must start with the accepted facts that a soldier does react in such fashions and learn how to prevent or counteract unfavorable reactions and how to stimulate desired reactions. Such courses of instruction should make liberal use of the panel type of instruction, inviting veterans of all ranks—including both the leaders and the led—to participate in free discussions.

The final step is to ensure that im-

proved instruction in morale, esprit, and leadership is made available to all units for use in unit training in unit schools. Service schools should be charged with providing lesson plans or brochures to all field units.

Much of the petty criticism and resentment directed at the Army today—both privately and publicly—finds its source in former soldiers who served under one or more leaders who apparently lacked an understanding of the human factor. How much of this aftereffect of war could have been avoided had our leadership training and our general knowledge of and respect for the human factor been adequate? I believe we could have avoided the harmful effects of the Doolittle Board and other measures aimed at "democratizing" our Army. Sound leadership training of our present and potential officers and non-commissioned officers will be a major step toward restoring the prestige and authority of our junior leaders which is a sorely needed measure.

Esprit de Corps

A boost to the esprit de corps of Army units is a boost to the morale of each team member.

There is no need here to develop the value of esprit de corps to the building of an effective fighting unit. High esprit in a unit will often overcome the individual morale problems of its members. Esprit is nothing more than a manifestation of confidence of men in each other and in their leaders. The indices of high esprit are pride in the unit, its history, its achievements, and its outstanding members. Here is the real team spirit which is by no means peculiar to the Army or to any military organization.

In all wars, esprit has caused many units to do more than their share. And in these units have been individuals whose morale was impaired but who, nevertheless, did their share because of their loyalty

to the team. Unit pride among infantrymen has most frequently and lastingly centered itself in the regiment; among artillerymen, armored troops, and engineers in the battalion. The development of high esprit is a constant objective of the commanders of such units because it pays off in battle just as it pays off on the football field. To the individual soldier, the sense of belonging to such a team, enjoying the association and respect of its members, and sharing in its history-making achievements, is both motivation and morale stimulant.

Shortsighted Army policy over the years has prevented our attaining the optimum of morale and esprit in our combat units, first, by failing to preserve our famous fighting units and their traditions; second, by an impractical approach to the problems of combat rotation and replacement; and, third, by failing to provide the combat arms soldier with a home in the Army and a sense of belonging.

Seldom, if ever, at the outbreak of a war, have we known which of our units would become involved. Naturally, it fell to the lot of those units closest to the flame, or in the best state of preparedness, to strike the initial blow. Right from the start, the harried commanders of these units have had to face the problem of developing esprit and intense pride in the unit—usually among men who had just joined the unit to bring it to fighting strength. Losses among these units have been filled by individual strangers who, in many cases, have never heard of the unit before joining it. In battle there is little opportunity to inculcate these strangers with pride in the unit, its history, and its achievements.

Many of our famous fighting units—those with long histories of prideful achievement—have been inactivated for long periods of time between wars or during wars, or isolated in some inconspicuous assignment in the Zone of

Interior. It sometimes appears that misguided economy or administrative convenience has ruled our heads and our hearts.

The Army has belatedly recognized the harmful effects of individual rotation on both the soldier and on the combat unit he joins. It has recently developed the 4-man team replacement package and is striving toward unit replacement by platoons. There is still much more that the Army can do without prohibitive cost in manpower and dollars.

Every soldier, from his recruitment to his discharge, desires to be identified with a unit—and a famous one, if possible. The Army can and must provide the combat arms soldier with a home in the Army. The British Army has adhered to this principle of esprit under economic restrictions far more austere than ours. They have also adhered to the principle of maintaining their famous fighting units in active status through the centuries. Their units are steeped in tradition and battle honors and identified by distinctive dress, insignia, nicknames, colors, and mottos. All officers and other ranks of the combat arms are members of these units as long as they are in the British Army and their unit's history becomes a part of them just as they become a part of the unit. The examples of British unit esprit in battle need no recounting. I do not imply that American units have never developed unit esprit in battle. I simply point out that a British unit goes into battle with a ready-made esprit.

Here is what we can do to improve unit esprit and morale in our fighting units. First, the Army should activate and perpetuate as many as possible of the famous old fighting units of each of the combat arms, even at the expense of eliminating newer unit designations.

George Fielding Eliot points out that:

The strength of an army—its soul for

that matter—resides in its fighting units. The central objective to which all planning at the highest level should be directed is the production and preservation of these fighting units; the regiments and separate battalions of infantry, artillery, armored troops, and engineers upon whose prideful performance in the hour of peril the safety of the nation is staked.

We should not leave these units lying in mothballs or on the shelf as we have the famous 3d Infantry Regiment, *The Old Guard*, which has escorted live and dead dignitaries at our Nation's capital, while newer units with far less tradition have added battle streamers to their colors in Korea. Let us capitalize—as the British have done—on the traditions and color of these old units. An administrative problem to be sure, but esprit de corps will ring up the profits in combat.

Let us put combat rotation and replacement on a fair and realistic basis by holding the replacement package at the 4- or 6-man team, by extending the tour of duty in the combat zone, and by more frequent rotation of units into reserve.

We have already eliminated the "orphan of the storm"—that bewildered individual combat replacement who wanders homeless and friendless through our impersonal replacement pipeline. The 4- or 6-man replacement team is the best answer. Unit replacement by squad or larger unit will never fill the bill. First, losses in combat will disrupt any unit rotation procedure and adversely affect morale. What can you do with newly joined members of a unit due for rotation which will be fair to them and fair to others? Second, any commander will immediately leaven a newly arrived unit with combat veterans. This, too, will preclude smooth operation of the unit replacement program. Since the squad is the smallest tactical unit and most frequently the basis of patrol action, it, too, must include men with battle experience. It, therefore, follows that the 4-

or 6-man team is the largest which can be integrated into a fighting command without disturbing orderly rotation procedure and without requiring a redistribution of combat experienced personnel.

Rotation is a necessary evil. It provides the combat soldier with a horizon. It protects his morale against that feeling of inevitability which pervades the mind after a prolonged period of combat. This is the feeling that "sooner or later, I'm going to get it." However, we have gone overboard in our rotation policy to the extent that tactical efficiency of units has been impaired. The most practical answer is to increase the over-all period of duty in the combat zone and, at the same time, provide as frequent rotation of units into reserve as the situation will permit. We have not always done the latter at each echelon of command.

The Plan

It is within our present capabilities to give every combat arms soldier a permanent home in the Army—and one of which he can be proud. The plan I shall discuss in relation to the infantry applies equally to the other combat arms. Simply stated, it is this. Every combat arms soldier—officer and enlisted—should be permanently assigned to a unit which has both a home depot and an overseas, or "combat-ready" element.

For every infantry division and regiment overseas or scheduled for overseas movement, there should be a training division and regiment with the same numerical designations in the Zone of Interior. Soldiers should be assigned to these regiments in their 4- or 6-man teams after completing basic training. In the home depot of the regiment, along with unit training, they will be steeped in the traditions, history, ceremonies, and other martial color which is a part of their regiment. The home regiment will furnish replacement teams as required to

its overseas element. Thus, the combat replacement would travel with his teammates to a fighting unit of which he is already a member and in which he already has pride.

Upon return from combat, the veteran will rejoin his home unit, either in a training role, for processing, or for reassignment to a staff or branch immaterial job elsewhere. In all future troop assignments he will serve with his own regiment. He will always wear its insignia. These regiments will not draw personnel from one particular region of the country. Experiences of National Guard units in World War II revealed the effect of heavy battle losses from one locality. Rather, these regiments will be filled with a cross-section of the country's manpower, both geographically and qualitatively.

I recognize that such a plan is not foolproof. There will be occasions when unusually heavy losses by the overseas unit cannot be satisfied by its home depot. Therefore, it may be necessary to establish at least one independent training division at home to meet such emergencies and possibly to meet the requirements of independent units or newly formed units and task forces.

Motivation

American society has shirked its responsibility for providing proper motivation to the future soldier.

There is a fine but distinct line which separates the motivating factor from the morale stimulant. Motivation provides man with the will to do something he would not otherwise do or to do that thing with greater enthusiasm than he would otherwise do it. In battle, it is the force which makes him keep moving and—on occasion—to do more than his assigned duties demand. On the other hand, the morale stimulant simply makes adversity more bearable. The man who is strongly motivated has few morale prob-

lems. For example, the man who fights to avenge his brother's death at the hands of the enemy is far more immune to combat stresses and morale depressants than the man who lacks strong motivation.

It is well within the capabilities of the Army to provide morale stimuli to its soldiers—even in the battle area. The capabilities of the Army to provide motivation to the soldier who is about to enter battle are far more restricted. It is within the capabilities of American society and civilian agencies to stimulate the morale of the fighting soldier before and during combat. But more noteworthy is the fact that it is well within the capabilities of our social institutions to provide motivation to our fighting men before they enter battle and even before they enter the Army. In the exercise of this last capability, we Americans have failed.

It is indeed a lamentable commentary upon our American educational system, our news media, and particularly upon American parental guidance which General Omar Bradley, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expressed in the following words:

Despite the opportunities for free education that exist in these United States, too many young men come into the Army appallingly ill-informed on the issues and crises that warrant their service. American education has failed to give many young men an alert appreciation of their liberties and a consequent explanation of their obligations. We have taught our young people how to plunder our resources, how to get jobs, how to get rich. We have neglected to tell them that democracy is a 2-way street—that with its benefits comes the necessity for also giving service.

Is it not the mission of American education to prepare the child and adolescent to become a useful citizen in a democratic way of life with an awareness of his

privileges and his obligations? If so, American education has not accomplished that mission. In this generation, millions of young men found that the way of life for which they had supposedly been prepared, took them to battlefields all over the world. The Army did all it could in the brief time allowed to prepare them. Our educational institutions did not do their share in the preparation. I am pointing the finger at our educational institutions, our news media, and particularly at American parental guidance. In the foreseeable future, more millions of men and women will find themselves in the Armed Forces, perhaps not in battle, but preparing for battle. Our social institutions must accept their share of the preparation.

Our children—as soon as they are capable of absorbing such knowledge—must be taught the underlying basis of our country's foreign policy and its associated military policy. If the comic book technique is the most effective media, let us accept it—some of our churches already have. I do not propose that our schools and informational media glorify military service. However, I do propose that they treat it with the respect that it deserves and demands. A course in current affairs which treats with foreign and military policies, current defense activities, and the aims and activities of hostile governments should be required in all high schools and higher educational institutions.

Our annual defense appropriations are the greatest financial burden borne by the American public. Economy measures are constantly applied with public support to lessen that burden. And yet, a part of these appropriations are used by the Army to teach the new soldier "Why you are in the Army" and "Why the Army is in Korea." This teaching must be conducted in the already too-short time available for training the new soldier in his job. Furthermore, his reaction is most fre-

quently, "So what? I'm in the Army. Why tell me now?" Why should the Army, under a decreasing budget, foot the bill for society's failure?

I recommend that our new Department of Health, Education, and Welfare be charged with the task of bringing our educational institutions into line and assisting them to discharge their full responsibilities under a Democracy. I further recommend that the Army having the most to gain start the ball rolling by soliciting the aid of the other services, news media, the President, the Congress, and the churches in order to ensure the strongest possible unified support of this project.

With the natural American favoritism for the underdog and a natural militant resentment toward "our guys getting pushed around," our young people, if given the facts of the matter, will enter the military service already equipped with their basic motivation and orientation. And those who do not enter the military service will provide the military with a more unified, active, and co-operative support from the homefront.

The Army can no longer afford to pay for society's failure to provide the soldier with his basic motivation and orientation. But it was a natural development, in the face of society's failure, that the Army should undertake the basic orientation and motivation of the recruit. However, it has been established beyond question that the recruit—already in the Army and reconciled to the fact that he must train to fight—is primarily interested in how to get on with the job and how to survive while doing it. Army leaders bemoan the fact that too much of the average soldier's time is spent in the pipeline—which includes training—and that the time is too short during which he is available for gainful employment in the job for which he is trained. Yet we have been carried away by our Troop Information Program to the point where it detracts

needlessly from gainful training and employment. Precombat orientation and motivation of the soldier is dissipated by our effort to teach him too many nonessentials.

The Stouffer survey—conducted during World War II by the Army's own Troop Information and Education Division—arrived at the following conclusion based upon thousands of interviews and questionnaires:

... the American soldier [was] typically without deep personal commitment to a war which he nevertheless accepted as unavoidable. . . . in general, he gave little concern to the conflicting values underlying the military struggle. Although he showed a strong but tacit patriotism, this usually did not lead him in his thinking to subordinate his personal interests to the furtherance of ideal aims and values. The core of the attitude among combat men seemed to be that any talk that did not subordinate idealistic values and patriotism to the harsher realities of the combat situation was hypocritical and a person who expressed such ideas was a hypocrite.

S. L. A. Marshall, in an interview, stated that he personally conducted tests among groups of recruits to determine where their primary interests lay. He attempted to stimulate their interest by references to such subjects as the basic issues of the war, what benefits the soldier can obtain from the Army, and the coming USO shows. He concluded that never was there a single spark of interest in these matters.

But as soon as a sergeant walked in and set down a mortar or a machinegun, they immediately came to life, crowded around the weapon, and started asking questions. These men knew why they were in the Army and were interested in nothing but how to learn the job they were going to perform.

Marshall stated that he conducted these

tests to prove to senior officers that the emphasis in our orientation of the recruit was wrong and based upon a misconception of the average soldier's aims and interests. "But," he said, "these officers appeared unconvinced."

Has the Army paid any heed to these experts? Let us look at another report. In 1949, a committee appointed by the President examined the Army's Troop Information and Education Program in the field. The findings of this committee were unanimously laudatory. Here is a bit of supporting testimony from the committee's report to the President:

One of our staff reports, commenting on an exceptionally fine discussion group held by a young paratroop platoon leader, had this to say:

'It was obvious that this was an exceptional officer who had built up a close relationship with his men, many of whom were uneducated and not very alert. Nevertheless, it was a treat to see the way they stood up and discussed foreign trade (sic) with him. He showed an exceptional knack at eliciting comments from the men, coaxing them, wheedling them, ordering them, but in the end gaining a general agreement on the value of foreign aid (sic) and stimulating them to a continued interest in related topics.'

It was obvious that here was a young officer who was developing his capacities for leadership through his participation in the Information and Education Program.

Let me say first, that any officer who can order the interest of his men is indeed exceptional. And without intent to take unfair advantage of what may be an editor's oversight, I will wager that many of these men knew not, nor cared, whether they were discussing foreign trade or foreign aid. The "coaxing, wheedling, and ordering" is proof of that. But what is more important, this report included

hearty indorsements of the program by many senior commanders but not one opinion of a soldier subjected to the program.

A troop information program which runs the gamut from "Tibet, the Roof of the World" to "Customs and Traditions of the Turkish Navy" is not a program which develops motivation or in any way prepares the soldier for battle. War is a pretty grim business and men preparing for war are aware of that. They know that their principal job will be to kill and destroy. Our training mission is to teach them to do this job efficiently and quickly and to survive while doing it. Proper motivation and high morale will ease their task and the training task. They come to us with potentially strong motivating forces such as self-pride, the desire for approbation, pride in their country, desire to win, a willingness to go "all-out" to keep from letting the rest of the team down. These are the same forces that have driven them since childhood and have continued to drive them through high school and college football. These are the motivating forces which our troop information programs and our basic and unit training programs must seek to develop.

The principal bulwark of fighting morale is confidence—confidence of the soldier in himself, in his teammates, in his leaders, in his own weapon and those weapons which support him. Only by intense and concentrated training and association can this confidence be developed to the desired degree that will sustain the soldier in combat. It is in the interest of the quality of the finished soldier, rather than in the interest of economy, that we should seek to eliminate all deviations from this objective.

I subscribe to the contention of S. L. A. Marshall who believes that in the recruit's earliest training, we must give him the facts of life—give him an understanding of the battlefield, more realistic training. Cut out the lectures on na-

tional policy and strategy, tactics and logistics of high command. Give him "the simple details of common experience on the battlefield. Substitute reality for romance." The soldier must be given some idea of the loneliness, the fears, the stresses and morale depressants he will encounter in combat and he must be taught how to counteract and minimize them; in this way they will come as no surprise and he will be better able to control them.

In short, the Army must eliminate from its precombat training and orientation programs the "long hair" discussions, the "flag-waving," and the other nonessentials which detract from our principal objective of ensuring the battle-readiness of the individual and the team.

External Relations

Now, more than ever, we need a whole-some relationship between the Army, the public, the Congress, and the press. Never in history has any organization been subjected to such a volume of day-to-day critical analysis as our Army. Never has any organization had so many living former members who, by virtue of their brief membership, have qualified themselves as experts in the policies and affairs of that organization. Never has one organization influenced the lives of so many in a way which has resulted in sacrifice and deprivation. Furthermore, no single organization has ever before absorbed more of the tax dollar. Lastly, never in history has criticism been so one-sided. Is it any wonder, therefore, that the Army's public relations program has long been a defensive program? Have the critics ever stopped to consider the impact of their blasts on morale in our Armed Forces—even among troops in combat? Have they ever considered that the morale of the leaders they attack can influence by contagion the morale of the troops these leaders command?

A servant—who is permitted no right

to retaliate—can be publicly browbeaten for a limited time, beyond which the results can be nothing but dire. Our military leaders are public servants who must accept criticism from Congress and the press but who cannot criticize in return. Here is what one civilian official thinks about this unfortunate condition and its effects. Former Assistant Secretary of the Army, James P. Mitchell writes:

Nothing affects the morale of our soldiers more than a feeling that the Army and the uniform are not held in esteem by the citizenry. Any action by any of us that leads to that conclusion strikes at morale and thus at efficiency. Such an approach should not inhibit healthy criticism which, in a democracy is natural, expected, and necessary. However, there is a very definite line between healthy, intelligent criticism, and castigation of those who, for want of a better term, are called 'the brass.'

As a result of the present unwholesome relationship between the Army, the Congress, and the press, Army prestige, discipline, and combat morale have suffered.

The very nature of Army organization, its mission and activities, the source of its support, dictate Army policy as one of receptiveness to criticism. Our lawmakers—as the spokesmen of the public—possess the greatest authority to criticize. Within the Army, we try to adhere to a policy of criticizing subordinates in private. Obviously, criticizing a leader in the presence of others—including his subordinates—not only shows disrespect for the individual, but also affects adversely his morale and that of his subordinates. Public criticism of our military leaders and their activities by Congress and the press cannot help but create food for thought and conversation throughout the ranks of our Armed Forces. It cannot help but weaken morale as well as the very structure of military discipline which is

based upon mutual respect and confidence between soldier and commander.

Oftentimes such criticism is founded upon misinformation, insufficient information, or no information. It need not be directed at a particular leader to have an ill effect. For example, a public reference to "the plush living enjoyed by officers in the Tokyo area" does not help the morale of the tired and dirty rifleman in his Korean foxhole. Yet, such utterances are made without thought of their full effect and often without respect for the facts. I am certain that many such statements would never be made if the spokesman gave due consideration to the over-all effect.

I know of no other bodies wherein we can find men who are more conscientious or more dedicated to the welfare of our Nation than in our Congress, among the press, and in the officer corps of our military services. Surely here is the basis for a mutual and healthy respect which is all that is needed to iron out differences of opinion in an atmosphere of friendly and inconspicuous co-operation. I do not mean to propose that Congressmen or the press be gagged or that these three agencies conduct all of their liaison under a cloak of secrecy.

I only suggest that certain matters—which can have a far-reaching and harmful effect upon morale and discipline or upon the prestige of a military service—be discussed on a "leader-to-leader" basis toward a constructive solution. Furthermore, this relationship, to be practical, must be bound by a written code of ethics.

You may ask, "Who must make the first move toward establishing this relationship?" The answer is, *he who possesses the most moral courage*. Obviously, the Army has the greatest need for such a relationship and—if no one else makes the first move—we in the Army must muster the moral courage to make it. Such a relationship may occasionally require a

Congressman to subordinate political aspirations for the good of national security. It may frequently require a columnist or correspondent to "tone down" an exciting story by presenting both sides of the issue. It may even, on occasion, require a military leader to jeopardize his future by standing his ground in the face of opposition from the Congress or the press. But when I look at the caliber and integrity of our top military leaders, our leaders in Congress and in the world of journalism, it is inconceivable to me that such a relationship cannot be established. This relationship with the spokesmen of the public and the informers of the public is essential if we are to expect unified public support of our military ventures, an acceptance by the public of its obligations, and a healthy respect for the military services.

It is time for the Army's public relations program to shift from the defensive to an aggressive selling campaign.

Public apathy and resentment toward the military and its activities is largely due to the lack of a sound, imaginative, and aggressive public relations program in the Army. The recent report of Admiral Womble's committee stated in part:

There is ample evidence of a lack of understanding on the part of the people concerning the necessity for implementing our present national military policy. It appears that a portion of this unfavorable attitude stems from the recent conduct of hostilities in Korea. Certainly these hostilities were conducted without the degree of public support afforded to two preceding worldwide conflicts.

The morale of the fighting soldier demands that his trials and sacrifices be recognized and appreciated. The esprit of the Army demands unified public support. Public apathy or resentment cannot only lower morale in the combat zone, but it can also influence military planning and

thereby determine the course of a war.

I have already criticized Congress and the press for their share in the responsibility for this condition. The Army also deserves its share of the criticism. Our Army public relations program must leave its defensive positions and enter upon a sound and aggressive educational campaign designed to present timely and complete "facts of life" to the public and to enlist its unified support of military programs and of individual units.

We must not depend so heavily on the press and public officialdom to "sell our product" and to unite the public behind our policies and programs. The Army draws capable men from every walk of life. Certainly this provides the capability of establishing and maintaining a promotion and merchandizing program equal to or better than that of any business or industry in the Nation. We cannot admit that our product is harder to sell when to date we have done little more than attempt to defend that product. It is time we directed our sales effort at the public which elects the Congress instead of devoting our major selling effort to the Congress.

Let us go to work on the public. If they are apathetic, it is our fault. A soldier in a combat unit in Korea wrote to his hometown explaining that his platoon was trying to help an orphanage. The entire town pitched in enthusiastically to help in this project, and it was not a one-time proposition. A lasting and friendly liaison was established between

a small American town and a small fighting unit in Korea. There are hundreds of similar instances from the Korean conflict alone. Can we justly accuse such a public of apathy? If one soldier can stir up such unified local public support, what could the Army do if it tried? Why not approach our cities and towns and invite them to "adopt" overseas units as some have already done?

The American soldier, by nature, is a champion of the underprivileged. Even in the combat zone he will give his pay and his spare time to a worthy cause. The public which produced this soldier has the same heart and soul. Fraternal, religious, and business organizations would cheerfully handle the administrative burdens of such a project. Here, I believe, is one suggestion which would start the ball rolling toward unified public support, higher combat morale, and a warmer international relationship and one which might also take some of the burden of foreign aid and rehabilitation off the Army and other Government agencies.

Needless to say, I have spoken for myself. Many of the ideas expressed herein are by no means original. Many of the issues which I have treated are somewhat sensitive and controversial. But let me say that my morale has been partially sustained by the fact that never—during my career in the Army—have I been restrained from expressing my opinion on any controversial issue within the limits imposed by good taste and security classification.

It is of the utmost importance that everything possible be done to create an atmosphere conducive to the maintenance of a career military service, clothed in dignity and honor, which will be attractive to the highest type of young American. Nothing is more detrimental to the service than a feeling among its personnel that they are held in low esteem by their fellow citizens. Any action which fosters such a conclusion strikes at the tap roots of our security.

Secretary of the Army Robert T. Stevens

CHRISTIANITY and COMMUNISM

Major S. J. Watson, *Royal Engineers*
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In today's world of risks and alarms we must, and we will, remain strong and seek to make our good friends strong in all those scientific, material, and military means that ensure or enhance our safety, and discourage aggression against us or against our friends. But there is no true and lasting cure for world tensions in guns and bombs.
—President Dwight D. Eisenhower.

The views expressed in this article are the author's and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army, the Command and General Staff College, or the British War Office.—The Editor.

THIS subject is not confined to a military theme; for modern war—being total war—is not confined to military persons. Today, servicemen in uniform merely constitute an advanced echelon of the national war effort, increasingly dependent, not only upon the material support and efficiency of civilians who furnish their fighting equipment, but also upon the moral support and encouragement of relatives at home who are now in turn the target of hostile aircraft and guided missiles. The *mot* of the famous French Premier, Georges Clemenceau, that “war is too serious a matter to be left to soldiers” has lost none of its validity during the last 35 years; for the complex mechanization of warfare and the advent of weapons of mass destruction have enhanced, rather than diminished, the need for the vital human qualities of courage and fighting determination on the part of each individual, whatever his task or situation.

Furthermore, nearly all the free nations of the world have now realized Oliver Wendell Holmes’ ideal of:

*The freeman, casting with unpurchased hand,
The vote that shakes the turret of the land.*

But democracy postulates the individual responsibility of every single citizen not only to vote with conviction in internal affairs, but with equal conviction to meet any external challenge; and to do this effectively he must be like Oliver Cromwell’s “plain russet-coated captain that knows what he fights for and loves what he knows.”

Faced today with the challenge of Soviet aggression, the object of the free nations of the world is the containment of this aggression by building up equilibrium between the Eastern and Western blocs: conversely the Soviet object is to disperse the Western effort by instigating troubles in every part of the world, and by undermining individual wills by incessant and intensive propaganda. As long ago as 1860, Lord Palmerston—the great British Prime Minister—told the House of Commons:

It has always been the policy and practice of the Russian Government to expand its frontiers as rapidly as the apathy or timidity of neighboring states would permit, but usually to halt and frequently to recoil when confronted by determined opposition.

Today, there are few signs of timidity in the Western bloc: it was not by timidity that Major General William F. Dean won the Medal of Honor and Lieutenant Colonel Carne won the Victoria Cross in Korea. Nor did Brigadier General de Castries display any timidity in his epic defense of Dien Bien Phu. But there is now a very real danger—since fighting has ceased in Korea and Indochina and British security forces have consolidated their gains against the Communist bandits in Malaya—that the West may succumb to the even more insidious evil of apathy.

It is, therefore, appropriate to recollect that the Soviet challenge contains two distinct features: first, the Soviet armed strength and, second, the Communist ideology. Each must be met with a different technique; for, although armed strength can be countered by superior armed strength, an ideology can be overcome only by a superior ideology. What ideology has the West to offer? The one that is most dynamic and universal is, without doubt, the ideology of Christianity; and, just as soldiers when setting their maps in the field frequently look for a church to assist their orientation, so Christians can equally look to the Church for guidance when in perplexity.

The Church's directions are both clear and explicit. The Archbishop of York has stated that "of all the foes which today oppose the Christian Church, communism

proposed to pursue this subject by examining three vital questions:

1. What is communism?
2. Is communism compatible with Christianity?
3. What is the Christian answer to communism?

What Is Communism?

The object is to suggest a line of thought, rather than to present a "school solution" to these problems; and this should provide an additional incentive for each individual to solve them for himself.

There is an easily remembered quatrain which runs as follows:

*What is a Communist? He who has
yearnings
For equal division of unequal earnings:
Who always, on every occasion, is willing
To hand you his penny, and pocket your
shilling.*

This is, of course, an oversimplification; but it does recall to mind that communism is essentially an economic theory, based on the supposition that all the injustices of human society are caused by the existence of property. The possession of property by persons is called capitalism; the possession of territories by nations is called imperialism. The people who own no property at all—if this is in-

We of the Christian faith have a great and serious responsibility to the free world today. The ideology of Christianity is our strongest and most convincing answer to the opposing ideology of world communism

is by far the most dangerous." And the Papal Encyclical *Divini Redemptoris* proclaims: "We are witnessing a struggle, cold-blooded in purpose and mapped out to the last detail, between man and 'all that is called God.' Communism is by nature antireligious." It is accordingly

deed possible—are called the proletariat; and the avowed object of communism is to bring about a revolution resulting in what Lenin called the "dictatorship of the proletariat," when all property shall be taken from individuals and vested in the community—hence communism.

The international objective has been defined by Stalin: "to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat in one country, using it as a base for the overthrow of imperialism in all countries." This reveals two important features:

1. That the Soviet Union, where the dictatorship of the proletariat has been consolidated, has taken it upon herself to be the instrument for establishing communism in all other countries.

2. That the "overthrow of imperialism" implies the backing of Communist policy throughout the world by military power.

Thus, communism has ceased to be just an economic theory, but has become a dynamic system of worldwide change—not by gradual evolution, but by violent revolution consolidated by all the tyranny of a totalitarian state.

Spiritual Tyranny

Communism is something more than a social or political tyranny, it is also a spiritual tyranny. The Communists allege that material matter is all that exists, and so-called spiritual things—such as morals, ideals, or religion—are merely the reflection in the human brain of material economic conditions. Every human thought and deed is held to be the inevitable result of the conflict, or contradiction, or dialectic—whichever one likes to call it—between the people with ma-

terial possessions and those without them. And, because the development of this conflict is inevitable, it follows that events must always mold mankind and that mankind can never mold events. All that the Communist individual must do is to understand thoroughly the dialectical process, so that he can correctly foresee the next stage in the conflict.

Every social empiricism is superficially attractive; and many people, without thinking very deeply, may, no doubt, sympathize with Pooh Bah in Gilbert and Sullivan's comic opera, "The Mikado," when he proclaims:

*If I were Fortune (which I'm not),
B would enjoy A's happy lot,
And A would die in misery—
That is assuming I am B!*

But no real progress is achieved by merely transferring all grievances, real or imagined, from one section of the population to another. In any case, the possession of property does not make an individual morally better or morally worse, but merely affords him the opportunity to use his property in the practice of either good or evil.

Dignity

In the words of the British philosopher, Aldous Huxley, "real progress is progress in charity": and by this is meant the development of the innate knowledge of good and evil to the ideal state where everyone will automatically do what is right and refrain from doing what is wrong. The evolution of this ideal state will obviously take considerable time: but it is a goal that clearly reflects the Christian attitude based on the dignity of individuals who are all regarded as the children of God "made in His image," and on the continuous process of raising up the fallen and helping the unfortunate. Communism, on the other hand, requires quick material results, and purposes to

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achieve them by pillage and destruction. Then, if the Communists fail to alleviate discontent, they simply eliminate the discontented. Man is a mere tool of the totalitarian state; for, although the Communists extol the virtues of collective society, they treat as robots the human beings who form it.

From time to time in the history of Christianity there have emerged small groups of devout persons who have lived together and "had all things common": they appeared among the earliest Christian converts in Jerusalem, and were founders of monastic communities during the Middle Ages. It is important to differentiate between this Christian type of communism and the Marxian communism practiced behind the Iron Curtain today. The former was essentially a voluntary way of living chosen by persons who subscribed to Christian ethics and beliefs. The latter is a compulsory system enforced, politically and intellectually, by an unethical materialistic tyranny. Christians, however they choose to organize their lives, proclaim and worship "the God of Truth and Love." In Marxian communism there is no love, there is no truth, and there is no God.

No God

As has been shown, the Marxian Communists attribute everything to men's economic struggle for material possessions. Religion, they say, is simply a device of the Capitalists for treading down the proletariat—for keeping "the rich man in his castle, the poor man at his gate." Religion is, therefore, just a convenient daydream for those who are economically destitute; and the clergy, in league with the Capitalists, think up imaginary joys in an imaginary world-to-come so as to divert peoples' attention from the real injustices of this world, and tell them in the words of a song often sung at Communists meetings:

*Don't dismay, watch and pray, live on hay:
You'll eat pie, in the sky, when you die.*

Lenin described religion as "a kind of spiritual vodka in which the slaves of capital drown their human shape and their claims to any decent human life."

Furthermore, the Communists aver that man's idea of God arises simply from his own sense of inadequacy: as Karl Marx wrote in *Das Kapital*: "the omnipotence of God is nothing but the fantastic reflection of the powerlessness of men before nature, and of the economic relations created by themselves." Thus, they delude themselves that man is self-sufficient. And the Communist man, by his comprehension of the process of dialectical development, can always know what is going to happen next: so his need for God has disappeared.

No Truth

Christians believe truth to be absolute and permanent. What God has revealed to be right is right for all time. However, without God, right and wrong—on which all morality is founded—are merely passing expedients. Under the heading "Morality" in the current *Soviet Philosophical Dictionary* is written:

With changes in the form of social structure, morality also changes. From the point of view of Communist morality, 'moral' is only that which facilitates the destruction of the Old World, and which strengthens the new Communist regime.

Similarly, the late President Kalinin of the Soviet Union categorically stated in a speech to the 14th Congress of the Russian Communist Party that "the idea that truth remains the truth is admissible in a philosophical club, but in the Party the decisions of the Congress are obligatory also upon those who doubt the correctness of a decision." Thus, there is no scope for individual morality based upon ultimate truth, either in deed or in thought.

Every Marxian Communist is bound—body and soul—to the decisions of the Party.

No Love

Love in its widest and most enduring sense is inseparably part of Christianity. Christians are enjoined by St. John: "Beloved, let us love one another: for love is of God." And Jesus Christ exhorted his disciples to love even their enemies. What now do the apostles of communism preach? To them love, like religion, is merely a capitalistic device to divert attention from economic frustrations. What the true Communist must learn to do is not to love—but to hate.

A recent edition of the official Soviet publication, *Party Life*, states that "Marxist-Leninist ideology must instill a hatred of the capitalist order." And the current Soviet textbook, *Pedagogy*, issued for teachers of children under 7 years old, states that:

The pupils of the Soviet schools must realize that the feeling of Soviet patriotism is saturated with irreconcilable hatred toward the enemies of Soviet society. Hatred gives birth to revolutionary vigilance, and creates a feeling of irreconcilability toward the class enemy.

Peace Congress

An even more striking example of this attitude occurred when in November 1950, a Communist Peace Congress was organized at Sheffield, England, and the delegation from Czechoslovakia set out with the intention of presenting to each delegate an illuminated poem containing the passage:

Wherever the American GI sets foot he will be murdered, poisoned, set aflame, beaten, starved, baked as in Hell; and this will happen in France, in Greece, in Bulgaria, in China, in fact everywhere.

This is far removed from the Christian concept of brotherly love, and indeed is

a somewhat unusual sentiment for a Peace Congress, but it shows how Marxian communism fosters not love but hatred—a hatred so intense as to distort and embitter all personal and international relations.

In summary, the Marxian Communists derive their attitude to Christianity from Lenin's famous declaration of policy:

The fight against religion, the opium of the people, occupies an important position among the tasks of the cultural revolution. The fight must be carried on persistently and systematically. The proletarian power must withdraw all state support from the Church, and abolish the influence exercised by the Church on the system of education and training organized by the state; it must ruthlessly suppress the counterrevolutionary activities of ecclesiastical organizations. The proletarian power acknowledges freedom of conscience, but at the same time uses all means at its disposal to conduct antireligious propaganda; it abolishes the privileged position of the established Church, and reforms the entire educational system on the basis of the scientific materialist conception of the world.

The foregoing is the official Party Line; and as recently as July 1954, the Malenkov regime launched a renewed drive in the Soviet Union against religion, describing it in a *Pravda* editorial as "a clinging, harmful remnant of capitalism" and urged all Party organs to counter it with intensive "scientific and atheistic propaganda."

What then is the Christian standpoint? This has recently been clearly defined by the American Bishop, G. Bromley Oxnam, who, on 15 August 1954, told the Assembly of the Council of Churches:

The respect for personality that emerges from the fact that God loves us, and this is our Father's world, means that we reject all forms of tyranny. We repudiate

the assumption that the state has the right to determine the philosophy to which every individual who lives within the state must give assent, that the state has the right and duty to mobilize every impact upon the mind. We reject once and for all those theories that command us to conform or die, and that arrogantly affirm that dissent is treason and deviation is disloyalty.

It is, therefore, evident that Christians cannot possibly make any compromise with Marxian communism: they cannot serve God and mammon.

The Problem

The immediate task of Christians is to study the various types of people who are attracted by communism. Broadly speaking, it appeals chiefly to three main categories: first, the idealists; second, the genuine proletarians or underdogs; and, third, the placeseekers.

To attract the idealists, the Communists select some genuine grievance or injustice which they proceed to publicize and magnify: they blame it entirely on the existing social order, and claim that they alone know how to redress it. Idealists are invariably emotional, often impractical, and generally sincerely unselfish, and they frequently lend to the Communist movement a spurious semblance of respectability. Consequently, the Communists do not hesitate to exploit them, whether they are old folks exhausted by a lifetime of welfare work, or middle-aged intellectuals striving for the social and political advancement of their race and nation, or young servicemen appalled by some horror of war which many are bound to experience on active service. And so cunningly do the Communists appeal to the ideals and emotions—especially of young people with irrational consciences—that it is not too broad a generalization to say that anyone, who, at the age of 20, is not susceptible to some

foible of communism, probably has no heart—although the person who is still attracted to communism at the age of 25 certainly has no head.

To appeal to the underdogs, the Communists again exploit some well-founded grievance. There are always misfits who need little persuading that their situation is due, not to their own shortcomings, but to the iniquities of the existing social order, and who are eager to destroy for sheer wanton destruction's sake. It is also hard for genuine unfortunates not to be attracted by promises of plenty under a Communist regime. And many of them, out of reach of the Church, embrace communism as a religion as much as a political system. It is these underdogs that the Communists recruit to provide the rank and file and cannon fodder of revolution.

Then there are the placeseekers who join the Communist movement with their eyes wide open to all its shortcomings, simply in order to gain for themselves political power or material prosperity. They are selfish, unscrupulous, cynical, and usually quite merciless. They come from all walks of life, and are sometimes to be found even within the Church itself.

The Answer

How, then, should Christians approach these types attracted to communism? From the outset, they must take the initiative. The obvious sign that they have not done so in the past is the melancholy fact that the Communists pose effectively as the only progressive political party, calling everyone else reactionaries and even pretending that their drive against Christianity is a progressive act, when, in fact, Marxian communism is the most reactionary tyranny of all. Christians must stop being negatively apologetic about their faith. They must make their reputation by what they are, rather than by what they are not. Furthermore, people should not become Christians just to op-

pose communism or any other totalitarianism: they should be Christians because it is only as Christians that they can do God's will.

Humility is a Christian virtue, but false modesty is more harmful than good. After all, Christians have much in which to take pride. Their faith spread around the world without having to be backed by the military threat of 3,200,000 men under arms; and, best of all, Christianity alone can solve the age-old problem of how to stop people in power from abusing their power, simply by the Christian's individual accountability to God, who is above and beyond any social, political, or economic system on earth.

Finally, having regained the initiative, Christians must set a practical example, not by superficial religious formalities but by true Christian living. If Christians really fulfilled their duties and obligations, there would be far fewer grievances and injustices to disturb the idealists and be exploited by the Communists, and *ipso facto* there would be far fewer underdogs for the Communists to seduce. And as the followers of the Party decrease or fall away, so is communism bound to lose its appeal to the placeseekers who must, of necessity, seek the winning side; and even these misguided people may come to learn from the Christian example that power and material prosperity do not, in themselves, contain the secret of true happiness.

We who profess and call ourselves Christians have a great responsibility in

the world today. The free nations are faced with a challenge to all that they hold most dear, and already are engaged in a struggle such as William H. Seward called "an irrepressible conflict between opposing and enduring forces." The present cold war is now primarily a war of ideologies: we Christians must, therefore, seek the forefront of the battle. We must *care*, we must *share*, and we must *dare*. We must care for all our fellow human beings as the children of God "made in His image"; we must share with them the enduring strength and consolation of the fellowship of the Holy Spirit; and we must dare to stand up for what we know to be right, wherever we are and whatever we are doing—where we live, where we work, or where we fight.

Finally, let us pray, in the words of George Washington's immortal petition, that we may all be disposed:

To do justice, to love mercy, and to demean ourselves with that charity, humility, and pacific temper of mind which were the characteristics of the Divine Author of our blessed religion, and without a humble imitation of whose example in these things, we can never hope to be a happy nation.

Then, if we can do this, we shall no longer be apathetic. We shall know what we fight for and love what we know. And, above all, we shall *live* the Christian answer to Marxian communism—and that is the most convincing answer we can give.

MOVING?

If you are moving, please notify the MILITARY REVIEW, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, of your change of address. Be sure to include your name, old address, and new address.

THE ARMY

AS AN INSTRUMENT OF DEMOCRACY

Lieutenant Colonel Coleman W. Thacher, *Artillery*
Instructor, Command and General Staff College

The views expressed in this article are the author's and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Command and General Staff College.—The Editor.

THE current conflict between the free world and communism can continue indefinitely without a full-scale World War III. In fact, our current defense policy—based on retaliation with mass destruction weapons—will tend to make total war improbable, even though the risk of conflict remains with us. In such a world, the Army is no longer a force that can be kept *solely* for the purpose of fighting wars, as has been done in the past. The Army has a greater, more complex mission based upon political and economic considerations, in addition to the military requirements. The Army is an instrument of American democracy. It represents landpower as an essential element of our national strength. The Army has become just as characteristic a part of the American way of life as the other elements of our national power. Like them, its greatest importance is to be realized in the political and economic fields as contrasted to its purely military role.

Part of our readiness in meeting the challenge of communism is to understand clearly the purpose of Army strength. In

accounting for a sizable portion of the national tax income, the Army makes an immeasurable contribution to the security and well-being of the country and is too often overshadowed by undue emphasis on the warmaking capability. We can no longer assume that war is inevitable and assign this as the reason for supporting an Army. It is unfavorable to both the national and the Army interests because it forces the Army to guide its activity toward some unpredictable war of the future losing sight of the advantages which can be gained by viewing the Army as a pillar of national strength. For the foreseeable future, we are faced with maintaining a larger Army than we—or any other self-governing people—have ever had before, except in time of war; this requires a critical evaluation of the more productive, more complex, and little understood part of the Army mission—the cold war mission. Let us clear the air as to what the Army does in the cold war.

Economic Aspect

Our own security and the well-being of the free world depends in part upon our maintaining the integrity of widespread raw material and trading areas. Such a friendly atmosphere for trade must be protected against the creeping restraint of Communist domination because our strength for continued existence in the

The Army has become as characteristically a part of the American way of life as the other major elements of our national power. Like these, its greatest value can be realized in the political and economic fields

free world lies in our tremendous commercial and industrial activity.

We have observed both in Europe and Asia how superior sea and airpower alone cannot ensure this economic freedom of action. We control the air and sea adjacent to the mainland of China and we have no free access to their vast commercial areas or to their raw material. We see the natural trading area of Germany stopped to the east by the barrier of satellite states. Japan's production capacities have run against stifled markets. We need the Army on the land in a manner similar to that once expressed by Alexander Hamilton for the Navy, "trade supports naval power and naval power supports trade."

In addition, there remains the fact that the Army uses a sizable portion of the national industrial production and employs a fair amount of the available manpower. If the present national objective of creating massive retaliatory power so as to make "hot war" improbable is attained, we must find new and effective ways for tying our Army to economic progress during an indefinite cold war.

Army personnel today represent all that is American in every part of the world. Their responsibilities cover the entire range of power factors including politics and economics. In addition to the military responsibilities, Army activities include governing vast areas of the globe and assisting other nations to maintain their way of life. This encompasses the entire scope of our national and foreign policies.

Lieutenant Colonel Coleman W. Thacher served as an artillery officer with the 26th Infantry Division in the European theater during World War II. He was assigned to the Command and General Staff College as a student in 1948, and was graduated from the Regular Course the following year. Following his graduation from the Army War College in 1951, he was again assigned to Fort Leavenworth, where he is presently serving as an instructor at the Command and General Staff College.

Our own Army is now assisting to provide the background of strength once accomplished by the armies of our friends. As such it has become a basis of authority on which our international political activity can be conducted. The historian, H. G. Brownson, has written:

The frontier of successful diplomacy, both political and economic, is ever circumscribed by the frontier of naval policy . . . the gestures of international statesmen are meaningless, without the support of a naval establishment adequate to give them meaning.

A similar political function is inherent in the Army mission.

It is now apparent that the real foundation of military power in the Western World is dependent upon the total military potential of the United States. Contrary to any dreams that we may have, we cannot, and will not, repeat the experience of 1920—the withdrawal of our land forces from Europe. We withdrew then partly because at that time it appeared that European military strength, actual or potential, was sufficient to maintain a balance of international markets to free trade and commerce. Washington in his Farewell Address (1796) pointed out that, "Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation" and that our "detached and distant situation invites us to pursue a different course from Europe." However, policies do change. Modern world conditions have erased the "detached and distant situation" leaving the United States with worldwide responsibilities. Our national interests of security and well-being are now best served by a change in course—joining and supporting the United Nations. To withdraw from Europe today would give the game to the Soviet Union and could result in ruin for the United States, both politically and economically. Consequently, we can look forward to our

Army being represented throughout the free world so long as we expect to retain the present position of democratic leadership. Alfred T. Mahan's statement in *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History* that the "continuance of prosperity at home depends primarily upon maintaining power abroad," is still valid. The Army is now as much a part of that power as any other element that constitutes national strength.

National Well-being

The Navy has always been associated closely with the national well-being. In the early days of this country, President Washington said, "To an active external commerce, the protection of a naval force is indispensable." Alfred T. Mahan also made an immeasurable contribution to the Navy far beyond providing a new theory of naval strategy. He evolved a reason for existence for the Navy, interwoven securely with the power and prosperity of the country. His basic hypothesis was that seapower is vital to national growth, prosperity, and security.

The necessity of a navy, in the restricted sense of the word, springs from the existence of a peaceful shipping, and disappears with it, except in the case of a nation which has aggressive tendencies, and keeps the navy as a branch of the military establishment. . . .

Today, there is a well-established consciousness in the public mind—as well as that of the Navy—that this concept is still valid and that seapower is the key to greatness in the modern world—the keystone to global strategy and national defense. This approach is an effective and healthy one because in it, the citizen, who is providing the personnel and the means, can understand that his own way of life is directly affected. Knowing that our industry imports and consumes nearly one-half of the raw materials produced in

the free world, he may understand clearly the close tie existing between himself, his daily life, and the existence of naval strength.

The Air Force in its short existence has enjoyed a similarly favorable position in the understanding of the citizens who support it. Probably it is not completely accurate to say that the Air Force is the Navy of the Air; but substitute airplanes for sealanes and the underlying concept is very much the same. Air Chief of Staff, General Nathan F. Twining, recently expressed the mission of the Air Force by saying that "the main job is to prevent war"—this is a realistic concept wherein the political and economic factors are allowed to have full play.

We should not underestimate the great advantage which comes to both the Air Force and the Navy by their constant emphasis on the role as instruments of democracy, and their intimate relationship to the prosperity and well-being of the people themselves. These services are brought closer to the individual interests of the people through the understanding that they make a direct contribution to the American way of life. Both are maintained not only for defense but to provide a background of authority for free world commerce and free political activity. The latter role is always heavily weighted in everything they say or do.

Soviet Approach

The Soviet Union holds her prominent position in the world today largely by reason of her landpower as contrasted to air or seapower. The Soviet Army has been likened to one leg of a 3-legged stool—the other two being the *MVD* and the Politburo. As it is widely deployed throughout the Soviet Union and the satellite countries, it ensures maximum effect in its role as a pillar of the central government in Moscow. Its presence provides the background of authority for the

political and economic dealings of the Soviet Union. It is thereby an essential element of Soviet power and strength—independent of how great or small the outside threat may be.

Stalin's "Three Distinctive Traits of the Red Army," delivered in Moscow on the tenth anniversary of the Soviet Army in 1928, relates the "source of the strength and power of the Red Army," and how it is radically distinguished from all other armies of the world. Stalin says:

The first and basic trait of our Red Army is the fact that it is the Army for the liberation of the workers and peasants . . . in other countries between the army and the people there is a barrier that separates the army from the people. Our people and the Army have one aim and are one family.

As with all armies there is small doubt that the warmaking capability is a real one with the Soviet Army. However, the emphasis is placed on the cold war function to show the Soviet people that their own security and well-being, whatever it may be, is tightly interwoven with the existence of a powerful and adequate Soviet Army. There is no separation of the Army from the people in the Soviet Union; the Party Line is: what is good for the one is also good for the other.

The Keystone

Landpower is, in part, the keystone of both air and naval power. Mobility—which landpower has now attained—can seriously threaten the land bases without which naval and airpower find it difficult to exist. Admittedly the base which is lost can be atomized by the Navy or Air Force to deny it to the enemy, but this is not a satisfactory solution. The mere fact that the base is open to our interests makes possible a flow of goods and services so essential to free economic activity. The denying of the base to the enemy cuts off

this vital interest instead of advancing it, while by contrast the presence of army forces on land can ensure our continued political and economic activity.

Dollar Basis

Although the sea remains a main highway for world trade, the markets and raw materials to which these highways lead are equally important to all democratic nations. The dollar is now the basis for trade in the free world sphere of influence and it is essential that it continue to be so. If the ruble is ever allowed to assume this importance, we will find ourselves in a restricted world where neither freedom nor our civilization can exist. In this respect, continued economic progress and with it our security is measured in part by the ability of the non-Communist world to exchange goods and services with one another. The Army contributes to such progress by its presence wherever free trade areas are threatened by Communist domination.

Our history shows that we have always kept an Army primarily for the purpose of fighting wars. We have clung persistently to the "minuteman" concept of national defense wherein the Nation springs to arms with the threat of conflict. The American way has been to maintain a small Army except when fighting a war. This concept has proved effective in the past, but we can no longer get by with a small Army. In a speech in Baltimore in September 1952, President Eisenhower said:

In time of peace we have always cut the Military Establishment to the bone. In time of war we have said, "Let the professional soldier take care of it." This has been bad enough in the past. In today's world of continuing tensions it is intolerable.

It is certainly clear that the cold war mission of the Armed Forces—including

the Army—has become of at least equal importance to the national welfare as the ability to wage successful war.

The current concept of the Army's role focuses on "success in war." In order that the cold war mission can be recognized and given widespread emphasis this concept needs revision. The desire for success in war is not a sufficient basis to sustain the Army effectively during the period in which we now live; it overweighs the destructive role; it places the Army in the position of a necessary evil, maintained only to fight wars and makes the Army justify its existence on a strictly military basis.

History and Tradition

The causes for extreme emphasis on the Army's warmaking mission are rooted in American history and tradition. Historians have busied themselves with recording and analyzing military campaigns almost to the exclusion of the many other contributions made by the Army to the national progress and growth. The demonstrated beliefs of our forefathers show that they considered the Army as useless—even dangerous—when not required for immediate service. Albert Gallatin wrote in 1802:

The distribution of our little army to distant garrisons where hardly any other inhabitant is to be found is the most eligible arrangement of that perhaps necessary evil that can be contrived. But I never want to see the face of one in our cities or intermixed with our people.

James Madison declared that "with respect to a standing Army I believe there was not a member in the Federal Convention who did not feel indignation at such an institution." The same underlying idea remains with us in all its vigor to this day since we continue to look on the Army as an agency whose main business is to wage war. The place of the Army in gov-

ernment, economics, and society seems to have troubled our forefathers, but they never found it necessary to solve the problem.

Our traditional and inherited dislike for the Army has blinded us to the value of the Army as an instrument of democracy. Focusing on the belief that the Army is for fighting wars, we have always found it convenient to talk of heavy tax burdens on the people, and the Army's wasteful use of manpower. However, this reasoning is meaningless in a United States which can no longer solve the security problem on the basis of the past—a small Army separated from national policy and planning. In the future, even though this may be something new in American Government, the Army must have a major role in policy and planning. This concept is stated very well in the *History of Military Affairs* prepared by the Advisory Committee of the Princeton University Military History Project:

A difference between the Army and the people must be an abomination to him [Secretary of Defense] for the state is lost in the very moment when the people imagine this difference.

The people must understand that it is their Army and that it constitutes a necessary element to continued existence in a modern free world.

Cold War Mission

Certainly it is a new requirement in our military history to understand the cold war mission. We have had only a limited need for an Army in the past. This limited need has been consistent with the wars we have fought during our national lifetime. Even World War II required but a fraction of the total war-making potential of the country. Every other war involving the United States has been "limited" in all respects. Out of this experience, we have developed a

"limited" understanding of the purpose of an army in a democracy—"limited" in the sense that armies instead of populations are the combatants and those not immediately involved in the war effort can assume a detached concern for the entire operation. Such conditions have been favorable to the thinking that the Army is an element apart from the people. It has led us to justify the Army with a restricted mission of "success in war." World conditions—recognized realistically by the current Eisenhower policy—indicate that war can no longer be limited. This has a distinct impact upon the Army. It means that the interests of the people and the Army will be intimately related in any future war. National disaster can follow the failure of either one. However, it will be difficult to effect mutual understanding after war is upon us unless such interests are firmly established now. Only in this way can the enthusiastic public support of the Army—so essential to both—be accomplished.

Security and Prosperity

Since time remains a supreme factor in war, it is essential for a nation—not essentially military by nature, and objecting to maintenance of a large military force—to tie its military into a basic purpose interwoven with the security and prosperity of the nation. This offers two advantages—providing a military posture strong enough to discourage attack and contributing in the long run to the overall national prestige.

Conclusion

The United States is slowly but increasingly accepting the necessity for an active army considerably larger than has ever existed in time of peace. However, we are finding it difficult to justify such a force without orienting it on an unwanted war of the foreseeable future.

Our people will always resist spending

money for their own defense when danger is not actually staring them in the face, unless it is forcefully and realistically impressed upon them that the existence of such a force is a profitable political and economic condition, and that it is the key to continued world greatness. Once it is understood by soldier and civilian alike that the Army is the key to well-being, we can ensure ourselves of a shield of defense power behind which the reserves of free world strength may be developed; we can seize and retain the initiative because we have interwoven this segment of the Nation into the essential elements of our way of life; and, we can weigh the cold war mission properly. The threat from outside is no longer the principal cause for keeping an Army, nor for determining its size.

Categorical statements have constantly been made by Stalin that so long as a "Capitalist encirclement" exists, the Soviet Union will strain every effort to strengthen her Government and her Army. "Capitalist encirclement" will probably continue just as long as there is a free world left.

The Army has become just as characteristic a part of the American way of life as the other elements of national power. Like them its greatest importance is realized in the political and economic fields. If its representation throughout the free world serves to maintain economic and political integrity, it will be a potent factor to tilt the balance in favor of freedom. The frontiers in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East are no less live than are those of the sea and the sky.

Time will not again be given us to assemble an armed force under conditions similar to those of the pre-World War II period. Any future aggressor nation will plan an initial blow of a magnitude calculated to disable this Nation before an equal and opposing effort can be exerted. We realize the futility of maintaining an

Army which is big enough to defeat, immediately, any future threat against us. However, we must develop that enthusiastic popular support—represented by full participation in all Army activities—which is necessary to provide an Army of the size required to form a background of authority for national political aims and the economic bases.

Current Trend

The current trend of political and economic events should encourage the growth of our Army and thereby assist in the search for political and economic progress. A constant demand to reduce the Army on the basis of the "success in war" mission is archaic and will produce only

difficulties. The size of the Army, once established with the military factor in its proper light and realistic consideration given to the cold war mission, need no longer be considered as an unproductive element of the national strength. It need no longer reflect the mood of the opposition in their oscillation from threats to offers of peace and back to threats again. Instead, it becomes a characteristic part of the American way of life, just as essential as any other element of the national structure. It is an efficient representative of our Nation as the leader of the free nations throughout the world.

In this manner we then find that the Army representing landpower is an instrument of democracy.

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Evaluating the Practical Exercise

Captain Carl M. Guelzo, *Transportation Corps*
Commanding Officer, Headquarters, Otaru Sub-Port
Detachment, 2d T Port Command C, Japan

The views expressed in this article are the author's and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Command and General Staff College.—The Editor.

THE honest appraisal of human performance, based upon sound fact and devoid of the element of personal prejudice, has long been sought and only partially achieved by those who seek to solve the human equation. The yardstick by which a man is to be measured, perhaps, will never be found in the desired degree of precision; but in the search for better systems of evaluation, progress need never be delayed.

Many phases of military training lend themselves but poorly to measurement by the customary paper and pencil examinations. Mechanical training in individual and crew-served weapons, troubleshooting an internal combustion engine, or the use of the lensatic compass is beyond the scope of the traditional multiple-choice type question. Yet, the proper evaluation of manual skills is so deeply involved in simple personal opinion that a truly objective procedure is difficult to devise.

As an interim approach to the problem, the method of evaluation described here seeks to lessen the effects of personal subjective opinion in deriving practical exercise grades. The primary objectives in devising a system of evaluation are actually manifold. Preferably, the system should be contained on a single sheet of paper and be self-explanatory with regard to the entries and the steps to be

followed in deriving grades. The method should be easy to use and produce results immediately available to instructors and students. Above all, the method should produce results which can be easily interpreted.

Several systems were studied, ranging from a simple checklist of five desirable characteristics to highly complex forced-answer type rating scales, the results of which were treated statistically by the application of standard deviations. The simple checklist, while certainly easy to use and interpret, introduces a highly undesirable element of subjectivity too early in the grading process. Point weights must be assigned to each item on the checklist and, while agreement on the characteristics to be considered in grading can be generally secured without difficulty, considerable disagreement is experienced in assigning point values to each element. Some decision must be made whether "interest in class" is worth 1, 10, or 20 points, and the resulting decision will be not only arbitrary but highly subjective as well.

The system which relies upon complex statistical procedures, while undoubtedly more objective in nature than most other methods, deprives the instructor of what may well be his vested right: a knowledge of just what he is giving his students as a grade. The additional burden of statistical procedures also does not seem worth the increase in objectivity in situations where personnel strengths are in a constant state of reduction. The grade—as a measure of student performance—is also an index of the effectiveness of the instruction and should be immediately

available to the instructor if only for self-appraisal. A system so cumbersome that it can neither be used nor interpreted conveniently seems unfair to both pupil and instructor.

Objectivity and Usability

The procedure described here (see illustration on page 35) is somewhat in the nature of a compromise between increased objectivity and increased usability and simplicity. No evaluation of human behavior can ever be entirely objective as long as other humans must do the evaluating. The goal here is to reduce subjectivity as far as possible without sacrificing simplicity, clarity, and ease of administration. The procedure may be used in one of two ways.

The Percentage Grade

Where a percentage grade on practical exercises is desired for consideration in deriving the over-all grade of the student in both practical and academic subjects, the illustrated form may be used, utilizing all the steps indicated on the format with the exception of Step IIIB. A percentage grade, descriptive of the achievement of the student under each item listed, is entered opposite the item in the appropriate column. Situations may arise in which only one of the two groupings are considered under either "Performance" or "Attitude"; but whether one or both groupings are considered, the percentage

persons may be able to differentiate between students in increments of a single percent, but the majority will find the task difficult enough of making distinctions in percent increments even as small as five. At this point an element of subjectivity is immediately introduced—but unavoidably so. Grading is no simple process that can be conveniently used to fill in spare moments, and the seriousness of the problem is compounded by the importance attached to grades in the personal lives and even careers of the individuals rated. If only out of fairness to the students, instructors charged with the derivation of grades, especially where the machine-like precision of short-answer, objective-type tests is largely unavailable and even impractical, owe their classes and their jobs a degree of impersonal detachment in the grading process that is and should be absent in their classroom relationships.

In discussing practical exercise grades, I should like to avoid the percent versus standard score controversy. Each method of grading, whether it be in percentiles, deciles, quartiles, or standard scores, is suitable in its own special field. In classroom work, especially where students present unusually uniform professional backgrounds and abilities—as is the case in students selected for attendance at the advanced military schools and colleges—the standard score is invaluable in that

The honest appraisal of human performance, based upon sound fact and devoid of the element of personal prejudice, has long been sought and only partially achieved by those who seek to solve the human equation

ratings are added, recorded in Step I, averaged separately in Step II, and the final percentage average computed in Step IIIA.

A wide variation will be experienced in the ability of individual instructors to assign percent ratings. Some outstanding

the academic achievement of the individual is measured against the achievement of all others within his own class or group. But the standard score is primarily a measure of the relative performance of each student within a given group; it does not necessarily indicate a partic-

ular degree of achievement or improvement as measured against a set standard of performance.

The practical exercise seeks, however, not so much to make comparisons between students as to teach a practical skill or the practical application of a theory or principle. From the standpoint of personal skill and achievement, it is desirable that all students in the class perform an exercise perfectly. A student may have only an infirm grounding in the theory of azimuths and declinations and on the basis of this relatively imperfect understanding may be so ranked among his fellow students; but from a practical standpoint everyone should be able to convert grid and magnetic azimuths perfectly and the work of the instructor is not ended until each student is able to perform adequately. Less than 100 percent performance on the battlefield makes imperfect ability to perform nothing short of criminal.

Since the practical exercise seeks to discover what a student actually can do, his individual performance must be measured against a set standard. The percent method of grading is the most satisfactory where such arbitrary standards are applied. In practical situations, it is thoroughly possible for a student to rank high under the comparative standard scores, yet still be far below acceptable standards. A student may be able to use the aiming circle in laying a field artil-

lery battery faster and with greater facility than any other student in the class and thereby achieve the highest standard score of the group; yet, the number of minor procedural and arithmetic errors may be enough to prevent the same artillery battery from firing accurately, resulting in a low percentage grade. In the classroom, the procedure for laying a battery is important and amenable to measurement by the standard score; in the field, the criterion rests with the ability of the battery to fire, and less with an understanding of the theory or a mastery of a series of steps.

The intent of the list of 10 items selected as the essential elements of evaluation is to channel the attention of the grade-giving instructor and ensure that each desirable element of performance is considered separately. The single, over-all judgment frequently considers only certain outstanding aspects of the student's performance—whether it be outstandingly good or bad—and unconsciously, through the "halo effect," the instructor may either impute the same exceptional qualities to other unobserved aspects or ignore them entirely.

The element of subjective judgment is further reduced by requiring grading of each item on a full 100-point scale rather than asking the instructor to assign a certain number of points for each item out of a set maximum. If "interest" carries a weight of 20 points, the element of subjectivity is only compounded by asking the instructor to assign all or a portion of those 20 points as he sees fit. It was felt that using the full range for each item would at least lessen the effect of subjectivity.

The mechanical aspects of the procedure require nothing except an ability in the basic arithmetical operations of addition and division, and avoids entirely complex statistical treatment. When the instructor actually enters the percentage grade op-

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PRACTICAL EXERCISE EVALUATION SHEET									
Student				Rank		Serial number			
Course			Subject			Subject code			
Class number			Department or Branch			Date			
Item						Rating			
						Ex 100-90%	Sat 89-70%	Unsat 69-0%	
Performance	<u>Quality and quantity of work:</u> Proper sequence observed—produces accurate results—results are usable—results meet minimum/maximum standards								
	<u>Use of tools and equipment:</u> Handles required instruments efficiently—uses instruments effectively—chooses instrument appropriate to task to be performed								
	<u>Care of tools and equipment:</u> Uses instruments properly and only for intended purpose—protects instruments from unnecessary handling dirt and/or abuse.								
	<u>Observance of safety rules:</u> Performs required operations carefully—has due regard for the safety of personnel, property, and equipment								
	<u>Observance of special operational rules:</u> Follows instructions—uses proper methods—avoids unauthorized "short cuts"								
Performance totals									
Attitude	Attention and interest in class Co-operation with instructor Co-operation with other students (in group work) Accepts criticism and tries to improve work Promptness in starting work								
Attitude totals									
Evaluation	Step I—Grade Recapitulation			Step II—Averages			Step III—PE Grade		
	Grade	Performance	Attitude	Performance total ÷ 5 =			A. Numerical		
	Ex			Attitude total ÷ 5 =			Total %		Grade
	Sat						÷ 2 =		
	Unsat						B. Descriptive		
	Total			Total percent =			<input type="checkbox"/> Ex	<input type="checkbox"/> Unsat	
							<input type="checkbox"/> Sat	<input type="checkbox"/> No grade	
Remarks									
Authentication									
Printed name and grade					Signature				

posite each item, his decision will be subjective in nature; but the surrounding processes and methods by which he is led up to that point are designed to emphasize objectivity and at least ensure consideration of all essential aspects of the student's performance rather than just a few.

Descriptive Grade

Many schools do not use percentage grades in evaluating practical exercises. The exercise is either satisfactory or unsatisfactory, although occasionally a bit of incentive is provided by rewarding the outstanding performance with an "excellent" or a "superior." Grades have always been a powerful motivating influence in student achievement, although the danger should also be recognized of placing an undue amount of emphasis on grades as such. As a measure of student performance, grades are fine; but the primary objective of any course of study is the acquisition of skills, abilities, or understandings—not the earning of grades. What a tragic educational waste would result if the only object of schooling rested in a well-filled academic report.

Instead of entering a percent grade opposite each item being considered, a check mark under the appropriate column may be made on the evaluation form. Only Step IIIB is used in the evaluation. The student who receives a preponderance of check marks under a particular column may receive that as his over-all grade; an even distribution of check marks under all columns involves again a subjective determination in no way less important than that involving numerical percents. The comparatively small weight allotted the results of practical exercises in the final end-of-course grade excuses carelessness in neither the percent nor the descriptive methods of grading. Not only may the career of the student be affected, but his life and the lives of his subordinates as

well may rest upon his ability to perform in the field regardless of his facility with a paper-and-pencil examination.

Each of the items on the evaluation form is followed by a series of statements which are designed to serve as a guide in selecting which aspects of the student performance to consider.

Quality and quantity of work.—Correct procedure is vitally important in the practical application of fire direction center procedures for field artillery battalions. The deflections reported by the various members of the center may be produced by correct manipulations of tables and rules, but the efforts are valueless if the results cannot be used.

Use of tools and equipment.—Evaluations must be made, for example, regarding the ability of each student to use a compass in finding his way about during a night problem, just as the selection of the proper graphical firing table will determine the degree of skill and facility of students learning fire direction procedures. By the same token, a student may understand perfectly the basic principles upon which the aiming circle is based, but be virtually incapable of using the instrument in a practical situation.

Care of tools and equipment.—Two members of the crew of a 105-mm howitzer may be able to use a fuze wrench with equal facility in setting time fuzes on artillery shells; but the student who uses the wrench *only* for setting fuzes will rate higher than his companion who also utilizes the wrench to open beer bottles.

Observance of safety rules.—The agonizing "M1 thumb" that results from ineptness in closing the bolt of the M1 rifle, or the frequently serious injuries caused by fumbling during the assembly or disassembly of the .30 caliber light machine-gun involving the powerful operating spring, lend ample authority to the voice of caution in observing safety practices. The consternation of the local Oklahoma

farmer decreases not a single whit the potential danger of an artillery round directed beyond prescribed safety limits by a careless student S3.

Observance of special operational rules.—Many years of practice and experience have gone into the formulation of present rules for range procedures. That deviations are dangerous is amply illustrated by the fatal and near-fatal injuries on ranges that result almost invariably from failure to follow instructions. The student machinegunner who loosens the fastenings of his weapon to spray his fire movie-hero fashion is deserving of far more serious punishment than simply a low grade. And the radar mechanic who devises his own private method of tracing and repairing circuits faces at the very least ruination of a costly item of equipment and at the most severe personal injury or death. Instructors at Fort Riley frequently caution students that no barrier exists to the bitter winter winds that blow from Siberia to Kansas except a picket fence—and that blown down. The "short cut" on a night problem may find the student closer to Siberia than his ultimate objective.

The considerations noted in the preceding paragraphs are as applicable to the quasi-military skills of welding, railway car repair, or air brake maintenance as to such primarily military skills as map reading, service practice, and range firing. Whether the subject be a military or a vocational skill, however, the five items grouped under "Attitude" are self-explanatory and require no further amplification.

The use of the evaluation procedure outlined here introduces a strong element of objectivity into what is basically a highly subjective activity: the judgment and evaluation of human performance. Essentially, the judgment of a manual skill is largely a matter of expert opinion, but a great deal can be done to lessen the effects of those personal prejudices

that may creep into the evaluating process.

The method and evaluation form described here is easy to use, the results are easy to interpret, and, at the same time, are immediately available to both instructor and student with a minimum of processing, none of which need be done by personnel trained in statistical procedures. The attention of the instructor is directed toward specific characteristics generally agreed upon as warranting consideration when practical grades are rendered, and "snap judgments" are avoided that may omit consideration of many essential points or place undue emphasis on elements of minor importance.

The results secured by using the evaluation form in preference to the frequently haphazard generalized approach to grading procedures are generally favorable and are, judging from the correlations obtained during an actual test of the procedures, reliable to a significant extent. Validity of the procedure was secured by obtaining general agreement among experienced instructor-technicians regarding the characteristics that should be considered in evaluating practical performance.

A definite distinction should be made, however, between practical exercises and performance tests. The practical exercise is an over-all evaluation of the progress made by a student in the acquisition of a military or vocational skill. The performance test seeks to determine the efficiency and the effectiveness of a student in performing a specific operation or series of operations, frequently in a prescribed sequence. The skill may be wire splicing, or the assembly of a carburetor with the grade determined by the speed, correctness, and proper sequence of motions. The practical exercise grade may be used in lieu of the performance test where time, facilities, or the nature

of the subject will not permit extensive preparations; or may be used to supplement the results of performance tests and written examinations.

Efficiency of grading procedures is increased using the evaluation form by producing a grade in which the subjective element has been minimized to an extent consistent with ease of use by individual instructors and the availability and interpretation of results. Where performance and usability of results are paramount, this procedure seeks to place the emphasis in the proper place giving the academic plum to the man who can turn out a workable logistical plan when judged against his companion who produces a neatly written logistical order for a thoroughly impractical plan.

The procedure described in these paragraphs is not the perfect answer to the

evaluation problem, but it does present a uniform method of tested reliability and reasonable validity that protects the student from ill-considered judgments of his performance on the job as distinguished from his personality. It provides the instructor with an evaluation as closely and rigidly restricted to job performance as can be obtained in a grading system of this type while minimizing the effects of emotional responses not concerned with job performance.

Admittedly, the subjective element inherent in the evaluation of human performance cannot be eliminated entirely; but the objectivity of the mechanical grading procedures can be so increased that, coupled with the efforts of a co-operative instructor cadre, many of the evils of subjective judgments can be rendered almost without effect.

We can design equipment which will perform in a specified manner under given conditions. A machine has no feelings. But soldiers are not machines. They deserve and must have consideration for their personal problems and interests. Not just the efficiency but the determination, the devotion of our soldiers—in short, their spiritual strength as well as their physical stamina and technical skill—determine the ability of the Army to fulfill its function. That function, I repeat, is victory in battle.

No element of the Army is more essential to the achievement of that goal than the hard core professionals who preserve and extend military knowledge in peacetime, who provide the nucleus around which the vast expansion of wartime mobilization takes place, and who train and lead in battle the soldiers who are brought into uniform from civilian life for the duration of hostilities.

Because the professional soldier is a key to the effectiveness of the Army, it is obvious that his welfare and spirit are of the greatest importance. At the same time, the conditions which prevail today create problems which in many respects are greater than ever before in our experience.

General Matthew B. Ridgway

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PUTTING MILITARY ANALYSIS BACK TOGETHER

Lieutenant Colonel Lowell L. Wilkes, Jr., *Signal Corps*
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The views expressed in this article are the author's and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Command and General Staff College.—The Editor.

THERE is a premium on commanders and staff officers who have the ability to analyze. Senior commanders constantly are looking for officers who can define a problem and break down its significant parts. Both in the field and on other assignments, the man in demand is one who has the ability to analyze logically.

Army training is designed to help officers develop just such ability. Our service schools typically teach by placing students in difficult situations which require application of logical reasoning. On duty assignments, officers gain analytical experience when continuously faced with an endless variety of complex problems. This experience shows that only by careful and detailed analysis can the foundation be laid for a sound solution to any problem.

Aids to Analysis

Although good analysis does not come merely from following routine procedures and standard forms, many useful guides are available. Military estimates and staff

studies are common throughout all the services. So important are some of these forms that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have standardized their use. Examination of our generally accepted forms highlights the emphasis placed on analysis. The Intelligence Estimate devotes a major section to "Discussion and Analysis," which might well be termed the heart of the estimate since it is the basis for the "relative probability of adoption of enemy capabilities." Similarly, a major portion of the Logistical Estimate is devoted to "Logistical Analysis." Here the capabilities and limitations for supply, evacuation and hospitalization, transportation, and service functions are carefully weighed.

Centers on Commander


In the Commander's Estimate even greater emphasis is placed on analysis. The commander utilizes consolidated factual data and the specialized analyses of the staff as a basis for his estimate. The full military skill and experience of the commander himself must be utilized in his "Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action" and his "Comparison of Own Courses of Action." Whether the estimate is mental or written, the commander engages in the same basic thinking proc-

The ability for keen analysis may win recognition for its possessor, however, an officer must go further in order to synthesize his analysis in terms of men and machines if he expects to accomplish his mission

esses, and the estimate form serves only as a guide. In his analysis the commander must determine the probable effect of each enemy capability on each friendly course of action. Then further analysis is required to determine the advantages

Natural Instinct

Although the process of analysis is aided materially by training and recognized guides, there is an underlying natural instinct and ability in every man to analyze. Almost all individuals have the



and disadvantages of his own courses of action. The result is a decision which has been carefully considered and weighed. Moreover, it is a decision which the commander understands and one which he honestly and enthusiastically can support with complete and unqualified confidence.

Lieutenant Colonel Lowell L. Wilkes, Jr., was graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1943. During World War II, he served in the Mediterranean theater. From 1946 to 1949, he was assigned to the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project, and for 2 years with the Office of the Chief Signal Officer. Following his graduation from the Command and General Staff College in 1954, he went to Korea where he is currently serving in the Headquarters of the Korea Civil Assistance Command.

insatiable desire to see what makes things tick. Many are quite capable of exhibiting ability to probe into inner workings and hidden mechanisms and of criticizing negatively.

However difficult and important defining and analyzing a problem on the mission may be, a harder task still looms ahead. Analysis must be put back together, otherwise its usefulness is extremely limited. More than just this, analysis must be translated and integrated through individual men employing complex machines to accomplish the over-all mission. In short, analysis must be synthesized.

At this point planning comes into full play. As detailed and complete as estimates may be, relatively greater effort

is expended on plans. The mission and the commander's concept form the basis of planning. Here is the beginning of the evolutionary process of fusing analysis for its ultimate purpose. Plans serve to assist in the enormous task of integrating the many complex factors which affect an operation. Therefore, it is not surprising to find plans augmented by numerous annexes, inclosures, and tabs intended to aid in directing a unit's combined effort toward achieving its mission.

So far the process is primarily academic and the actual job is yet to be done. Plans must be communicated to the minds of those who are to fight the battle and provide support. This in itself represents a critical gap which too frequently is not bridged effectively. Moreover, weapons, equipment, skill, experience, training, and the frame of mind of each officer and man are interrelated in a manner which literally is inconceivable by a single human or group. The diagram on page 40 illustrates forcibly how complex only a few related factors become. Nevertheless, the successful commander must synthesize these elements and elicit the unified effort of the command in accomplishing his mission.

Not So Natural

Although the factors involved in both synthesis and analysis are infinite, natural instinct and ability to analyze is not matched by the innate ability to put together and synthesize. Many recognize the deficiencies in a military organization, but how many can correct these deficiencies when made responsible for that organization?

How

In order to overcome this natural disinclination to integrate thoughts and actions, first there must be an awareness of the ultimate requirement to synthesize diverse and even conflicting factors. Nevertheless, awareness alone is not enough. Ability also is required to synthesize continuously from the point of view of the entire command. This must be done in order to cope with an ever-changing situation and a resulting change in analysis.

Such ability can best be developed through balanced experience gained in service schools and in positions of command and staff responsibility both in combat and administrative organizations. Indeed, in this manner the successful military career can best be synthesized.

Good leadership tends to perpetuate itself. The essential objective of leadership—getting men to do what you want them to do individually or in concert—has never really changed from the days of the cave man. How it is done varies with the individual leader and his personality; and what may be a good technique for one may be a pitfall for another. But the common basis of all enlightened leadership is sound discipline, which, in fact, is merely another word for co-operation—for subordination of individual desires in the interests of the group. As such, discipline can be said to be the fundamental requirement for achieving effective co-operative action.

General Charles L. Bolte

YOU AND CIVIL DEFENSE

Colonel Lawrence J. Lincoln, *Corps of Engineers*
Engineer, Headquarters, Fourth Army

The views expressed in this article are the author's and are not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Command and General Staff College.—The Editor.

ON A blazing hot day in July 1951, the Army Engineers were supervising the removal of putrefying bodies from the mud and slime of the wreckage left by the Kansas City flood. Fortunately, there were few human casualties from that great disaster, and the bodies being so removed were actually the carcasses of what had been fine, fat pigs and good, prime Kansas City steers caught by the flood waters in the stockyards. However, some of us laboring to prevent the possible outbreak of disease and to restore survival conditions in the disaster-ridden flood plain, did not escape the feeling that the situation could be a foretaste of disaster conditions following a heavy bombing.

Since that Kansas City experience, Army aid to the civil power has been of prime interest to me. This interest has included a great curiosity and some confusion about contemplated aid in case of military attack on our population. It has, however, taken the special opportunities of the Army War College to open the way to learning the score on military aid to the civil power in case of enemy attack. Here is the way I see it, and the picture does not look good. If you are skeptical, check a few references and read your morning newspaper.

In the United States Army, we are well indoctrinated in the spirit of the offen-

sive and are loath to place much emphasis upon defense. We like to defend by attacking as Jackson did in his famous Valley Campaign. Nevertheless, the facts of life may force us for a time onto the tactical as well as the strategic defensive. In fact, the modern military facts of life may well force us temporarily into elaborate passive defensive activity in order to prevent or mitigate disaster at home. The weapons and delivery systems we have are, unfortunately, also in the hands of our potential enemies, and we could have a militarily caused disaster far beyond anything seen in history.

If the enemy should strike, we are told there will be prompt and massive retaliation; and we have no reason to doubt the great and growing capacity that we have for such retaliation. However, lighting atomic fires in the Soviet Union will not put out our own fires nor succor the injured and suffering within our own country. Civil defense, then, becomes the last means of keeping our domestic situation manageable in the face of hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of casualties. Our survival, and the effectiveness of our mobilization base to support a counterpunch, will then be dependent on the success of civil defense, the fourth arm of national defense.

While the Army role in the peacetime civil defense preparations is properly quite limited, such limitation may not in any way measure the scale and nature of our civil defense effort should a disaster necessitate our support to the civil defense effort. With such a possibility in mind, ask yourself if you are ready for the role you, as a member of the

Army, may play in civil defense. Do you even understand what the role may be? If your answer is "yes" to either of these questions, you should be writing this article instead of reading it.

Civil defense is interdependent with military defense, so you should first consider your potential role in continental military defense. If you are in an anti-aircraft unit, the answer may seem obvious. Perhaps you are in the infantry or artillery and do not anticipate much beyond some local security work at a nearby vital installation. Or maybe you are a technical service officer at a Class II installation and are primarily concerned with your internal security and internal civil defense problem. If you are overseas, continental defense may be far from your official thoughts. However, whatever your assignment or station may be, I doubt that you can be really complacent about your situation with respect to civil defense. Clandestine or missile attack may finesse your anti-aircraft battery; the vital installation you are scheduled to secure may be beyond the need of security. Your Class II installation may be an integral part of the turmoil and even if you are overseas, there is a civil defense problem there. In fact, with a few hours' notice, or even less, you can be pitched into the middle of a disaster-ridden, panic-stricken mob to restore order, fight a fire, rescue and aid the in-

jured, or perform any of a dozen other tasks.

Could your installation be quickly converted into a temporary hospital, feeding station, or assembly point for refugees if there were thousands of them in flight from a nearby, bombed metropolitan area? Do not say that it could not happen to you. In 10 minutes of your reading time you will find out that it can happen.

First, in the proper form, we should ask whether the enemy can deliver the punch. It is not necessary to eavesdrop on the National Security Council to get the answer. Your Commander in Chief summarized the situation some months ago by saying:

The facts are these The Soviets now possess a stockpile of atomic weapons of conventional types and we must furthermore conclude that the powerful explosion of August 12 last was produced by a weapon or the forerunner of a weapon far in excess of conventional types. We, therefore, conclude that the Soviets have the capability of atomic attack on us, and such capability will increase with the passage of time.

The President's statement did not detail the possibilities of "suitcase bombs," chemical, biological, and radiological warfare, or psychological attack for magnifying panic. However, official concern with these Soviet capabilities is a matter of public knowledge. It seems that the dangerous fable that a police state cannot

Lighting atomic fires in the Soviet Union will not put out our own fires nor aid our injured and suffering. Civil defense, then, becomes our only means of managing domestic affairs in the face of countless casualties

Are you prepared? Is your unit or organization ready for such a task? Do you have plans? Are you trained? What would you do if ordered out on a civil defense assignment? How would you go about it?

view with free men in the scientific and industrial demands of modern war is now thoroughly destroyed. For we now find our adversary—however primitive his attitude may be—will be able to fight with all the modern devices and weapons and will be able to project his attacks across

the ocean and Arctic barriers which have protected us so well heretofore. Next, we should evaluate our defense against our modernized enemy. We have the deterrent of our strategic air threat. However, this is not a definite deterrent, in view of the fact that many have questioned whether it is actually any deterrent considering Soviet psychology. In any case, if we should come under attack, our strategic air offense would be a vital element of our defense. It must reduce the capacity of the enemy to launch long-range attacks against us. This will not be done in a few hours, despite the fact that our newspapers would lead us to believe that it may be accomplished in a matter of a few weeks. These few weeks could be the 60 critical days of the next war which General Eisenhower mentioned in his final report as Chief of Staff in 1948. Until those critical days have passed, can we completely defend against attack at home? Unfortunately, the answer is no.

The late General Vandenberg as Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force stated to a congressional committee that a near perfect defense could get only about one-third of the attacking aircraft and that such a defense was not in sight. The record of the very effective defenses of the Battle of Britain was 15 percent. Our own defense is getting stronger every day, so let us suppose that we do very well and by some good fortune knock off 50 percent or even 75 percent of the 300

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or 400 bombers they could send against us. Add to the results from those who filter through, the effects of clandestine operations, submarine-based missile attacks, and psychological warfare, and you have the makings of a major disaster.

Civil Defense

The enemy capabilities against our defenses do not make a happy picture. The question then becomes, what do we intend to do about that lethal leakage through our military defenses? That is the task of civil defense. Its present statutory basis is Public Law 920 of the 81st Congress (1950). The law states:

It is the policy and intent of Congress to provide a plan for civil defense for the protection of life and property of the United States from attack. It is further declared to be the policy and intent of Congress that the responsibility for civil defense shall be vested primarily in the several states and their political subdivisions. The Federal Government shall provide the necessary co-ordination and guidance. . . .

The law establishes the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) to co-ordinate and stimulate state and local programs; to co-ordinate the various Federal agencies in civil defense activity; to make provision with the military services to receive warnings of attack—an Air Force responsibility—and disseminate such warnings to the public; to develop civil defense techniques, conduct training, stockpile emergency supplies, and administer Federal financial contributions to the states. It can be seen that the primary responsibility rests with the state and local governments who will be given Federal assistance and guidance. The FCDA has broad powers which it can exercise in actual emergency, including the co-ordination of military support after it has been directed by the Presi-

dent. There have been proposals that the military services assume full responsibility for civil defense; however, they have met with little favor on official levels inside or outside the Department of Defense.

Civil defense preparations depend first upon volunteer co-operation of individuals and existing private agencies of all types, and second upon existing public agencies at the state and local level. A group of leading citizens under contract to the Department of Defense made a comprehensive report in 1952 known as Project East River. Among other things, the report brings out that Public Law 920 provides a loose, unwieldy, and relatively undisciplined organization. The law is, nevertheless, a faithful reflection of our concept of government which provides for maximum local autonomy. A few states like New York have passed stringent laws—even including conscription—for civil defense in an emergency. However, stringent laws on civil defense are exceptions.

This article is not intended to educate you in civil defense organization and operations. Nevertheless, you should recognize that although civil defense is a civilian function, the pattern of organization and operations is essentially military in nature and you would not have any difficulty in understanding it. Any army unit, organization, or individual could prepare for a civil defense mission with no more difficulty than a good, well-trained football team would experience in adding a new play to its repertoire.

So we have a plan and organization to cope with possible disaster; the question is, can the civil defense setup cope with the probable situation following an attack? Reports of FCDA indicate that civil defense is not prepared for the task. Certainly if an attack came, the American people would be able to do a few things to help themselves. However, there would be hundreds of thousands of cas-

ualties directly attributable to a lack of knowledge of protection and to general mental unpreparedness. Warning would probably, but not surely, be received from the Air Force by civil defense officials; however, it could not be passed on to over half the population in the critical areas. Even if warning were received, most of the people would not find adequate shelter or timely means to evacuate. Medical supplies, feeding facilities, emergency housing, and rescue and welfare services would be lacking. Highways and streets, otherwise open, would be clogged with vehicles and panic-stricken refugees going somewhere else and in this way precluding assistance getting into disaster areas.

Mr. Philip Wylie, in his recent best seller, *Tomorrow*, paints a dramatic and terrifying picture of a part of the scene as he imagines it. In one case, he portrays a harassed commander who sends troops to protect an airport. He wrote:

When his motley troops arrived there, several thousand people had already reached the airport and most had gone past, but hundreds had turned in. They were without control or meaningful plan—fear maddened men, women, and children who rushed indoors, promptly looted the airport concessions, smashed the furniture, insanely demolished the ticket counters, rushed out on the field, entered waiting planes, got themselves hit on runways by service equipment and, in general, turned the airport into headless hell. They were reinforced by persons arriving from the main highway at a rate of a hundred a minute or more.

Or consider the situation when the mobs in flight in opposite directions from two large cities meet headlong on the highway.

People from here, in cars, have piled up against people from Kansas City, also in cars and trucks, headed this way—and all roads are blocked—and they are hungry and freezing and fanning out,

burning barns and houses just to keep warm, cleaning out every little town, smashing all grocery stores and supermarkets, all jewelry stores. Women are being advised to take to the woods all over the nation.

Do you expect that we could initiate our mobilization on such a D-day?

While it might not be as bad as we have described, it could just as easily be worse. In any case, the Army cannot ignore the possibility because our tradition, law, regulations, and commonsense all show that we would have a major role if a serious disaster occurred.

The Army has often demonstrated its effectiveness in civil disaster. The great Chicago fire, the Texas City explosion, Operation Snowbound, and major floods have demonstrated that the civil authorities can depend on the Army when mother nature goes wild or our own mistakes create an uncontrolled disaster. Army Regulations 500-60 applies and major headquarters have outline plans for aid to the civil power under such conditions. On the civilian side, the civil defense organizations have now largely taken over the disaster problem and have already demonstrated great effectiveness in dealing with natural disasters. Such improvement will enable civil authorities to handle more of their own troubles in a disaster and, thus, correspondingly relieve the Army. However, some natural disasters and enemy created disasters could get beyond their capacity. The Soviet capability indicates that it could happen. What will you do then?

Public Law 920 indicates that the armed services may support civil defense upon Presidential direction. Department of Defense Directive 200.04-1, dated 24 January 1952, gives the basic policy for the Armed Forces. The Army guidance on civil defense is Army Regulations 500-70. It consists of two and one-half pages, faithfully reflecting the Department of

Defense policy. Paragraph 4 states in part:

The basic civil defense responsibilities of the Department of the Army are to plan for and provide emergency military support of operations for civil defense and related matters in those instances involving enemy created disaster wherein the civil defense organizations are unprepared or otherwise incapable of operating without this support, and for co-ordinating participation by the Departments of the Navy and Air Force in this activity. Plans for military support of civil defense operations will be based on the concept that such assistance will provide minimum practicable diversion from the Army's primary mission.

To date, much of our civil defense preparation in the Army seems keyed by the latter statement rather than the former. However, the "minimum practicable diversion" could be a major or even total diversion in a severe disaster. A senior officer could find himself totally responsible for a specific area should civil organization break down. As a matter of fact, in a major emergency practically any unit or individual under Department of the Army jurisdiction would be available for civil defense support. Reserves could be ordered to active duty; National Guard units could be called by the governor. Any of us, active Army, Reserve, or National Guard could be in it.

Conclusions

After over 20 years of commissioned service—including 4 on the War Department General Staff and, last but not least, 1 at the Army War College—I am well aware that any good military article should have recommendations and conclusions. Here are a few that seem obvious:

1. The Soviet Union has the capability of attacking the United States by air, submarine, sabotage, and other means, pos-

sibly creating a disaster involving hundreds of thousands of casualties and severe industrial damage.

2. The combined effect of our strategic air effort and our continental air defenses can initially stop only a part of a determined enemy attack. The portions that filter through our defenses can well overtax the civil defense capabilities in critical areas.

3. The Army having primary interest in support to civil defense may be required to lend major support for a period after D-day attack. It is, in fact, obligated to lend major support by tradition, law, and its own regulations, should the President so direct after he considers the military requirements of the situation. No unit or individual in the Army is immune from such duty.

Recommendations

The recommendations are also obvious:

1. As a part of their routine training program, Army units should prepare to carry out civil defense missions appropriate to the military tasks of the organizations.

2. Individual officers should become acquainted with civil defense in general and specifically with the organization and operations in nearby communities or cities.

3. Installation commanders should plan for utilization of their facilities in support of civil defense in case of severe emergency.

4. Training and mobilization plans for civilian components should take into consideration their possible use in support of civil defense in the early stages of a war.

That is the score as I see it. Try shooting it down and you will find there are many reasons for not following the recommendations. Some of the reasons can be found in official publications; some others have been voiced by high-ranking generals. The most important conclusion of this article is the one you make concerning the problem. Finally, I recommend that if you feel that the Army should do no more about civil defense support than it is doing at present, you ask yourself if you are ready to carry out the task you may be assigned should there be an atomic attack on the United States tomorrow.

Most Americans know that the dawn of the air-atomic age found us without any assurance that our cities would have more than a few minutes of advance warning in case of attack. Under those circumstances, our original "duck and cover" program was the only possible solution to the problem of saving of civilian lives in an emergency.

As our facilities for advance warning have increased—and there has been a marked improvement in that field in recent months—we have been able to shift our emphasis to evacuation. In order to reduce the risk to our daytime concentrations of people in critical target areas, we now seek to thin out the more crowded areas when the alert warning sounds. Drills and rehearsals in a number of our principal cities have demonstrated that this is practical, and so we are working along that line today.

Val Peterson, Federal Civil Defense Administrator

THE ALLIED OFFICER AND THE Command and General Staff College

MODERN military operations combine the fighting force of scores of allied nations representing varied tongues, dialects, and dissimilarities of organizational composition. If the occasion arises, these vast polyglot forces must be assembled and organized into a co-ordinated fighting unit before effective military operations can begin. Here, indeed, is a task of frightening dimensions and urgency.

The same problem—to a lesser degree—existed in World War II. The strategy, capabilities, and limitations of the Axis nations afforded the Allies the time needed for developing and co-ordinating a combined organization of international forces. Even so, language barriers and compositional differences between armies and army groups placed a tremendous premium on patience, tolerance, and diplomacy. Today, however, even the most optimistic of our Allied military planners do not foresee time for the perfection of such virtues after the onset of any future world conflict.

Problems Foreseen

Since the early years of World War II, the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) has taken a farsighted approach to this problem by placing ever-increasing emphasis on its Allied Officer Program. The growing importance of this program is demonstrated by the fact that of the total 1,100 Allied students who have attended the Regular Course at Fort Leavenworth since 1908, over 500, repre-

senting 45 countries, have been enrolled since 1946. The current enrollment—exceeding 70 officers from 35 countries—is a typical postwar quota.

All of these officers—attending in grades from captain through major general—undergo approximately 1 month of intensive orientation in the organization of the United States Army with primary accent on the infantry, armored, and airborne divisions. The majority are, in addition, given a preliminary 5-week course in "American English" with emphasis on United States military usage. The net effect is that Allied officer students are afforded a 2-month period, not only to prepare themselves for the regular academic year, but also to become adjusted to new customs, new friends, and an unfamiliar language and a foreign environment. These benefits are incidental, however, to the principal value of the Allied Officer Program which is realized through the introduction into the armies of our Allies, a growing nucleus of key officers, learned and skilled in the doctrine and organization of the United States Army. These officers, it is believed, will contribute to the elements of friendly co-operation and understanding which are essential to the success of the armies of the United States and her Allies. Surely there is good reason to expect such results as the students enrolled each year in the Allied Officer Program are carefully selected from the finest and most capable officers of their respective armies. Their

selection, by their governments, for attendance at the Command and General Staff College, therefore, implies anticipated military distinction within their native countries.

Thus, the Command and General Staff College is developing an ambassadorship in the most important echelon of our Allied armies—that vital echelon where major command decisions are made in the planning and execution of combined military operations.

The entire 2-month period of academic preparation and social integration at Fort Leavenworth is conducted by the Allied Officer Section (AOS), a subsidiary department of the Command and General Staff College.

This section, currently headed by Colonel Donald B. Webber, was developed in direct response to the needs and wants of the Allied officer and his family. The AOS exists solely as a service to the Allied officer and acts as an essential point of contact between the student and his new environment. This service is accomplished with a courtesy and efficiency which fosters quickly a sense of belonging and friendship between the Allied officer, his family, and his Fort Leavenworth associates.

Consider for a moment the problem confronting the AOS in terms of the individual characteristics of the Allied officer. One attribute which he will have in com-

His uniform will have subjected him to the speculative wonder of hundreds of curious eyes on his long trip to and across the United States. His religion may be rare to this country, and with it he may adhere to dietary customs which are difficult to observe while traveling among the omnivorous peoples of the United States. At any rate, it is expected by the College that the Allied student will arrive at Fort Leavenworth tired from a long trip, confused by the babel of a foreign land, and anxious for a place where he can hang his hat and feel at home.

The AOS has anticipated this and has prepared for his arrival long before the student ever left his native land. These preparations and subsequent services are best demonstrated by following a theoretical Allied officer through the various phases between the time of his nomination for schooling and his actual entry into the Regular Command and General Staff College Course.

Before being appointed for Command and General Staff College attendance by his government, the Allied officer had already been subjected to a highly competitive program of selection. In response to an allocation of spaces at the College, by the Government of the United States, the Allied government concerned nominates a number of army officers meeting specific qualifications.

These officers are invited—through

The Command and General Staff College is developing an ambassadorship in the vital echelon of Allied armies where major command decisions are made in the planning and execution of combined military operations

mon with all the Allied officers sent to Fort Leavenworth is a high degree of intelligence and military talent. Except for that, there is no norm. He may arrive in any grade from lieutenant to lieutenant general. His language may be Slavic, Teutonic, Asiatic, Romantic, or any other.

their own government—to undergo a language test given by the United States Military Mission or Attaché in the country. These tests reveal the degree of basic knowledge of the English language possessed by the nominee, and establish his oral-aural fluency level. Individual grades

are then submitted to the government concerned to assist in the final selection of appointees. This does not imply that relative proficiency in the English language is necessarily a primary determinant for selection to the College. The AOS can begin with a fair academic background in English and produce a surprisingly fluent officer in a 2-month period.

A reasonable academic basis in English is essential, however, as the College does not, and cannot, teach the fundamental mechanics of the language in the brief period available.

When the College is notified of the appointee's identity, the AOS goes into action. A letter of welcome is dispatched accompanied by a packet containing the information necessary to ensure that the Allied officer arrives with a reasonable knowledge of climate, facilities, transportation, and proper reporting procedure. Provided he has notified the College of his time and place of arrival, the student will be met by an AOS escort officer. Often the escort officer will be proficient in the language of the incoming student. This is not always possible, however, as the AOS cannot maintain linguists in every tongue represented by its Allied students.

After arrival, the Allied student is given no opportunity to become lonesome. The escort officer will take him directly to Post Headquarters where his arrival will be officially recorded. Next, he goes to the AOS where he is welcomed by the Section Director. While there, he is given a brief language test. In addition, he draws his textbooks, his initial language lesson assignment, and receives information to assist in his introduction to Fort Leavenworth and nearby areas. It is also at this point that the Allied officer files application for commissary, post exchange, hospital, and theater privileges, and is made a member of the Post Officers' Mess.

A conducted orientation tour of the

Post follows, during which the escort officer points out all key facilities on the Post and shows the student his billet in the Bachelor Officers' Quarters. The student will find that his quarters are fully furnished, and that his baggage has already been placed there for him. Finally, the student will be taken to the finance office or the bank where his financial affairs are attended to and with that, his initial day of orientation is completed.

Personal Service

Meanwhile, a second echelon of personal service is going into action. Before he arrived at Fort Leavenworth, the Allied student acquired a friend in some member of the Post or College officer complement who volunteered to provide the friendly and personal services that are essential to a visitor in a foreign land. This officer, or "sponsor," will invite the Allied officer into his home, and introduce him to the warm and informal hospitality which is typical in the home of an Army officer in the United States. The children may shout in a different language, but the international flavor of home and family will be there to break down the barriers of loneliness and provide a comfortable refuge from the newness of a foreign land.

The friendship of the sponsor and his family is not limited to the Allied officer alone. It also embraces his wife and children if they accompany him or join him subsequent to his arrival. Initially, the incoming family will be billeted at the Officers' Mess or at a downtown hotel while permanent lodgings are being found.

While the wives of the student and his sponsor are exchanging introductory pleasantries in the temporary billets, the children will, as usual, dispense with formality in order to get down to the serious business of playing.

Unfortunately, Fort Leavenworth cannot provide family type quarters on the

Post for Allied officers. The AOS Personal Affairs Officer, in co-operation with civilian rental agencies and private owners, has, therefore, developed a list of rental properties in the adjoining community of Leavenworth, Kansas. Rental rates are rather high and the furnished housing available is not always of the best quality. However, the Allied family, with the assistance of the Personal Affairs Officer, will have little difficulty in finding quarters in the vicinity of the Post.

Once the major aspects of domestic adjustment are well in hand, the Allied officer must necessarily leave such details as curtains and household decorations to his wife and the wife of his sponsor, as academic pursuits will consume the majority of his time. He may, however, want to buy an automobile. If so, he will be assisted in the selection of a dependable machine and provisions will, if necessary, be made with the bank for financing the student's car.

Preparatory Course

With his family housed, the Allied officer is ready to report to Stotsenberg Hall for the first day of his Preparatory Course curriculum. His proficiency in basic English will have been determined from his test records and from his conversational and comprehension ability as noted since his arrival. He will find, however, that there is a distinct difference between British English and American English. In addition, he will discover that the latter has been flavored by association with the Army to such an extent that he must go even further afield from the Oxfordian version of his own native textbooks and learn United States Military English.

In language classes, as in all academic instruction at the Command and General Staff College, the student will learn that rank is forgotten and all students are treated with complete impartiality, al-

though due deference is accorded the rank of the student in nonacademic activities. He will be assigned to the advanced, intermediate, or beginners' section entirely in accordance with his degree of basic proficiency in the language. At any point in the curriculum, however, he may be resectioned as warranted by his rate of progress.

The teaching of United States Military English will dominate all other instruction for the first 5 weeks of the Preparatory Course. This instruction will follow a refined process which places primary emphasis on understanding the spoken language and reading, since oral instruction and study consume the majority of the student's time in the Regular Course. Lesser accent is placed on speaking ability as this comes naturally through social necessity. Writing instruction is not emphasized, but is integrated into all Preparatory Course work in a manner calculated to develop an essential degree of proficiency with minimum pain to the student. The over-all result is astonishing to the uninitiated observer. At the end of the first month, advanced students are conversing freely with each other and many are proud of their facility with military slang expressions.

The bond of a common language creates a sense of teamwork at this point and results in many permanent friendships of an intercontinental nature.

Language training—being the key to all understanding at the College—is never abandoned for non-English speaking students. However, during the last 3 weeks of the Preparatory Course it gives way in emphasis to such subjects as map reading, map exercises, estimates, plans, orders, and organization. Such instruction is an essential preliminary to a proper understanding of the doctrine and tactics taught in the Regular Course. It is during this phase of preparatory instruction that the Allied officers from English-

speaking countries join those who have been through the first 5-week language course.

As August wears on and September approaches, the time comes for a final evaluation of language fluency. This is necessitated by the fact that demonstrated fluency at the end of the Preparatory Course determines the Allied officer's classroom assignment for the Regular Course. Those who will need additional help will be assigned to a classroom attended by an AOS officer appointed to assist in the translation or understanding of difficult material until the student attains the necessary degree of fluency.

The Allied officer is not in competition with United States officers attending the College. He does, however, take the same examinations and they are evaluated just as are all other student papers. The Allied students are given a little more time on examinations and an AOS representative is present to assist in the student's understanding of the test; however, no help is provided in reaching the solutions to problems.

As the regular academic year progresses, the Allied students need less and less help from the AOS.

There is, consequently, a weaning-off period which is normally completed by March, although the AOS maintains continual surveillance over its Allied students and is prepared to provide, or volunteer, additional assistance during the entire time that the student is at Fort Leavenworth. There is, however, a time and tide regularity to the needs of the Allied student, and his academic self-sufficiency is quickly followed by a need for help in completing his affairs in the United States.

This brings the Personal Affairs Officer back into the picture. He arranges for the clearance of each Allied student from the Post so as to minimize the amount of administrative responsibility that

would otherwise fall on the officer concerned. In addition, he helps settle their personal affairs, and arranges for the packing and transportation of the students' personal property.

Allied officers are entitled to take with them all unclassified instructional material received during attendance at the College. In addition, the Director of the AOS maintains correspondence with all Allied students who wish to continue an association with the Command and General Staff College. The student is, therefore, provided a continuing source of new material and doctrine if he desires to avail himself of it.

The Exodus

With June comes the exodus. Occasionally, an Allied officer will be retained, with the consent of his government, as a guest instructor. The majority, however, will leave the friends they have acquired in the United States and return to their respective homes throughout the free world. It is a time of mixed sorrow and happiness, for while all are parting with warm and lasting friends, most are, at the same time, looking forward to reunion with their families after a year's absence.

The College faculty watches their departure with a sense of personal loss and professional gain, for every personal friend departing is a returning ambassador of good will and mutual understanding between the student's own country and the United States. It is known that in some countries, a yearly reunion of Command and General Staff College graduates has been arranged to maintain the friendly associations and spirit engendered among all graduates who have "been through the mill" together, so partings are not necessarily final.

For each Allied student, the College wishes all good fortune in his future career.



Uniforms of 35 Allied nations are represented at CGSC during the 1954-55 academic year. Above, hats stacked outside a classroom reflect the cosmopolitan flavor of the Allied student body. Below, Allied officers study map reading in an outdoor exercise during the 2-month summer Preparatory Course.—Department of Defense photos.





The AOS greets each arriving Allied officer. Above, an arrival from South America is met at the Leavenworth Railway Station. Below, is an aerial view of Fort Leavenworth, historic old frontier outpost and home of the Command and General Staff College, which many Allied officers attend during each academic year.—Department of Defense photos.






Each reporting officer must record his arrival. Following this, he is conducted on a tour of the Post by an AOS escort officer. Above, a new arrival signs in at Post Headquarters. Below, Bachelor Officers' Quarters, readied for each student prior to his arrival, are comfortably adapted to study needs.—Department of Defense photos.





The latest advances in language teaching are employed to help Allied students master American Military English. Above, in the audio-visual laboratory, the student hears his own accent compared with that of an instructor. Below, an Allied officer employs a military slang expression in an original sentence.—Department of Defense photos.






Unfortunately, Fort Leavenworth cannot provide family type quarters on the Post for Allied student officers; however, assistance is provided in selection of off-Post housing by the Personal Affairs Officer of the AOS and the sponsor. The stress of study vanishes in the restful atmosphere of home and family.—Department of Defense photos.






Life at Fort Leavenworth is built around the student and his family. Participation in sports and social activities is encouraged at the many fine facilities offered by the Post. Above, an Indian officer enjoys golf with his classmates. Below, family groups find the Officers' Club pool a popular summer retreat.—Department of Defense photos.






Allied students at Fort Leavenworth learn many United States customs. In turn, they are popular speakers before local civic groups. Above, student families at the Post commissary are quick to adopt the self-service method of shopping. Below, a Chinese student describes his homeland to a civic gathering.—Department of Defense photos.






A springtime highpoint is the annual excursion down the Missouri River to Kansas City aboard the Army's riverboat, *Sergeant Floyd*. Above, two Scottish officers don the kilt for the trip. Below, the skipper points out a famous landmark dating back to frontier days of trade and traffic on the Missouri.—Department of Defense photos.





Football season brings up a new type of classroom exercise for many Allied officers who are unfamiliar with this pastime. Above, students are briefed before attending a game. Below, it's back to the old grind as examinations expel all thoughts not concerned with lessons in command and staff concepts.—Department of Defense photos.





With the first warm days of spring, the Allied student's thoughts turn to graduation and home. Above, by the latter part of the Regular CGSC Course, the Allied student participates fluently in classroom discussions. Below, may we meet again. Meanwhile, farewell and good luck from your friends at CGSC.—Department of Defense photos.



MILITARY NOTES

AROUND THE WORLD

UNITED STATES

Plastic Maps

The first successful combination of relief and curvature in plastic maps for military use can make the sand table all but obsolete. The relief modeling in the new maps is exaggerated vertically 30 times. The earth-curved relief maps, tough, lightweight, and colorful, are of North America, South America, Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia, and the North Polar projection. According to the announcement, they are produced in 23-inch disks which are actually sections taken from a 30-inch relief globe.—News release.

Mobile Launcher

A technique which may eliminate the need for runways for conventional, piloted jet fighters in certain combat conditions has been developed by the Air Research and Development Command. *F-84G Thunderjets* with booster bottles attached to their tails were launched successfully from a truck platform. The equipment used in the launching of the Air Force's guided missile, the *Matador*, was used in the test. The shock was reported to be less than that experienced by pilots during catapult takeoffs. The new method is expected to add flexibility to maneuvers since the ramps are mobile.—News release.

Polar Communications

As a means of long-distance communication in the zone of the aurora, polarized radio signals are being tested. In addition to the changes in ionosphere which, at times, seriously hamper radio transmission around the world, auroral activity presents an additional problem in the far north. A team of radio engineers is testing the polarization of radio waves to see if it is the solution to the problem. It is felt that polarized radio waves may be the answer to the problem caused by sudden ionospheric disturbances when shortwave radio can be blacked out for periods ranging up to several hours.—News release.

Abolish Board

The six boards charged with developing joint tactics for the services on some airborne and amphibious combat actions have been abolished by the Department of Defense. According to the announcement, the boards were established in May 1952 on a temporary basis. They were established to develop and evaluate common tactics on such activities as the aerial support of ground troops, the airborne movement of military forces, and amphibious landing operations.—News release.

Train Guardsmen

Plans have been formulated to conduct special Infantry and Artillery Officer Candidate Schools to qualify selected National Guardsmen for officer status again this summer according to the Department of the Army. The Schools will be open to National Guard noncommissioned officers and warrant officers of the 48 states, territories, and District of Columbia. The concentrated 10-week courses will be given at The Infantry School in two classes, 2 May to 8 July, and 13 June to 19 August, respectively, and at The Artillery School 16 June to 19 August. The special courses were initiated in the summer of 1953, and candidates, as a minimum, must be high school graduates or equivalent. Qualified graduates of the special schools will be granted temporary Federal recognition as second lieutenants by the National Guard Bureau on the date of graduation and they will return to their units as commissioned officers.—News release.

New Rifle

The newly formed Ordnance Weapons Command is discussing the possible adoption of a new Army rifle. Under consideration are two possible rifles, both lighter than the present weapon and both fully automatic. These new rifles are designed for standard ammunition and would be advantageous to North Atlantic Treaty Organization troops in Europe.—News release.

Army Alignment

In the recent realignment of the Army, there will be a structure of 13 mobile, 2 static, and 3 training divisions, a total of 18. Until the end of last year, the Army had been planning on an organization of 24 tactical type divisions in varying states of readiness. The budget for Fiscal Year 1956 will also provide for 11 separate regiments and 136 anti-aircraft battalions.—News release.

Voluntary Reserve

The Navy plans to maintain a voluntary reserve organization regardless of what Congress might do to put compulsory features into the military training program. The Navy said that it planned to operate on a volunteer basis, both in the Regular and Reserve establishment, as long as it could. The Air Force had previously indicated its intention of relying on voluntary means to build up and maintain its reserve strength.—News release.

Increased Power

A new, higher-powered version of the Navy's HUP-2 fleet helicopter, designated the HUP-4, successfully completed its first flight recently. The flight of the new model, powered by an R-1300-3 engine, was the first phase of a 2-part program sponsored by the Navy's Bureau of Aeronautics to increase performance of its present fleet helicopter. The second phase of the program will be the incorporation of new dynamic components, capable of utilizing the full 700 horsepower of the new engine. The present HUP-2 has an engine rated at 525 horsepower



Added power for Navy's fleet helicopter.

emergency and a 475 horsepower normal rating. The new model will have an increase in power, resulting in higher payloads, speeds, and ranges. It is such that retrofit installation can be incorporated in the present crafts.—News release.

Prestige Plan

The Army's new military occupational specialty structure for enlisted personnel, its plan for the separation of non-commissioned officers and specialists in the top four enlisted grades, and adoption of new personnel records will become effective on 1 July this year. The new personnel records include Form 20, Enlisted Qualification Record, and Form 24, Enlisted Service Record. Revision of tables of organization to reflect the new noncommissioned officer-specialist structures and new military occupational specialty are now in process. It is expected that all the new individual tables of organization will be delivered to field commands at least 1 month prior to the changeover. Distribution of the new specialist insignia will be made by 1 July.—News release.

Bomb Burst Locator

The development of an improved heat-sensitive device for quickly locating atom bomb bursts has been announced by the Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA). It is known as the "atom bomb air zero locator," and consists of a hollow sphere, 14 inches in diameter, made of a fibrous material. This sphere is covered with a lacquer capable of being scorched by heat and is marked off with latitudinal and longitudinal lines. The FCDA has recommended its use by states and cities in their atomic defense programs. The inventor of the instrument says that with volunteer labor it could be built and installed for as little as \$25. The essential part consists of a small, geography type globe.—News release.

Cargo Securing System

A new method using aluminum stanchions which can be locked into position around a piece of cargo, securing it vertically and horizontally, is being studied for use on ammunition ships.—MSTS.

Revise Reserve

Under a new plan, Air Force Reserve combat units will consist of 9 fighter-bomber wings, 13 airlift wings, and 2 tactical bomber wings. The Reserve structure will include many support units, consisting of air depot wings, aerial port squadrons, and communications, storage, and medical units. Approximately 600 aircraft of all types are assigned to the Reserve. The Air National Guard, rapidly becoming an all-jet force, has about 2,000 aircraft, of which over one-third are jets. At the present time, the Reserve has 23 wings, of which 9 are troop carrier, 6 fighter-bomber, 2 tactical reconnaissance, and 6 flight training wings.—Aviation Age.

Ground Defense Command

The newly organized Continental Army Command, responsible for the ground defenses of the United States, has absorbed the present functions of Army Field Forces and will direct the training and other operations of the six continental armies and the Military District of Washington. Formerly, these organizations were directly responsible to the Chief of Staff. The new command, an army group type headquarters, primarily concerned with training and tactical operations, has been established to provide for more effective direction of the six regional armies and the Military District of Washington to limit the number of field commanders reporting directly to the Chief of Staff, and to permit the regional armies to operate as decentralized activities of the Department of the Army. The new command has assumed the responsibility for the combat, service, and technical training of individuals and units composing the army in the field, the development of doctrine, tactics, and techniques, the development of tables of organization and equipment for units normally a part of the army in the field, and the continued development of new weapons, matériel, and equipment.—News release.

Rotochute

A new device for supplying beachheads and other confined combat areas from the air is being developed for the Marine Corps. The device, known as the Rotochute, will permit supply aircraft to drop equipment and supplies from lower altitudes at higher speeds and with greater accuracy than is possible with a parachute. The present parachute must be dropped from relatively high altitudes and is subject to wind drift, thereby making pinpoint landings difficult. In addition, high speed, low altitude drops by Rotochute will keep the supply aircraft below the effective range of large caliber anti-aircraft fire and greatly reduce the length of time which the supply aircraft must spend over the drop area.

The Rotochute consists of two rotor blades attached to a hub which, in turn, is attached to one end of a standard military *M2* supply container. The rotor blades fold back 90 degrees and telescope to one-half their normal length, permitting the device to be carried on the external bomb rack of a high speed propeller or jet aircraft. It is released in the same manner as a bomb. As soon as the Rotochute is free of the aircraft, the rotor blades begin spinning automatically and swing 90 degrees to full rotating position. The rate of descent is very slow and efforts are being made to slow it still more.—News release.

Battlefield X-Ray

A newly designed portable X-ray unit now being subjected to further tests will permit X-rays to be made of the wounded on the battlefield. The new device, powered by radioactive thulium, is capable of producing an X-ray picture without electricity, water, or a darkroom. The complete unit, including a film holder, weighs only 48 pounds and can be carried on the back of an individual. It is so simple that most personnel can be taught to operate it in a few hours' time.—News release.

Lightweight Truck

A truck designed to be lighter than the conventional Army vehicle so that it could be used for airborne operations and yet carry the same load has been developed. The experimental all-aluminum vehicle weighs 6,000 pounds less than the conventional model and utilizes a fuel-injection system, hydraulic disk brakes, and ball-joint suspension. The truck, the *T55*, is a cab-ahead-of-engine 2½-ton vehicle with 6-wheel drive that weighs only 9,000 pounds. The body of the truck, including the wheels and axles, is made of aluminum. The front and rear axles are identical and interchangeable. An automatic gearshift makes the truck virtually impossible to stall. The vehicle has a waterproof 6-cylinder, 200 horsepower, air-cooled engine and is capable of speeds of over 60 miles an hour. It can climb a 60 percent grade and with its waterproof engine and ignition system, together with a fording kit, can cross deep streams under its own power. The windshield slides up and down.—News release.

Plastic Airplane

Production models of an airplane with an exterior almost completely made of reinforced plastics are now on the assembly line. In addition to the fuselage and wings, the plane's seats, doors, gas tanks, wheel pants, cowl, instrument panel, and other parts are made with glass-reinforced plastics. Of the exterior surfaces, only the rudder and elevator, because of flight characteristics, are covered with fabric. In the construction process, plaster molds are made of the fuselage, wings, and other sections. Glass cloth and resin are placed in the mold and permitted to cure. The parts are then riveted or otherwise attached to the tubular steel skeleton of the fuselage and the spruce and aluminum wing structure. The plane is 25 feet long, has a 36-foot span, and weighs about 1,300 pounds.—*Aero Digest*.

Decontaminate Water


Because of the possibility of radioactive contamination of public water supplies from the use of nuclear weapons or from improper disposal of waste from atomic reactor installations, research organizations are studying methods to combat this menace. Removal of radioactive contaminations from water by ion exchange slurry is among the latest of these methods being tested by the Corps of Engineer's Research and Development Laboratories. The method consists in removing the radioactive contaminations from the water by the addition of commercially available ion exchange resins. Attracted to the resins, the radioactive ions settle out with them after the solution has been agitated. Under certain conditions, this method brought contaminated water to a level suitable for emergency drinking purposes within 30 minutes.—News release.

Vertical Takeoff

A jet-powered vertical takeoff and landing aircraft which could revolutionize military aviation has been developed recently. It is powered by two jet engines mounted on an axle at each side of the body of the plane. The engines can be turned from a vertical position for takeoffs and landings to a horizontal position for level flight. The craft is equipped with a compressed air system that ejects air streams at the wingtips and tail, thus giving the pilot control of the plane during landings and takeoffs. During level flight, standard aircraft controls will be used. The plane has no wheels and a glider body with an open cockpit. It is 21 feet long and has a wing span of 26 feet. From the military standpoint, it was said that the plane can operate in the field without runways, like a helicopter, but unlike a helicopter, its speed is not limited to 200 miles an hour. The principle can be applied to combat jet fighters exceeding the speed of sound, it was said.—News release.

Mighty Transport

Now undergoing flight tests is the *Hercules* YC-130, the Air Force's mighty, new multipurpose transport. This turboprop cargo carrier can take off from



Multipurpose transport to join Air Force.

short runways with personnel or supplies. It is able to fly higher and faster than existing military transports and to discharge paratroops or airdrop cargo to ground troops. The plane is capable of landing on rough or wet makeshift airstrips for delivery of troops and weapons to the frontlines. It can also be used for the evacuation of wounded. The *Hercules* measures 132 feet from wingtip to wingtip, 95 feet from nose to tail, and 38 feet in over-all height. With the use of fast acting propeller reversals, the plane has been able to stop in remarkably short runway lengths. It has four *T-56* turboprop engines, developing 15,000 total horsepower.—News release.


Fiberglass Igloo

A fiberglass igloo that can be assembled by six individuals wearing heavy winter clothing and mittens in about 45 minutes is being tested by the Marine Corps. The hut is 20 feet wide and can vary in length from 20 to 60 feet. Each hut has a heating system and an air conditioning unit. A special insulation is also utilized to make the shelters more weatherproof. It is easy to transport.—News release.

USSR

New Sea

As part of a long-term program to change the physical surface of Siberia and the wastelands to the south, there are indications that the Soviets are going to use nuclear explosions to blast out a Central Asian sea according to recent reports. The plan calls for the diverting of two of Siberia's big rivers, the Ob and the Yenisey, both of which now flow north to the Arctic seas. The Soviet scientists hope to make these rivers flow southward to form the new sea. Previous plans called



for an area in Siberia to be irrigated and crisscrossed by a system of canals and dams. The reports said this would change the weather in Siberia, making the winters and summers milder. Western meteorologists predict it would have a profound effect on the weather throughout Europe in making winters milder there. Nuclear explosions would blast out the required land areas.—News release.

Defense Budget

The Soviet defense budget for the year 1955, announced recently, amounted to slightly more than 28 billion dollars or an increase of 12 percent over the previous year. The increase in the budget submitted to the Supreme Soviet amounted to about 3 billion dollars. In presenting the budget, the Finance Minister told the two houses of the Supreme Soviet that nothing had happened in the international situation which would permit the country to reduce its defensive capacity.

While such items as education, social welfare, and physical culture probably cover defense functions, some experts have estimated that at least half of the Soviet budget goes directly into military expenditure. Government price fixing policies coupled with government control of industry would permit the Soviet Union to build up her Armed Forces inside whatever over-all defense budget figure is announced according to experts in Soviet affairs.

The military share of the budget amounted to about 20 percent of the total estimated expenditures for 1955, as compared with 17.8 percent last year. The total budget for 1955 was 147.4 billion dollars, while in the previous year it was 140.7 billion dollars.—News release.


Heavy Industry Priority

The development of heavy industry is the most important task in the Soviet economy, according to *Pravda*, organ of the Soviet Communist Party. The article was described as a Stalin economic theory and quoted Stalin on the need to give top priority to heavy industry in order to ensure the safety of the Soviet Union. It was pointed out that the Soviet economy in 1954 was devoted 70 percent to heavy industry and at the time there was a move to sharply increase the production of consumer goods.—News release.

GREAT BRITAIN

Package Unit

A new development of the probe and drogue system of refueling planes in flight is a package unit which combines the hose and fuel supply tanks in a single unit, so that the aircraft's own fuel supply does not have to be drawn on for the refueling operation. The self-contained unit also makes it unnecessary for



In-flight refueling of planes is improved.

planes equipped for ground pressure refueling to be converted for tanker duties. The picture shows a transparent scale model of a section of an aircraft's fuselage with the package unit in position in the bomb bay. The hose has been extended to show the drogue attachment into which the pilot of the plane to be refueled flies the probe on his plane, usually located in its nose.—News release.

Air Transport

The British Army and the Royal Air Force will soon form a joint experimental unit to be based at the School of Land-Air Warfare to judge to what extent air transport is likely to be a practicable, efficient, and economic means of providing greater mobility to the army in the field. Its initial equipment will consist of helicopters. The Ministry of Defense expects the experiments will provide information necessary for it to reach decisions on the problems involved.—*The Aeroplane*.

Submachinegun

The *Sten* machine carbine is to be replaced throughout the British Army by a new submachinegun which has been tried out in active service conditions in the Far East and in Kenya. Known officially as the *L2A1*, the new gun weighs only 6 pounds, more than 2 pounds lighter than the *Sten*, and is 2 inches shorter, even when the folding stock is fully extended. With the stock folded, the gun is only 18 inches long and can be used like a machine pistol in confined spaces. With the stock extended and bayonet fixed, it can be used almost as effectively as the rifle for bayonet fighting. Its accuracy is said to be greater than that of the *Sten*. The *L2A1* has a caliber of 9-mm and can fire single shots or bursts. Bullets leave the gun at the rate of 540 a minute and the effective range is 200 yards. Other innovations are a swivel aperture back sight and a locking apparatus which holds the breechblock in either the forward or rear positions so that it is always safe until the safety catch is pushed forward.—News release.

Mobile Division

An experimental atomic age army division is to be maintained in central reserve in Great Britain according to a recent announcement. This experimental division will be designed for maximum mobility and all its loads will be kept within airborne limits. It will have a flexible supply system based primarily on load carrying helicopters.—News release.

Responsibility Allocated

According to a recent report, responsibility for the handling of surface-to-surface guided missiles has been allocated to the Royal Artillery. The Royal Air Force, for some time, has been responsible for the operation of air-to-air and surface-to-air guided missiles.—News release.

FRANCE

Light Bomber

The third in the series of prototypes of the *Vautour*, the *SO.4050-03*, a bomber version, recently completed its first flight. The other models of the plane are an all-weather fighter and a ground attack plane. Its manufacturers claim that it is the



Light, high-speed bomber is being tested.

first truly supersonic bomber and was conceived for bombing at high speeds. While it is the lightest of bombers, its equipment will permit it to make the longest European missions and make it capable of effective offensive action.—News release.

Guided Missile

The development of a guided missile, the *SS10*, used by the French Army for air-to-air and air-to-ground attack, was announced recently. The apparatus is very adaptable and easy to use. It can be operated by soldiers without specialized knowledge and after only a few hours' training. It can also be fired from a helicopter or airplane in flight.—News release.

Atomic Submarine

The Navy Ministry is drawing up blueprints for an atomic submarine expected to be similar to the nuclear-powered *Nautilus* of the United States Navy. Aside from its strictly military value, the main mission of the submarine would be to serve as an experimental atom-fueled engine in France's general program of development of atomic energy for peaceful uses.—News release.

'Magic Eye'


Experiments are being carried out over the Sahara Desert by the French Air Force with a rocket which guides itself on to the target by an electronic "magic eye." It was said that the rocket splits in two on impact and ejects the electronic device which swings to earth on the end of a tiny parachute ready to be used in another missile. The rocket, which is nearly 15 feet long and weighs about 700 pounds, could be shot from a plane at 1,242 miles an hour and strike a moving target more than 3 miles away.—News release.

Catapult Takeoff

A catapult takeoff which it is hoped will permit planes weighing up to 2 tons to take off in about 65 feet and to land in about 53 feet is undergoing tests. It can be mounted in 2 hours and dismounted in less than an hour. It weighs 2 tons and can be carried on a truck.—News release.

Swept-Wing Fighter

The *Mystere IV A*, supersonic swept-wing fighter, successfully crashed the sound barrier when equipped with armament, two reserve tanks, and two tanks of napalm, all attached under the wings. It is powered by a *Tay* jet engine, and has



Swept-wing fighter crashes sound barrier.

provision for an afterburner. Its armament will include the 30-mm cannon. The plane's wings have increased sweep and are of a relatively thinner wing section than the *Mystere II*.—News release.

EAST GERMANY

Increase Strength

The armored strength of East Germany's "Army" has been increased to 1,580 tanks and armored cars by the Soviet Union according to the West German Government. It was reported that the force is now equipped with 112 *Stalin I* and *Stalin II* heavy tanks and 587 obsolete *T-34* medium tanks. The Soviets are said to have supplied 2,170 artillery pieces and grenade throwers to the East Germans. The report said that the Army numbers 110,500 men, grouped in two corps. There are three divisions in Army Corps North which has its headquarters at Pasewalk. They are located in Schwerin, Prenzlau, and Eggesin. The three divisions of Army Corps South, with its headquarters at Leipzig, are located at Halle, Erfurt, and Dresden. There is a mechanized division in Potsdam, and more than 13,000 officers and noncommissioned officers are being trained by Soviet officers in special schools, it was said.

It is reported that the East German Air Force now has 7,000 to 8,000 men, and the number of Soviet training planes is expected to be increased to more than 300 this year. Paratroop units are also being trained. Although no jet planes have been turned over to the unit, it is believed that German pilots are being trained at Soviet airbases to fly *MiG-15s*. The Navy, with 9,000 men, has its headquarters at Rostock. It is equipped with minesweepers and coastal patrol crafts. Supreme headquarters for the three services is located at Strausberg.—News release.

NORTH KOREA

Economic Aid

During the past year, the Soviet Union sent 97.5 million dollars worth of relief supplies to North Korea it was announced. During the same period, it was said that Communist China sent 1.2 billion dollars worth of relief goods.—News release.

NORWAY

Amend Law

Under amendments to Norway's military law, which were recently passed by the Parliament, criminal cases in peacetime will be tried before civilian courts.—News release.

CANADA

Communications Net

A new microwave communications network to protect Canada's northern frontier is under construction by the Canadian Government according to a recent announcement. Known as the "over the horizon" system, it is composed of relay stations spread 150 miles apart, rather than the conventional 25 to 30 miles. Because it must spread over water and wide expanses of difficult terrain, although it requires from 10,000 to 20,000 times as much power as the present system, it is considered necessary. Details of the northern microwave development were not revealed.—News release.

Atomic Power

Plans to construct a commercial atomic powerplant generating about 20,000 kilowatts, or enough power to serve the needs of a town of about 30,000 people, have been announced in the annual report of Atomic Energy of Canada, Limited. It is planned to build the plant somewhere in Ontario and to have it completed in 1958. It is felt that Canada, a pioneer in the field of reactors moderated by heavy water, can contribute specialized knowledge of worldwide value. There has been no detailed estimate of the costs for the project given as yet. Behind the plans for the smaller pilot plant, are studies for a larger project that would develop 100,000 kilowatts. It is feared that as early as 1962, Canada will face a power famine in her industrial areas unless a new source of power is developed in the immediate future.—News release.

COMMUNIST CHINA

Industrial Expansion

Under present plans, Communist China intends to build 22 large factories this year according to a recent announcement. This will include the country's first automobile and tractor plants.—News release.

SOUTH VIETNAM

Build Seaport

Economic aid teams from France and the United States plan to create a new seaport in Cambodia to prevent the Communists getting a stranglehold on the country's foreign trade. It is feared that the Communists may gain control of the Mekong River which carries nearly all of Cambodia's imports and exports. There are two possible sites for the new port. One of them is on the bay of Kompong Som and another at the more southerly port of Ream. The United States favors the Kompong Som site and plans to build a road from the capital at Phnompenh to link it with the port. The project is expected to cost about 6 million dollars.—News release.

AUSTRALIA

Mineral Wealth

Australian explorers on the Antarctic icecap have discovered a range of mountains which indicated excellent prospects of mineral wealth. The range is 10,000 feet above sea level and extends for more than 100 miles.—News release.

YUGOSLAVIA

Trade Agreement

A 1-year trade agreement, involving an exchange of goods worth 14 million dollars in each direction, has been signed recently by Yugoslavia and Hungary. In exchange for rolling stock, machinery, spare parts for machinery, chemicals, and locomotives, Hungary will get agricultural products, tobacco, chemicals, and mineral ores.—News release.

SPAIN

Pipeline

A 600-mile, 40-million-dollar "big inch" pipeline to supply jet fuel to five American airbases in Spain is to be built by the United States. The pipeline will stretch from Rota, on the Atlantic coast, to Zaragoza, northeast of Madrid. The line will supply jet fuel to a naval air station at Rota and United States Air Force bases at San Pablo and Moron de la Frontera near Sevilla, Torrejon near Madrid, and at Zaragoza. When the line is completed, naval tankers will unload the jet fuel into storage tanks at Rota for pumping later into the pipeline. Pumping stations will be erected along the route. Spanish civil guards, paid by the Spanish Government, will be responsible for the protection of the pipeline against damage or sabotage.—News release.

Develop Plane

Intended for military liaison duties, the Dornier Do25, designed and built in Spain, has made its appearance. It has a fully cantilevered wing with external fuel tanks. The plane was built to Spanish Air Force specifications. It is a high-wing, all-metal light liaison monoplane with a 150 horsepower piston engine and a designed maximum speed of about 110 miles an hour.—News release.

INDIA

Defense Academy

India's National Defense Academy, built at a cost of close to 15 million dollars, was opened recently. The Academy is unique in that officer cadets for all three services, the Army, Navy, and Air Force, numbering 1,500 annually, will be trained under one roof. The Academy is modeled on the United States Military Academy and was built as a memorial to Indian soldiers who fell in World War II. It is located at Khadakvasla, 11 miles from Poona.—News release.

FOREIGN MILITARY DIGESTS

Personal Weapons

Digested by the **MILITARY REVIEW** from an article by Captain R. F. Newton in
"The Journal of the Royal Artillery" (Great Britain) October 1954.

IT HAS been said that there are two types of pedestrians: The Quick and the Dead. If this is true of pedestrians, how much more is it true of soldiers who depend for their survival on their skill with small arms?

In this article, I propose to deal with small arms in general and rifle shooting in particular, as they affect the entire Army.

First of all, I propose to discuss the weapons themselves. Military small arms are showing a tendency toward awkwardness in handling which is ruining their practical efficiency. There is no use having a weapon with a miraculous rate of fire and freedom from stoppages, if it is so clumsy to handle that it is difficult to aim in the right direction. If a man is to shoot well with a weapon, it must look right and feel right. It must seem natural in his hands, and come easily into the firing position. It must be properly balanced and feel comfortable. As examples of guns that feel right, I give a well-made shotgun and the *Luger* automatic pistol. Examples of those that feel wrong are the *Tommy Gun*, the *Sten Gun*, and *P.14* rifle.

The passion for plastering military weapons with unnecessary woodwork has ruined many otherwise good guns. No man can shoot well with a gun that feels and looks like a cross between a musical instrument and a pneumatic drill. It is a pity that the modern tendency is toward such weapons.

Second, I would like to say a few words about gun fitting. In the world of sporting guns, considerable trouble is taken to make a gun fit its owner. By this means, a man can point his gun accurately almost by instinct, without using sights. This is extremely important in tight corners with dangerous animals. Is it not, also, important for soldiers? At present, there is no provision for any kind of fitting to be done. Surely, it is not beyond the ingenuity of gun designers to devise some simple and cheap way of improving the fit of personal weapons. Obviously, it cannot be so elaborate or individual as for sporting guns, but at least a choice of, say, six standard butts could be offered, or two differently shaped butts, each with standard extension pieces. This would allow for men with arms and necks of various

lengths. Fitting could be done basically by use of a chart and later, accurately by experiment. It should not be beyond the powers of a regimental officer after a short course.

Sights

Third, let us consider sights. A soldier is, or should be, a hunter. As such, he needs a hunter's sights. By that I mean a wide open V backsight and a bead foresight. The bead should be white. These are the quickest sights to use, and this has been proved over years by thousands of hunters. They would not choose these sights, and pay for them, if they were not. They are suitable for all conditions of light and background, and are far easier to see than military sights. They can be made to be no more prone to damage than existing military sights, and they are much simpler. The present aperture backsight is far too large for real accuracy, and too much in the way for speed. It is quite hopeless on moving targets, and it gets in the way to the extent that it may obscure and lose the target when lead is being applied. It is about as convenient to use as the Admiralty Arch, with Nelson's Column as a foresight. Military sights are always fitted with comic little range scales. These are quite unnecessary. Once the weapon has been zeroed, the sights should have been set for life. They should be set to be accurate at 200 yards. This will give quite adequate accuracy at any range from 0 yards to 250 yards. This is the practical limit of rifle fire in the field. We have machineguns to deal with the longer ranges. A fixed sight is all that is needed, with nothing for the soldier to fiddle with or to set wrong. He does not have time to fiddle with range scales in action anyway and will set them wrong if he does. If it is felt that an aperture sight is essential, then let it be a flip-up type, additional to the open sights. It needs to have a very small aperture, and its only

function is to increase the depth of focus of the eye, so as to make the open sights clearer for a careful shot. It must be zeroed by replacement at the same time as the open sights, and must be aligned with them.

Fourth, I will deal with the zeroing of sights. In elementary training, it will be necessary for sights to be zeroed by a competent shot. A trained soldier should zero his own. The actual sight fitting will have to be done by the armorer, but the targets supplying the information must be fired by the man himself. When a man is excited or in a hurry, he is likely to shoot high. In war, he will frequently be both at once, therefore, his zeroing must allow for this. To overcome this, his groups for zeroing purposes must be fired at a rapid rate, and should consist of at least 20 shots in all. This will allow his main point of impact to be determined accurately, and the odd wild shot to be discounted. After the sights are set, he will probably shoot low on application at paper targets. This does not matter, as he is being trained to shoot men, not paper. The common fault of shooting high in bad light will be eliminated if the foresight is made with a white bead as recommended, as it will then be seen easily. Once the sights are set, the weapon should be the personal weapon of the man who set them. He must get to know his rifle as though it were part of himself.

Targets

Now to continue with the training itself. The primary consideration is that we are training for war and not for the parade ground. Therefore, the instruction must be related to war. Let us now consider likely types of targets to be encountered in war.

Stationary

This target is usually a fair way off, and although stationary, there is no rea-

son why it should remain so. The shot required is a quick, accurate one with no chance of a second try. The target will remove itself very suddenly if missed. This target is the nearest approach to the "Application" type of target on the rifle range.

Attacking Enemy

This will give a moving target, requiring quick, accurate fire, as time is short. It will allow for second chances, but unless the firer wishes to be bayoneted, the less of these he uses, the better. This target corresponds approximately to rapid fire on the rifle range.

Unexpected Targets

This usually occurs under conditions of restricted visibility, and at short range. Very often the surprise is mutual, and the first man to shoot accurately wins. To win this one, shooting of a "shotgun" character is required, and the remark at the beginning of the article applies with full force. Accuracy must be automatic. It depends greatly on gun fitting mentioned earlier. This target is "Snap."

There are many variations of these types of targets, but the main theme running through all of them is "Speed with Accuracy."

Firing Positions

Now, having discussed targets, I will deal with firing positions. The standard position which we use on the rifle range will hardly ever be used in war. The prone position is almost impossible to use in the field, as the view is so poor. Standing in trenches will be used, but, in that case, obstructions like long grass will presumably have been cut to permit the firer to see. Standing, kneeling, squatting, and sitting will be used extensively, according to the cover, visibility, and urgency. Hunters know all about these positions, but the average soldier has never heard

of them. On the range, we fire away for hours in the prone position, and when we go to war we never get a chance to use it again. The positions we need for war, and the way to use them with natural cover, are never taught, and are learned only through unpleasant personal experience.

In the last few paragraphs, I have tried to show that the shooting done on rifle ranges is not related to war. Targets must be more realistic and must be fired upon in all types of positions and conditions. The 4-foot square target must go as it gives an entirely false impression. Shooting must be on a "bulls or nothing" basis. Any shot that would not kill a man is a miss. Even near misses do not kill men. The only value in the 4-foot target is to check the zeroing of the rifle if a particular man is putting up an unexpectedly poor performance. It is so large that no shot should be lost.

Targets must be designed to give a man something for his money. When he shoots an enemy, the enemy falls down—so must the target. If the target cannot be made to fall down, some other means must be devised to indicate hits immediately. On Snap targets this can be done by twirling them around. For Application and Rapid, the ideal target is the Falling Plate. Until troops get used to them, they may be painted white, but later on they should be camouflaged. After all, the enemy will be camouflaged, and will not have nice aiming marks painted on him. Plates may be scored at 5 points each, with a bonus in Rapid if all the plates are cleared before time. Even in Application, a time limit should be imposed, but not, of course, as tight as in Rapid, in order to prevent men from taking all day over it. They do not shoot any better by taking ages over it, and are more likely to become tensed instead of relaxed, if they take too long. Snap may be done much as at present, except that targets should be made to jump about, and

not appear in the same place twice. All types of targets must be fired upon in all the positions described, with and without cover. They should also be fired at by troops that are out of breath. Snap may be fired between short bursts of running to stimulate the situation of troops in the attack. In the later stages of training, targets should be of odd shapes in addition to being painted in camouflage colors. Time should be lessened continually. It cannot be wasted in action. It must not be wasted on the range.

Boredom

One of the main reasons why shooting is so poor is that troops are bored stiff on the rifle range and very often half frozen as well. If exercise is combined with shooting, as described in the previous paragraph, then they will at least keep warm. Range details should be kept small so that each man gets plenty of shooting and does not sit around for hours. Competitions and sweepstakes for small sums should be organized on almost every practice. Men will thus be shooting against each other as well as the score book. Fancy shoots are valuable for increasing interest, but they must be designed to increase speed also. Anything that encourages "poking" at the target is out. It is up to regimental officers to make range work amusing and interesting. If they allow themselves to be bored, then their troops will be bored also. If the troops are bored, then it is the officers' fault.

I know that someone is going to complain that this type of training is too difficult for partly trained soldiers. It would be, if it were all to be fired at 200 yards, but there is no reason why it should be. The troops should be graded according to their past performance, and the range at which the next practice is to be fired chosen to correspond with this grading. The object is to ensure that every man shall shoot at a range at which he will

put up a reasonable performance. In this way he will see fairly frequent hits, and so will be encouraged by his own results. A 12-inch falling plate at 50 yards corresponds to a 4-foot target at 200 yards, so a man who can do nothing better than come close to the bull's eye at 200 yards should be able to get frequent hits at 50 yards on the falling plates. He will, therefore, be encouraged by these hits instead of depressed by scores such as 6 out of 20 which he would get on the 4-foot target. As his skill improves, so may his speed and range at which he shoots be increased.

If the grading is properly carried out, then all the men on the range on a particular day will be approximately equal in skill. This will mean that there is no man who is always the worst man present, or at the worst there should be only one man in this position for each battery or company. His is a depressing position. The grading will also mean that the competitions and sweepstakes will be on an equal basis, and every man has a reasonable chance of winning.

Conclusion

Regimental and other competitions should not always be for the best shots in the unit. They do not need the extra practice. It is not beyond the ingenuity of officers to devise competitions in which men of all levels of skill can take part. In fact, competitions for men whose scores, on annual classification are, say, in the 100 worst in the regiment, would do much to pull these people up. If the names of really disgraceful performers were to be published monthly in regimental orders, along with those of men who have done well, ridicule might well make them try to do better in the future. If these competitions were to be held after duty hours, then the improvement would be immediate.

One of the main causes of bad shooting, particularly the quick shooting that I hope

I have pointed out as being so important, is lack of familiarity with the weapon. Each man must have his own weapon constantly in his hands. It must not live locked up in the armory, only to be taken out for Saturday morning parade. He should live with it, handle it, point it at all things, but not, of course, at people, and get to know it so well that his shooting becomes instinctive. He must get to know it as well as he knows his wife—one day it may be more use to him than she is, and he should not forget the possibility. Added to this, there must be a really generous allotment of ammunition. A man will never be of any use with his weapon if he is only allowed to use it once a year. He must use it regularly every month, and fire a reasonable amount each time. A minimum of 500 rounds per man per year is not at all unreasonable, and much more is desirable. After all, the cost of ammunition would be a drop in the ocean compared with the amounts spent on marriage allowance and other welfare schemes. Also, the soldier cannot take his wife to war. He might like to, but she will not save his life in an emergency.

To conclude this article, the two things that I want to stress more than any others are speed and realism. Without these in training, no man will make a good shot in war, until he teaches himself the hard way. A good target shot is often poor in the field, so the training must be to produce good field shots. A third and important point is that if training is dull, proficiency will fall. It is up to regimental officers to use all their imagination to make range work as interesting as possible, and if troops are bored on the range, then it is the officers' fault.

The soldier in war must be able to use his rifle like a gamekeeper or a farmer uses a shotgun. There must be no thought or hesitation. If he sees a target, he must throw up his rifle and hit it. The action and accuracy must be automatic. Gun design, gun fitting, sighting, and familiarity all come into this. A man who can smash a bottle every other shot at 50 yards, when standing in the open, is far more useful than a man who regularly gets a possible on a 4-foot target at 200 yards, while lying down in comfort. Which would you rather have with you in a tight corner?

Political and Military Problems of Soviet Leadership During the Final Phase of the War

Translated and digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by
O. von Natzmer in "Wehrkunde" (Germany) August 1954.

ON THE German side we experienced often enough, during the last war, changes of military objectives by the state administration. In every case it affected adversely the over-all conduct of the war. We shall cite briefly, therefore, a particularly crass example of this in order to facilitate, by comparison, an understanding of similar situations on the other side.

Operation *Barbarossa*—for the attack on the Soviet Union—provided for an ad-

vance of the Central German Army Group on Moscow over the axis, Minsk-Smolensk-Viasma, seizing possession of Moscow before the onset of winter. The compelling reasons for this—the rapid elimination of the main body of the Soviet combat forces and of the Soviet traffic center—are sufficiently well known. After the seizure of Smolensk, the Army Group paused briefly, according to plan, in order to regroup and await the arrival of the

infantry formations. Our forces were to continue their advance after a few days' time in order to crush the main forces of the enemy between Smolensk and Moscow before they had time to reinforce themselves and organize their resistance. This was to be done in order to reach Moscow before bad weather set in. Just at this moment, however, Hitler changed his plan. The annihilation of the enemy forces south of the Pripet Marshes and opposite the right German Army Group, suddenly acquired priority. An armored army, and additional strong forces, had to be transferred. The advance on Moscow had to be postponed. This decision for a battle at Kiev—which, in itself, was a complete success—was made by the state administration, which was embodied in the person of Hitler, against the advice of the leading military authorities, and was more for political and economic reasons than military: the Ukraine and the Donets Basin were a tempting prize of war. Not until after the Battle of Kiev, was the old plan resumed again—but now too late. Although it was still possible to attain a part of the military objective—the crushing of the Soviet combat forces—in the battles of encirclement at Briansk and Viasma, the great operation was ended. Timoshenko had, meanwhile, reorganized and reinforced his armies. The winter battle for Moscow disintegrated in mud, blood, and bitter cold, and ended with the retreat of the Bock Army Group.

Strategic Considerations

The cardinal error which, in this case, was followed by the most disastrous consequences, is obvious: the military operation, which had been approved by the state administration, was suddenly changed for nonmilitary motives. One of the most basic strategic rules had been violated.

The elaboration of a strategic plan is the prerogative of the statesman; the soldier assists. The political administration

of the state assigns the mission, at the same time, taking account of the political and economic factors which will play the decisive role in the establishment of the military objective. Political and economic considerations clearly have priority in the planning. If, however, the situation is reversed, the soldier then comes into his right, and military considerations alone should be determinative and indicate the course combat operations are to follow. If the requirements of both domains, the politico-economic and the military, continually merge, incongruous directives succeeding one another at short intervals of time will be given the military command by the state administration, and the end result will be nothing but confusion. Battles, campaigns, and wars are lost by such means.

It will never fail to be necessary, during the course of a war, to change the original strategic plan as a result of a changed political situation. Such an alteration of plan is possible only by the closest co-operation between the military and the political leadership. Both sides of the argument must be carefully weighed, the one against the other. Precedence in the deliberations should be given the military, for they take place in the hour of its primacy, while the hour of the statesman has already passed. Even in the case of intermediary decisions, the matter of the annihilation of the enemy's main body of forces must occupy first place. The military victory will then automatically result in the political and economic victories. This view is not always shared by the political state administration or administrator when their position rests on a dictatorial basis. A comparison between the German and the Soviet administrations—both of which were in the hands of dictators during the last war—is, therefore, interesting. On the German side, Hitler acted contrary to the advice of the military in the case described here and in al-

most all others. The Soviet state administration used better judgment—at least at times.

Soviet Attitude

After the great successes of its offensive against Germany and her Allies, the Soviet Command found itself faced, in 1944, with the question of how its attack should be carried westward. The views of the military leadership under Zhukov clashed sharply with those of Stalin and his advisors. Zhukov demanded an offensive over the Warsaw-Posen-Berlin course. To Stalin, political considerations were preponderant. He demanded an offensive against the Balkans in order to ensure himself a position of supremacy there with respect to his Allies. Differences could not be ironed out by compromise. In this first striking case, the Soviet state leadership also won out over the military. An offensive with the main body of forces against the Balkans was ordered and Marshal Zhukov was removed from his post as commander of the army group in the south. As a result of dissipation of forces, the attack on the Balkans did not lead, however, to the results Stalin had desired. Neither the political nor the military objectives were attained in their entirety. It seems almost as though Stalin did draw certain conclusions from these occurrences—which even before this had been preceded by a few other failures when he had acted contrary to the views of the military command.

The situation in March 1945 had shaped itself much more dramatically. The Soviet offensive westward had not led to the rapid successes Zhukov had expected—and probably also predicted. In mid-February, the Soviet 3-day offensive reached the Oder without having been able to annihilate the German forces in Prussia and Pomerania. The Soviet General Staff counted on breaking through the German front on the Oder and on being able to oc-

cupy the capital city of the Reich with the divisions which were available behind the front in the second and third waves. The unexpectedly strong German resistance on both wings of the attack army, brought to nought the calculations of the Soviet Command. It was necessary for the Soviet forces to regroup again in order to secure their flanks before the initiation of the decisive drive on Berlin. Forces intended for the attack were stationed in Pomerania. The Soviet attack along the axis Guben-Sagan-Liegnitz-Brieg, began on the left wing, with the commitment of the three army groups which had been placed under Zhukov. Approximately the desired objectives were attained on the right wing. The attack on the German Central Army Group, on the other hand, although it did result in some terrain gains, was attended by no inconsiderable losses and, all things considered, was to be regarded as unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the two flanks were so strongly supported and the German adversary was so definitely on the defensive, that there no longer existed any acute threat. The Soviet forces could now prepare for the intended annihilating blow. It was again necessary to regroup, but again views clashed on the political and military sides with regard to this matter of regroupment and the question of the initiation of the new attack. The ideas of Stalin and of Zhukov were at wide variance with one another.

Stalin's Plan

The operational plan of Stalin's group provided for (see sketch on page 81):

1. The complete liquidation of the German forces in Prussia and Pomerania in order to ensure complete freedom of movement to the Soviet right wing.

2. An advance with the right wing as far as Stettin on the Oder, then for remaining passive there until the free forces from Prussia and Pomerania could be engaged for limited action. Thus, only a

complementary mission was to be assigned the right wing.

3. The concentration of the main body of forces in the Guben-Striegau sector in order to be able to carry out the decisive attack with them in the direction of Czechoslovakia. Under the plan, the German forces were to be annihilated before the mountain passes were reached and, following this, the forces were to continue on through the mountains over the axis Koniggratz-Prague, in order to join with the forces operating in the Slovakian mountain passes. Czechoslovakia was to be brought under Soviet influence.

4. The continuation of the offensive against Vienna, after the occupation of Czechoslovakia, in conjunction with the Soviet forces fighting in Hungary.

The purely political motives of this plan are clearly discernible. They are along the same line as the attack plan against the Balkans. Czechoslovakia was to be brought under Soviet influence as quickly as possible. By the continuation of his attack on Vienna, Stalin considered that he would now, finally, get the Balkans under his control. Czechoslovakia, which was already under Communist influence to a large extent would, moreover, constitute a useful ally and her industrial region, which was almost fully intact, would considerably augment the Soviet economic potential. It would also be possible, eventually, to plunge from Czechoslovakia into the heart of Germany. Hence, militarily, also, this plan had its advantages. In addition, the occupation of the Czechoslovakian and the Austrian areas would ensure the Soviets an extraordinary position in the Balkans in compensation of that of the Anglo-Americans in Italy and, with their further advance toward Germany, would flank the Allies coming from the west—a political motive based on deep distrust of their own Allies.

On the other hand, Marshal Zhukov pursued his purely military plan, which for

a long time had guided his operations, with all the tenacity of purpose and energy so characteristic of him. He followed his old method of launching his main attack at two widely separated points of the enemy front, which had so signally proved its worth at the beginning of the Soviet winter offensive out of the Sandomierz bridgehead south of Warsaw and the Ostenburg-Przasnysz sector north of Warsaw.

In contrast with Stalin's plan, it was Zhukov's intention:


1. After mopping up Prussia and Pomerania, to assemble the one main attack group on the right wing in the area east of Stettin-Schwedt.

2. To concentrate the other main attack group on the front between Guben and Görlitz.

3. To engage the Northern Group for a breakthrough against the German front north of Berlin then to push ahead over the axis Schwerin-Wittenberge.

4. To engage the Southern Group—after breaking through the German front in the Cottbus-Görlitz-Herschberg region—against the German forces in the mountain passes, hurl them back, block the passes, and continue the attack in the direction of Dresden.

In the further course of this operation, Zhukov counted on the Northern Group's cutting Germany off from Denmark and Scandinavia and, as one jaw of the pincers, encircling Berlin from the north and the west. The other jaw of the pincers would be constituted by the Southern Group, which was to continue its attack on Berlin from the Dresden area. Zhukov was striving—in accordance with purely military principles—to effect the annihilation of the main body of the forces still available to Germany for, in his opinion, the defense of their capital city could only be a matter of prestige for the Germans. In order to make his plan palatable, he permitted a few political motives to man-



ifest themselves in the plans for the continuation of his operation after the Battle of Berlin. The Northern Group was to push on over the axis Bremen-Hanover, effect a junction with the Anglo-Americans coming from the west, and gain as much terrain westward as possible—which might be of advantage in the subsequent division of spoils. It was to be the mission of the Southern Group to continue the attack southward over the axis Erfurt-Chemnitz for the purpose of cutting off the German armament industry there and in order—likewise an important point in Stalin's mind—to block off Czechoslovakia from the Allies who were approaching from the southwest.

Conclusion

Whether the last mentioned political motives of Zhukov or other considerations moved Stalin and his group to the renunciation of their plan, is not known. We do know, however, from bitter experience that Zhukov's plan was carried out in almost complete detail and that only the operations planned for the period after the Battle of Berlin, took a somewhat different course. In this case, therefore, the state political leadership yielded to the pressure of the purely military considerations and, as we now likewise know, did not fare badly by so doing. The execu-

tion of Zhukov's plan broke the last German resistance in the east. As a result of the military victory, the political objectives were also attained—although not by it alone. The Soviet Union attained her position of supremacy in Czechoslovakia and also in the Balkans and was also able to push her zone of influence farther westward than she probably dared to hope for at that time.

The most interesting thing about this entire matter, however, is the fact that the tensions between Stalin and Zhukov described here, and the two minutely detailed plans, are not deductions subsequently made on the basis of the events of the last months of the war, or products of the author's imagination. Both plans have an unassailable basis in fact and, together with all the details mentioned here and others besides, were delivered by the Chief of the "Foreign Armies—East Section," on 14 March 1945—hence, long before the beginning of the final Soviet offensive—to the Chief of the Army General Staff with the remark that in all probability, the plan would be carried out and that Stalin would this time renounce his plan. An Armed Forces command could hardly be better informed by the organs destined for this purpose concerning the plans of the other side.

The Pattern of Soviet Succession

Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Major G. M. F. Wood in the "Australian Army Journal" November 1954.

This article was prepared for publication prior to the recent changes in the Soviet Government.—The Editor.

THERE is no doubt that plans for a smooth succession of leadership occupied much of the ailing Stalin's later years, as he would wish to avoid a repetition of the tremendous struggle for power which oc-

curred on the death of Lenin in 1924. This struggle was not complete until Stalin reigned supreme, and the purgers were themselves purged, in 1938.

Stalin apparently decided that power should pass, not to one man but to three—Malenkov, Beria, and Molotov, with the first named as the nominal leader.

It is noteworthy that after Lenin died

his place was also taken by a *troika*, or threesome, including Stalin. In practice this did not work out, and Stalin steadily assumed dictatorial power until he was able to dispose of the other two members, Zinoviev and Kamenev, so effectively that their very names are now unfamiliar.

Stalin's bitterest and most determined rival, however, was not a member of the *troika*, but Trotsky, the hero of the Civil War. The struggle between these two lasted from 1922, when Lenin suffered his first stroke, until Trotsky was finally expelled from Russia in 1929. It closed with Trotsky's assassination in Mexico in 1940.

The evolution of this first succession may prove to have set a type of pattern of Soviet inheritance.

After Stalin's death there was a shuffling of ministries and other changes, but power seemed to pass fairly smoothly to the new heirs. Then, 3 months after the death of Stalin, a plenary session was summoned with some momentous news. Malenkov accused Beria of "criminal anti-party and antistate actions, intended to undermine the Soviet state in the interest of foreign capital."

Beria was removed from office, charged with treason, and executed 6 months later. Thus, it would appear that the struggle for power is again under way, and that the main contender will again come from outside the original *troika*.

Stalin has been dead over a year. Any possible contender should show up within, say, 2 years of his death, otherwise it appears feasible that the nominal ruler would have so consolidated his position that possible challengers could easily be diverted or disappear in the normal manner.

An examination of the prominent personalities of the Soviet Union, past and present, may give us an indication as to who is to succeed Stalin and if the succession is likely to be challenged. Self-effacing personalities should not be over-

looked, for both Stalin and Malenkov rose to power by a careful practice of obscurity and conformity in their early days.

Discussing Stalin's appointment as Commissar of Nationalities, Lenin joked, "No intelligence is needed, that is why we've put Stalin there." When someone asked who Stalin was, Trotsky snapped, "The most eminent mediocrity in the Party."

The change in Lenin's opinion is clear when, discussing his own succession, he said:

The two most able leaders of the present Central Committee are Stalin and Trotsky Stalin has concentrated enormous power in his hands, and I am not sure that he always knows how to use that power with sufficient caution. . . .

Later he added a postscript:

Stalin becomes unbearable in the office of General Secretary. . . . I propose to the comrades to find a way to remove Stalin . . . and appoint another man, more patient, more loyal, more polite, and more attentive to comrades, less capricious. . . .

The "way" had not been found when Lenin suffered a third and paralyzing stroke and Stalin began the long and devious intrigues to power which resulted in the final expulsion of Trotsky from Russia 5 years later.

Malenkov

Georgy Maximilianovich Malenkov has succeeded Stalin as Premier of the Soviet Union in his position of Chairman of the Praesidium of the Council of Ministers.

Aged 52 and born in the Southern Urals, Malenkov is fat and flabby-looking, with a pale, round, expressionless face. He was once Stalin's private secretary, and it was Stalin himself who trained Malenkov to handle the administrative machinery of the Party.

During the war, he reorganized the aircraft industry and later he became Presi-

dent of the Committee for the restoration of liberated areas.

Despite these great responsibilities, he never relaxed his grip on the organizational section of the Party or the administration of the Central Committee. This gave him control of major Party appointments and the opportunity to place loyal and talented supporters in sensitive positions.

During Stalin's lifetime, he was content to be his shadow and always appeared in the now outmoded Party uniform of a drab tunic with high-buttoned, turned-down collar, and a peaked cap.

There is some slight evidence that he became less favored by Stalin as time went by. It was then probably too late for the aged dictator to select and train another successor. This may have influenced Stalin in deciding on a *troika* to succeed him, although he knew from his own experience the danger of this course.

Malenkov is forceful, subtle, sensible, realistic, and apparently orthodox, but it seems unlikely that he can ever fill the mantle of that titan J. V. Stalin.

He is at least the nominal head of the Soviet Union and appears to be steadily gaining control of the channels of power. It is probable that the Security Police and Stalin's own super-police organization are now firmly under his control.

The disposal of Zhdanov and, more recently, Beria, shows that he has learned the lesson of ruthlessness from Stalin.

It would seem that complete, unchallenged power has not yet come to Georgy Malenkov. When it does, the myth-making machinery will be activated to complete the deification of Stalin and commence the canonization of Malenkov.

Beria

The world was not amazed but perhaps somewhat surprised to learn, on 7 July 1953, that Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria was deposed from his position as number 2 Communist, first Deputy Chairman of the

Council of Ministers, Chief of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (police), and Chief of Atomic Energy. He was lodged in the Lubianka prison, where he formerly had his office, on charges laid by Malenkov of "Criminal antiparty and antistate actions, intended to undermine the Soviet State in the interest of foreign capital in his perfidious attempts to place the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs above the government and the Communist Party." Some time later it was officially stated that he had been executed.

Beria was 53, and a native of Georgia, as was Stalin. He had been head of the Secret Police since 1938, so it was obvious that at a vital moment he had lost control of his own feared and powerful organization. He could not have lacked warning about his own possible fate, as his four predecessors in office either died in mysterious circumstances or were executed. The decline and fall of Beria is of great interest and would be more so if the truth could be told.

It is said that Stalin's son, Lieutenant General Vassily Stalin, has not appeared publicly since his father's funeral. One theory has it that he has been banished to a correction camp for refusing to believe that his father died from natural causes.

It is rumored that Beria plotted against Stalin and either arranged the murder of the aged dictator or hastened his death by an emotional shock which brought on the fatal stroke. These rumors are unproved but it seems clear, from the following extract from the Soviet paper *Izvestia*, that something dark and secretive did happen 2 weeks before Stalin's fatal illness:

The office of the Commandant of the Kremlin regrets to announce the premature death, February 15, of Major General Piota Kosynkin, and expresses its condolences to the bereaved family.

Kosynkin was one of the chiefs of Stalin's bodyguards and the very terseness

of the notice could be read as an ominous warning to the disaffected.

Another and more credible conjecture is that Beria sought to provide a loyal—to Beria only—stronghold in his native Georgia, and arranged many appointments in the area. True or not, after Beria's downfall, most Party appointees in the region were purged and replaced by new men.

The truth about Beria's downfall will take much unraveling and the full story may never be known, but there is nothing so far to indicate that his fall resulted from anything but the normal struggle for power.

Beria was replaced by his former assistant, Colonel General Kruglov, and it appears that the invaluable police apparatus is now firmly in Malenkov's hands.

Molotov

Of all the shadowy figures in the Kremlin, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov—the Hammer—is the man the Western World knows most about. He is Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister and has been a member of the Politburo—now Praesidium—longer, 33 years, than anyone else.

Aged 64, he is a small, colorless man, always correct, courteous, and coldly self-possessed. Churchill described Molotov as:

A man of outstanding ability and cold-blooded ruthlessness . . . his cannon-ball head, black mustache, and comprehending eyes, his slab face, his verbal adroitness and imperturbable demeanor were appropriate manifestations of his qualities and skill. He was above all men fitted to be the agent and instrument of an incalculable machine.

It is considered that Molotov's present peace offensive has a fourfold purpose:

A break between the United States and her Allies.

Breakdown of NATO and EDC.

The neutralization of Germany.

The end of Nationalist China.

Molotov does not appear to be ambitious for supreme power and has always shown great loyalty to leader and Party. He is, perhaps, too old to embark on such a fateful and difficult venture, too tainted by Western contacts, and too long a foreign affairs specialist to be accepted as supreme leader. He is, perhaps, satisfied to remain number 2 man although recent happenings indicate that Khrushchev has moved ahead of him.

Khrushchev

About 2 weeks after Stalin's death, Malenkov asked to be relieved of the Secretary Generalship of the Soviet Communist Party—a post previously held by Stalin—and this important position was given to the old Bolshevik, Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev.

This seemed odd and caused comment at the time because few officials, and least of all a brand-new Communist leader, would willingly give up a position of such power and privilege.

Khrushchev, the son of a Ukrainian miner, is aged 60, an old Bolshevik, squat, tough, and energetic, with plenty of bounce and ambition. A member of the Politburo since 1942, his precedence has varied slightly from year to year, but since 1947 has closely followed Malenkov.

An increasing number of important announcements have been made by Khrushchev and not Malenkov. The most important concerned the serious state of Soviet primary production, with a proposal for a gigantic agricultural scheme which would obviously entail some deferment of the expansion of heavy industries. Khrushchev promised "an abundance of popular goods and agricultural produce." Designed to correct a known unbalance in Soviet economy and improve living conditions, the plan should increase Khrushchev's popularity if it succeeds.

It is becoming clear that the man who will jog Malenkov's elbow, when he reaches for supreme power, is Khrushchev.

Marshal Bulganin

Deputy Premier and Minister of War, Nikolai Alexandrovich Bulganin, is 59. His military experience prior to World War II was limited to the usual participation in the Civil War. During the war, he showed an aptitude and ability for military affairs, and is said to be an able administrator and executive and a brilliant speaker. He is small, neatly dressed, and mild in manner and tone.

The Red Army has shown little political interest or ambition, having learned a salutary lesson in 1937, when all but 12 members of the general staff were shot during the great purge. A certain deference has been shown the armed services by the post-Stalin regime, and it may be that this powerful unit has not yet been brought under effective control by the new rulers.

If this is so, Bulganin may be a man to watch either on his own account or in association with others.

Kaganovich

Lazar Moiseyevich Kaganovich, aged 61, is the fifth and final member of the Praesidium of the Council of Ministers. He is described as a colorful, forceful man of great intellectual and practical capabilities and energy. He has kept out of political and power quarrels so far.

The Big Five

The five men mentioned are the big five, and it is among these men that the struggle for power will assuredly take place. It appears unlikely that any of the other members of the Praesidium, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Saburov or Peruvkhin, or any of the alternate members such as Shvernik or Ponomarenko, could successfully challenge the leader. They lack the firm and powerful base from which to organize their challenge.

The successful challenger must have the support of either the Party, the Se-

cret Police, or the Army. The Army appears to have little political ambition and can probably be excluded except to climb on the bandwagon.

Malenkov appears to control the Secret Police and Khrushchev at least major elements of the Party.

There can be no doubt of the rise of Khrushchev in the Party. Last April, when the Supreme Soviet met, Malenkov addressed the Upper House, while Khrushchev spoke to the more important Lower House. On May Day celebrations, Khrushchev had pride of place, and on 30 May, he appeared on an equal footing with Malenkov.

No less than seven recent major policy pronouncements have been made in the name of Khrushchev, not Malenkov. The name of Khrushchev has been steadily rising in the published lists of the Soviet leaders.

This useful pointer to the changing seniority of Soviet rulers ended in mid-June 1954, when the strict precedence of published lists of leaders' names was discontinued in favor of alphabetical order.

Khrushchev appears to be moving steadily toward the center of power and there are many evidences that he is challenging Malenkov's control. It may prove that the struggle has been going on for some time and will continue until one or the other is broken.

Power in the Soviet Union may be likened to a solar system. Lesser leaders, like satellites, are safe only while they gyrate in a fixed orbit outside the margin of central power. Every now and then a radical body flares up and, breaking from the safety and balance of its orbital movement, it plunges inexorably toward the center of attraction. Usually it flames briefly to self-destruction but, if conditions are sufficiently fluid, it may survive this headlong collision and usurp and overlay the solar body at the pivot.

The entire system, although shaken by

the clash of this event, may stabilize itself from inherent momentum and control.

Stalin boasted of being able to predict and to some extent control the course of history.

From our study of the personalities and the development of Soviet succession it appears that the Soviet Union is subject to the same bourgeois and reactionary pattern of history that afflicts the West, namely, repetition with variations.

Based on this assumption, the following prediction of Soviet succession is made:

"Collective leadership," willed on the Soviet by Stalin, has already broken down and the struggle for absolute power will slowly become apparent.

Molotov will retain his prestige in the Party, taking little active part in this struggle and tending to become more and more a foreign affairs expert.

The Army will remain neutral, simply reinforcing the victor when the outcome is quite clear, in the normal Asian fashion.

Malenkov's position as nominal leader will most certainly be challenged by Khrushchev, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, or some other less prominent member or members.

This struggle for absolute power will be in the nature of a Kremlin revolution. When the loser falls, he may drag with him entire sections of his supporters, but this will have little effect on the power and momentum of Soviet society.

To summarize, it is clear, despite Marx's statement of the harmful effects of "the cult of personality," that one man will rule as an absolute dictator and will be deified in the same manner as Lenin and Stalin.

On present indications that man is Malenkov, but he will have to survive a climacteric struggle with Khrushchev or some other contender before he assumes autocratic power.

What we of the West are most interested

to know is something about the policies that will guide Stalin's successor in his relations with us. In this we have little to guide us except Stalin's writings, Malenkov's statements, and the general actions of the Soviets since Stalin's death.

We know the importance the Soviet attaches to theory, and, as the new regime has not swept Stalin's published works aside, it can be taken that they are still regarded as the bedrock of Soviet dogma and practice.

To begin with, Stalin contended that in Marxist-Leninism he had a science of human society and its development in history which makes possible the prediction and, within limits, the manipulation of the course of history.

Stalin contended that the transition from capitalism to socialism could be accomplished, "not by means of evolution, not by means of reform, but only by means of a qualitative change of the Capitalist system, by means of revolution."

He stressed the importance of the class struggle. Under capitalism the chief contenders of the class struggle are the Capitalists and those who sell their labor to the Capitalists in order to exist—the Proletariat; the rest of society—petty bourgeois, peasants, and intelligentsia—did not matter very much.

To Stalin the importance of war "as the midwife of revolution" cannot be exaggerated. He considered that the Capitalist system would never recover its pre-World War I stability and assurance, although he agreed that there would be a considerable ebb and flow, and wrote:

The epoch of world revolution is an entire strategic period, embracing an entire series of years and, I dare say, even a number of decades. In the course of this period there can and must be ebbings and flowings.

Stalin considered that the revolutionary flow in the West began in 1929 and con-

tinued at least until 1948. Although he published nothing to indicate that the Western revolutionary movement had passed its crest, his silence and his doctrine of ebb and flow suggests that he expected an ebb thereafter.

"Aggressive tactics," he said, "should be timed with a rising tide but the tactics of defense, the assemblage of forces, the even retreat go with an ebbing tide."

The importance of gauging the direction of the tide is illustrated by Stalin's remarks in 1929, when he said:

This question, comrades, is of decisive importance for the sections of the Comintern. Is the Capitalist stabilization going to pieces or is it becoming more secure? On this the entire line of the Communist Parties in their present day-to-day political work depends. Are we in a period of decline of the revolutionary movement . . . or are we in a period when conditions are maturing for a new revolutionary rise, a period of preparing the working class for coming class battles—on this depends the tactical position of the Communist Parties.

Writing in 1946, Stalin inferred that the final struggle with the United States, the "stronghold of capitalism," would not be risked before the period 1961-66.

The evidence, therefore, indicates that Stalin believed that the early part of the 1950s would coincide with an ebbing revolutionary tide in the West.

Admittedly, this is a study of one phase only of Stalin's writings, the theory of ebb and flow, but there is no doubt that Stalin considered it of vital importance and probably his successors consider it in a like manner.

Since Stalin's death, and possibly before it, there have been a succession of carefully controlled gestures of easing up. They include:

Foreigners held in Soviet prisons on espionage charges were released.

More agricultural and consumer goods are to be produced at the expense of heavy industry.

In Austria and East Germany there has been a switch from military to civil government.

The Soviet Union has started trade negotiations with Western countries.

German and Japanese prisoners of war were released.

Many other restrictions on Russian and satellite peoples have been loosened, and Malenkov's public statements, although generally anti-Western, contain little of the vitriol we have been accustomed to in Soviet leaders.

He has even said that peaceful co-existence between Communist and Capitalist countries was possible. This statement appears to be just brushing the dust off that hardy perennial exhibited on suitable occasions in the past by his mentor J. V. Stalin.

Studying the recent relaxations by the Soviets, does it not appear that, viewing the satisfactory flow of revolutionary affairs in the East, they have conceded a temporary ebb of the tide in the West, and have accordingly adjusted their infinitely variable tactics to meet this recession?

The aim—world communism—and the over-all strategy remains unchanged, and we can say with certainty that Stalin's favorite quotation from Lenin is still the very basis of communism:

We live not only in a State, but in a system of States, and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with the imperialistic states for a long time is unthinkable. In the end either one or the other will conquer, and until that end comes, a series of the most terrible collisions between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states is inevitable.

To this quotation Stalin added a succinct, "Clear, one would think."

Tactical Air Forces in a Future War

Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Group Captain E. W. Pinto in the "Indian Air Force Quarterly" October 1953.

AIR FORCES assigned to work with an Army Group are termed as "Tactical Air Force." In World War II, tactical air forces were established in the Middle East, Europe, and Burma to assist the land forces in achieving final victory over the Germans and the Japanese.

Since the war ended it has been possible to examine the results in great detail, and several basic conclusions have emerged in regard to the correct use of tactical airpower in a modern war.

Principles

Of the 10 principles of war, those of flexibility, concentration of force, and economy of effort can be exploited to the maximum by airpower and in particular by the tactical air forces.

Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery commenting on the use of airpower said:

The greatest asset of airpower is its flexibility, and this enables it to be switched quickly from one objective to another in the theater of operations. Also, the entire weight of available airpower can be used in selected areas in turn. This concentrated use of the air striking force is a battle winning factor of the first importance.

This great asset of flexibility of airpower was admirably exploited in the use of the Allied Strategic Bomber Force in softening up operations prior to the landings in Normandy. To make profitable use of tactical airpower on a variety of targets, it is vital that the organization both in the air and on the ground is flexible. In general, tactical air forces derive their flexibility in two ways, first by their ability to strike rapidly at a variety of targets under varying condi-

tions of distance and weather, and in varying amounts of effort in relation to the land battle, and, second by the ability to shift operational control quickly to meet requirements of emphasis where needed.

Mobility on the ground is an essential requirement in a tactical air force, because although the tactical airplane is completely mobile within its radius of action, the base as such has to be fairly close to the battle area to allow the tactical aircraft maximum depth and time over target. But to meet a fluid battle line it is vital that the organization and facilities which maintain the aircraft be highly mobile, as depending on how the battle progresses it will have to move from airfield to airfield without interrupting the air effort. Lord Tedder said in 1941, "This war is a war for airfields" and it is just what happened in the North African Campaign and also in the Pacific.

To get the maximum effectiveness in war, the effort on land, sea, and air has to be conducted so as to work as a team, each part helping the other toward a common goal. All three arms of the fighting services are a requisite for victory in war and a balance between them is necessary. Germany lost the war because the balance of her Armed Forces was wrong; she stinted her Air Force as compared with the Army.

Primary Tasks

A tactical air force is charged with three vital tasks which in their order of priority are:

1. The gaining and maintaining of air superiority in the theater of operations.
2. The interdiction of the battle area to deny movement of enemy troops and supplies.

3. The provision of close air support to the land forces in the battle area.

The gaining and maintaining of air superiority in the area of operations is essential because if the enemy has access to the sky over our troops then our land forces are likely to suffer severe losses from enemy air attacks; moreover, our supporting aircraft could not operate. Air superiority may be defined as the ability of an air force to operate offensively and effectively, in other words, to be able to use the air over the battle area for its own purposes and to deny its use to the enemy. This is achieved by constant combat with the enemy air forces and thus destroying the enemy's aircraft either in the air or on the ground.

This battle for air superiority forms part of the entire pattern of the air battle in war and tactical air forces have to fit into the over-all pattern. In the early stages of a future war, tactical air forces will have to play their part by knocking out the enemy air forces in the air or on the ground before any effective close air support can be given to the land forces. In tactical air force operations it does not follow that air supremacy over the enemy throughout the entire area has to be achieved, but at least local superiority over its area of operation is essential. This local air superiority is a paramount requirement for the effective use of tactical air forces as they could not operate if they, or their bases, were continually subject to enemy attacks from the air.

Having achieved a measure of air superiority, the next task of the tactical air forces is "Interdiction." This implies the prevention of a buildup or deployment of enemy ground forces. It is achieved by isolating the battle area and by destroying the lines of communication leading into it. Tactical air forces play their part in this phase of the battle by attacks against transportation, railroads, barges,

road convoys, and the like. The entire Normandy area was successfully interdicted not only by the tactical air forces but the strategic air forces, as well, employed in the tactical role. This prevented the Germans from rushing in reinforcements to frustrate the Allied landings.

Finally, having secured air superiority and successfully interdicted the battle area, the tactical air forces can then direct maximum effort in helping the Army to advance by affording close air support. The flexibility of airpower allows for support to be given anywhere in the battle area where it is most needed. To avoid misuse of this effort it is essential that close air support requirements be integrated with artillery fire and movement of ground forces. It, therefore, calls for joint planning at the highest level in the area which would be tactical group-army level.

An indispensable supplement to the fulfillment of the three primary tasks of a tactical air force is air reconnaissance. No campaign—land, sea, or air—can be planned or fought without adequate intelligence about the enemy's intentions or dispositions. Air reconnaissance, particularly photographic, is the best way of getting precise information on these points.

The tasks of a tactical air force in air reconnaissance may be summarized as follows:

1. Strategic reconnaissance for both ground and air force needs.
2. Tactical reconnaissance mainly for the ground forces.
3. Artillery reconnaissance.

Information can be visual, photographic, or electronic and obtained by day or by night and from varying heights.

The importance of strategic reconnaissance is mainly for planning future operations and also to assess results of strategic bombardment operations. It is,

therefore, co-ordinated at a high level to avoid duplication of effort. Tactical reconnaissance is, however, designed to obtain information about the enemy within the tactical area of operations. Air reconnaissance is also provided for adjustment of artillery fire. Although this is normally done by ground observation or air observation in light aircraft, a high speed fighter reconnaissance aircraft is required over heavily defended enemy areas.

In a future war, air reconnaissance will play just as vital a part as it did in the last war, perhaps more so in the early stages. To be sure of obtaining this information, if the enemy is strong in the air, it will be necessary to resort largely to night photography. However, vital information may still be necessary by day in which event fighter escort may have to be provided. In the last war just before the battle of El Alamein, General Montgomery needed information of enemy dispositions in an area over which the Germans had air superiority. To obtain this information a lone tactical reconnaissance *Hurricane* was given an escort of a wing of *Spitfires*. Had the Germans adopted a similar policy over the Channel in June 1944, the Allied landings in Normandy would not have been a total surprise to them.

Command

For the proper and effective employment of tactical airpower, unity of command is very essential. The North African Campaign which was the crucible of the tactical air force doctrine showed the need for unified command of the air as a coequal of the Army in a joint land-air battle. To quote Air Marshal Coningham on this, "The soldier commands the land forces, the airman commands the air forces," both commands work together and operate their respective forces in accordance with a combined Army-Air plan. Prior to the evolution of this doctrine, the

air forces in the desert were split up into "Penny Packets" and tied down to different ground units, thus losing their usefulness. The integrated organization of the tactical air force with its own command as a coequal with the ground forces demonstrated the strength and versatility of airpower. This system of command will hold good in any future war.

Organization

There can be no rigid organization in size and composition of a tactical air force, as it would be governed largely by the land forces to be supported. In large-scale operations involving two or more armies, the over-all conduct of land operations is centered at the army group headquarters and the over-all conduct of the tactical air operations at a tactical air force headquarters.

The main functions of a tactical air force headquarters is the planning and over-all direction of tactical air operations, within the theater, conduct of joint operations with its associated army group, and arranging for the participation of strategic or transport air forces in the land battle when required.

Under the control of the tactical air force headquarters are the tactical groups working in intimate liaison with their respective armies, and, in addition, there will be a light bomber force, strategic reconnaissance force, air defense force, and a base group. The size of these forces is balanced in relation to the enemy air activity and the size of the land forces operating in the area. It is, however, quite feasible in certain circumstances to have a composite group operating with an army, in which case it would have under its control light bombers, strategic reconnaissance, and air defense forces relative to its likely tasks.

A tactical group with its associated army headquarters forms the main center for the control of offensive support operations. The fundamental requirements

of flexibility, mobility, and integration of effort are particularly applicable to a tactical group because of its intimate contact with the land battle. A tactical group is mainly composed of fighter, fighter-bomber, and tactical reconnaissance wings. The wings are operationally and administratively self-contained and the number of squadrons they control is governed—among other factors—by the capacity of the airfields. The physical operational control of the tactical group's offensive effort is effected through a Joint Operations Center (JOC) which also embodies the Air Control Center (ACC), the latter being responsible for the control of the air battle in the field, whereas the JOC is responsible for the control of the offensive air support. It is possible that the location of the group headquarters and, therefore, the army headquarters will be governed by the availability of a suitable site for the JOC-ACC. To meet the requirements of directing offensive efforts in close proximity to the scene of battle, there are Control and Report Centers established. Still farther forward along with the frontline troops, air control teams with vehicles are located to call for support and direct aircraft on to targets with the aid of radio and smoke. Air control teams now operate in leading armored fighting vehicles, particularly tanks. In Korea, aerial control teams employing *Harvard* aircraft, were used, but this is only possible where there is complete air superiority over enemy lines.

Tactical reconnaissance wings at group level are necessary to assist the land and air commanders in assessing the execution of the strategic plan and also to assess the immediate results of offensive air strikes. In addition, artillery reconnaissance is carried out to supplement the air observation squadrons. Types of reconnaissance are visual or photographic. Reconnaissance squadrons are controlled

directly by tactical group-army headquarters.

A tactical air force must, for the protection of its base area, ports, and lines of communication, have an air defense force. It is organized on a semistatic basis with early warning, control, and reporting facilities and equipped with day and night fighter aircraft, preferably all-weather, day-night fighters. If a tactical air force is operating in an area where static fighter defense exists, then the air defense forces will come directly under the air commander in chief of the theater. On the other hand, in a developing campaign, the air defense force may be under the control of tactical air force for a start but later may become an independent force directly under the air commander in chief of the theater.

Night fighters, which will play a predominant part in air defense in the future, may not be able to move forward as airfield requirements may not allow such a move. They will, therefore, have to maintain standing patrols depending on the enemy air activity. This, however, is uneconomical, so efforts will have to be made to accommodate night fighter squadrons in close proximity of the forward position and place these squadrons under the command of the tactical group. An extra task will, therefore, devolve on the ACC—that of controlling night interceptors.

The main punch of the tactical air force is its light bomber force. We cannot have too many of them but the limiting factor is one of economics and availability of airfields. The first task of the light bomber force is to gain and maintain air superiority by attacking the enemy airfields and installations. Having done this, it can then provide general air support and should be capable of operating by day and night and in all types of weather. Precision bombing under blind conditions is essential. In this operation it can be

assisted by the target director posts. Owning to the elaborate setup of bomber stations, these are likely to be well in the rear and operating from semipermanent bases. The control of the force has to be centered at the tactical air force headquarters to ensure co-ordination and economy in the allotment of the bomber effort to any army front which merits close support.

The transport force has a multifarious role: airborne assault, parachute drops of personnel and equipment, casualty evacuation, or routine advance of the tactical groups. To ensure proper co-ordination, it should also be controlled at the highest level in the theater. Air transport played a great part in World War II, and the conflict in Korea has emphasized its immense value in modern war, where tactical mobility of troops and supplies within the battle area is of tremendous importance. Bigger and faster airplanes are being developed so that heavy drops of large equipment can be made for front-line troops. Time and again United Nations units in Korea, cut off by the enemy, were able to fight their way out with the assistance of equipment and ammunition dropped from the air. Air transport in the future will make it possible for entire armies to be dropped into the enemy's rear with heavy drops bringing in equipment.

The strategic bomber forces are centrally controlled at theater level with policy directives from the chiefs of staff. The task of the strategic bomber force operating with a tactical air force is geared to the over-all strategic bomber plan, but it can be switched to close air support should the theater commander deem it necessary. In a future war, the first task of the strategic bomber force in a theater would be to attack the enemy's air potential and it is most unlikely that it would be employed in a tactical role.

Administrative Organization

Basically, the administration in a tactical air force is the same as in any other air force command. But as tactical air forces are linked up with the land forces, and during a campaign they are unlikely to stay static, the administrative machinery should have flexibility in its organization.

In the last war, most of the transportation was effected by motor transport; this was due to availability of roads and, what is more, complete air superiority. It would be desirable in the future to resort to air transport as it is the quickest and surest method of getting supplies to the right places. The advent of the jet aircraft raises a considerable problem of the supply of fuel. Fleets of bowzers would undoubtedly be an answer, but in a rapidly moving battle the only solution to the fuel supply problem would be the use of pipelines.

The capture of airfields or of sites suitable for airfield construction is one of the principal objectives in a campaign. It is just as important to the army as it is to the air force to have airfields in the right location behind the frontline. If they are too close to the frontline, they are likely to be harried by hostile attacks and also there will be insufficient warning time. If airfields are too far back, then there will be many flying hours wasted, depth of penetration will be less, and the number of daily sorties will be fewer.

The size of the airfield and the ground organization for the modern jet aircraft is more elaborate and complex than for piston-engine aircraft of the last war. It seems probable that ground attack fighter aircraft will have to operate from semipermanent airfields. From the experience of the last war it has been found necessary to include the airfield construction units as part of the tactical air force organization, for when airfield construction was an Army responsibility, it was not ac-

corded the necessary high priority nor was it adequately specialized. It is not always possible to rehabilitate captured airfields and, therefore, the construction unit will have a very high priority in the tactical air force organization. The use of helicopters to carry the airfield construction unit with its equipment to the selected site will play a great part in the future, as it dispenses with the geographical obstacles with which road transport is faced. One of the major requirements in the airfield organization is power supply. Mobile power supply units are thus essential until such time as supplies can be tapped off the main lines.

The successful application of tactical airpower is governed by rapid, secure, accurate, and flexible communications. The forces involved, both air and ground, must be tied together. Rapid communication is essential if the benefits of mobility and flexibility are to be exploited. Point to point communications are very often used by both services; mutual co-ordination and co-operation between the forces will prevent duplication. It is normal for the force having primary interest in the circuit or facility to be responsible for its installation and maintenance.

The Signal Corps equipment has to be designed so as to lend itself to frequent moves and rapid installation. The extra high frequency radio, now developed with ranges of 50 miles, would be ideal for forward positions but the necessity of land lines cannot be overemphasized in view of the possibility of electronic jamming by the enemy.

With the advent of jet aircraft and also the all-weather fighter, radio aids will have to be of a high order. Fixers, homers, and mobile ground control approach (GCA) will be prerequisite before tactical fighters could operate from advanced bases.

Tactical fighter.—The tactical fighter should be a versatile and high performance aircraft capable of air-to-air combat,

rocketing, bombing, air-to-ground gunnery, and reconnaissance. It is also desirable that it should operate without excessive logistic support, rearm and refuel rapidly, and have a radius of action of about 500 miles. These requirements are based on the experience of the last war, wherein the day fighter excelled itself in the tactical role, both defensively and offensively, as fighter-ground attack. In fact, for over 30 years, the high altitude fighter of today has been given the ground attack role. The present-day jet fighters could do likewise but with the emphasis on high altitude supersonic interceptors, it is possible that the design and performance characteristics of the future interceptor will not give it the endurance and stability as a gun platform at low altitudes which is needed for a tactical fighter.

Fighter-bomber.—Although in the last war great use was made of the fighter as a fighter-bomber, with the introduction of jet aircraft the angle of dive and speed limitations have been imposed which account for inaccuracies in bombing. The bomb load carried by a fighter-bomber is about one-third of that carried by a light bomber and it is restricted by weather and daylight. Provided, therefore, we are already strong enough in fighters to win the air battle and clear the air for ground support aircraft, it is logical to dispense with the fighter-bomber in the bombing role and assign all bombing to the light or medium bombers. The only bomb which the fighter should still carry is the napalm, as it is dropped at low level and near misses are acceptable. The role of the fighter in ground attack would then be rocketing, front gunning, and napalm bombing.

Tactical bomber.—The light or medium tactical bomber is a high performance aircraft capable of precision and saturation bombing. It should be capable of operating from semipermanent airfields, and be

able to navigate to, and bomb, selected targets accurately under all weather conditions. It should also have the speed and the defensive armament to protect itself from enemy action. The last war and the Korean Campaign reveal the great need for pinpoint bombing at night against enemy concentrations and moving columns. As activity by night is considerable in any modern campaign, the light bomber or night intruder operations will be a major requirement in the future.

Reconnaissance.—Aircraft employed for reconnaissance must be able to operate without fighter escort and be able to survive the enemy fighter aircraft to bring back the information. There are two types of reconnaissance—tactical and strategic. As the latter embraces deep penetration sorties both by day and night under all weather conditions, it would need an aircraft capable of carrying, in addition to cameras, electronic gear not only to aid it in navigation but also to locate enemy armor and concentrations and to take radar-scope photographs in overcast weather. The requirement is, therefore, for a fighter type aircraft for tactical work and a light bomber type for strategic reconnaissance.

All-weather fighter.—One of the great limitations of the tactical air force is that its fighter operations are affected by weather. The German breakthrough in the Ardennes in 1944 was due to their having taken advantage of weather conditions. The all-weather fighter should, therefore, prove a valuable asset to a tactical air force, so as to ensure operations despite adverse weather conditions. This type of aircraft would also be admirably suited for the reconnaissance role, in view of the observer and electronic gear that it is capable of carrying.

Helicopters.—The Korean Campaign has demonstrated the great part that helicopters play in modern war. The need for helicopter units in a tactical air force for

both army and air force needs is self-evident. It will be invaluable for communication, carrying of urgent supplies, river crossing operations, and rescue and casualty evacuation. The composition of the tactical groups in the future will undoubtedly include helicopter units.

Conclusion

The basic doctrine evolved in World War II still holds good, but one could easily be misled by the method of employment of the tactical air force in the concluding stages of the last war when virtual air supremacy over the enemy had been achieved, and likewise in Korea where the enemy did not use airpower against the United Nations. The first task of the tactical air force in a future war will, therefore, be to secure some measure of air superiority. This does not preclude the early use of tactical airpower in close air support, should the theater commander deem it vital, but if by doing this the fight for air superiority is lost, retribution will follow.

The development of the supersonic jet interceptor may create the necessity for a tactical fighter, but it is unlikely that this will arise as yet. Meanwhile, the development of the all-weather fighter is most likely to lead to its adoption as the standard aircraft for the tactical air forces, thereby overcoming the present limitations of weather. Precision night bombing is an essential requirement in a tactical air force to maintain around the clock harassing of the enemy, particularly as indications are that greater emphasis will be placed on night battles in the future. Air transport with its inherent flexibility will play a great part in the future in enhancing the mobility of the tactical air forces. In this respect helicopters will also play an important role.

Finally, as long as armies exist, the tactical air forces will remain an indispensable element of a country's fighting forces.

Staff Officer Training

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WHEN one's thoughts turn about the question of the creation of new German combat forces, the matter of the selection, education, and training of the staff members of the higher commands cannot but occupy a decisive place. To be sure, the experiences and legacies of our defense partners will have much to do with it, but it will neither be desired nor possible to leave German views out of consideration. We shall take advantage of the experiences of others without neglecting our own—which experiences we truly possess in no small measure. At the same time, we must see clearly what was in need of improvement in our former system of training and what is now outmoded by modern developments if we are to be of aid in the establishment of a new system of staff training.

The training center of the former German Army staff officer, hence, of the subsequent general staff officer, was the *Kriegsakademie* (equivalent to the Command and General Staff College). Its purpose was the training of staff members for the higher troop commands and the central command post of the Army, who could be advisors, assistants, and executors of the decisions of their commanders. Naturally, many outstanding troop commanders came from this school, although this was not the purpose of its training. In spite of a few starts in that direction, the training of staff members for a Wehrmacht command was never realized. It was confined, rather, to the Army. The attempt to establish a special Wehrmacht academy never got beyond a mere start. It was only during World War II that courses for higher troop commanders were inaugurated independently of the *Kriegsakademie*. Thus, in the training of the three branches of the Armed Forces, as

well as in that of the higher troop commanders, duplication existed. Combined training was likely not even considered before World War I, while during the period of the Reich Army after 1934, the idea also met with failure, principally, it is to be presumed, because of opposition on the part of the State Administration which, through motives of distrust, opposed all efforts in the direction of unification of the Armed Forces.

Selection

Army staff training was open to every officer. The decisive point in the selection of the candidates was not that the general staffs sought from among the troop officers those whom it wished to have in their ranks, but rather that it was the units which gave their best to the general staffs to test and train. This was accomplished through an appraisal made by the troop commanders which, in addition to the officers' service activities, their personalities were judged most important. This appraisal by the troop commanders was decisive, and no grade received in a military area examination—in the entrance examination to the *Kriegsakademie*, that is—could have compensated for a negative appraisal on the part of the troop commander. This was important, for in this way the troop units had the power to control the selection of officers they would like to see on their general staffs.

While at the time of the Imperial Army, application for the entrance examination had been voluntary, after World War I every officer attaining the prescribed age had to take the examination whether he wished to or not. This had the advantage of including all officers, and many young officers who, because of their heavy service

duties, other interests, or simply personal convenience, would not have applied for the examination, became in this way, almost against their wills, valuable general staff officers. In addition to this, as a result of the compulsory preparation for and taking of the examination, all young officers whose cadet college training was now in the distant past, once more received valuable training which was of inestimable worth to themselves and their units even though they were not admitted to the *Kriegsakademie*. There existed, here, a very important point of contact in the training of staff and troop officers.

Young officers were ordered to take the examinations after 8 to 10 years of service. They prepared for it for about 6 months. This preparation was effected by means of assigned studies and occasional gatherings for oral discussions by the candidates who continued their service with their unit during their preparation period. Moreover, every officer coming up for examination was virtually personally responsible for his preparation by private study, and it depended, among other things, on the understanding and interest of his unit commander to what extent he was supported by exemption from service duties.

Preparation

The direction of the preparation was in the hands of the military area headquarters. The general staff officers who were charged with the preparation and assignment of studies were obliged to carry on this work along with their other duties. Thus, this preparation for the military examination was an extra duty which constituted a very considerable burden—both for the instructor and the student. In spite of the fact that it almost always produced good results, it cannot be denied that this preparation, carried on as an extra task and in a decentralized manner by the various military areas, lacked uniformity in certain respects and the candidates did

not always present themselves for the examination under identical conditions. One wonders if another method could not be found in which preparation and direction of preparation would be a principal task.

The military area examination was then conducted uniformly by means of written tests given by the Army General Staff, which were to be taken at the seat of the military area headquarters on the same day and at the same hour and which were judged centrally at the Army General Headquarters. While the entrance examination for the *Kriegsakademie* before 1914 was, generally speaking, of a military and professional nature, after World War II, it was also extended to other fields. The main fields of the examination were: tactics, military science, history, political science, and foreign languages. The examination was supposed not only to throw light on the military knowledge of the student undergoing the examination, but render possible, especially in the general subjects, an insight into his general training, his capacity for political judgment, his mental versatility, and his capacity for concentration. By means of this addition to his over-all knowledge, the attempt was made to meet the ever-growing demands which modern time makes on the soldier and, especially, the general staff officer.

The training at the *Kriegsakademie* followed the same lines. Although prior to 1914, the military branches of study greatly predominated, more time was devoted after 1918 to the general training branches—this, however, only as long as the training program covered a 3-year period. When, after 1934, as a result of the building up of the Army and the resultant increased need of general staff officers, the length of the training period at the *Kriegsakademie* had to be reduced to 2 years, the nonmilitary branches, unfortunately, had to be slighted because of lack of time. In spite of this, however, the aim was still broader than in 1914.

Curriculum

It was the task of the *Kriegsakademie*, in the form of a military university, to impart to the staff members, in addition to a thorough general education, the theoretical knowledge which they needed for their initial posts as general staff officers in divisions and army corps, as well as in the various sections of the Army General Staff—a general education, that is, covering the fields of knowledge of operations, supply and administration, intelligence, and the transport service. Any special education was purposely refrained from for in a general education was seen, and rightly so, the best foundation for the latter—specialization occurring spontaneously as the result of the different talents of the individual officers and their different assignments.

The *Kriegsakademie* was divided into the faculty and several courses which were attended by classes of from 15 to 20 students each. The tactics instructor was, at the same time, class leader. His position was rated far above that of the other instructors, thus emphasizing still further the central importance of tactics, and on his personality depended, particularly, the success or failure of the training of a class.

The fields of instruction were divided about as follows, according to hours per week:

Instruction: tactics 8 (1 day); military history 4; Army supply and transport service 3 each; special weapons 4; engineers, armored, signal service forces, and air forces 1 hour each.

General lectures 2 (military economics, defense, foreign armies, organization, surveying, Navy, and others).

Foreign languages 2.

In addition, horsemanship and calisthenics.

This still shows a strong preponderance of military branches and, among these, of tactics. This preponderance was emphasized still more by the fact that tactics was

a taught subject—as contrasted with subjects dealt with through the medium of lectures, as well as by the psychological distinction drawn between principal and secondary branches.

History

The command thinking of a German general staff up to 1945 was based on the forms created by the elder Moltke, in which estimate of the situation and the making of the decision were the points of departure from which the objectives assigned the commander had to be reached. Since the momentary local development is always known only to the one in immediate contact with it, the local command had also to be given the liberty of making decisions of its own within the local framework. This could be practical only if all commands started from the same basis in their thinking. Training in tactics and in the other military categories was conducted in accordance with this idea of a so-called *Auftragstaktik* (tactics of the assigned mission). It dealt, primarily, with mobile operation, with the independent making of decisions on the basis of a thorough estimate of the situation, and a rapid and clear technique in the issuing of commands. This schooling bore its fruits in World War II until, through the intervention of the Supreme Wehrmacht Command, such fetters were laid upon it that it lost its superiority in this domain. He who attempts to deduce lessons from the past for formulating command principles to apply in the training of staff members must know definitely whether reverses occurred because the basic principles of the "tactics of the assigned mission" were wrong or whether they occurred, rather, because of the fact that the principles, although right in themselves, had not been observed by the supreme command. However, doubts have been loudly expressed with regard to whether or not, in the future, the same value will be attached to this aspect of the

training—the independent making of a decision within the framework of the “tactics of the assigned mission.” There is the contention that in the age of mass armies, divisions and army corps would engage less than in the past in independent fighting since, in contrast with Moltke’s time, improved signal communication and transportation means would easily bridge distances and render it possible for the immediately superior commander almost always to be in the decisive place himself, or to be so well oriented concerning the situation that he could give his opinion, issue commands properly adapted to both place and situation, and thus ensure co-operation on the basis of the over-all situation. From these considerations, the requirement is deduced of simplifying tactical instruction thereby acquiring time for other tasks. To this is opposed the fact that the tactical training of Army staff members has gained renewed importance as the result of modernization and the mobile principles of command of mobile forces. Certainly the advances of technique, the multiplicity of weapons, and the importance of supply urgently demand the giving of more attention to the “organization of the battle on the battlefield,” and also to systematic schooling in the field.

Method of Training

The methods of training at the *Kriegsakademie* consisted, mainly, of “instruction” in the most varied forms and “lectures.” In the “instruction,” principles were worked out in common by instructors and students. This was the case, primarily, in the military branches. The lectures on the other hand, were presented in a final state of readiness, although there was occasional discussion. The first of the two methods is incomparably better but requires more time than was usually available, generally speaking, in the case of the nonmilitary branches.

The tactical instruction served, pri-

marily, for training for posts with the operations section, while the remaining fields of training, because of lack of time, were but briefly touched on and left for subsequent study in the special fields. The lessons dealt, for the most part, with mobile warfare with special emphasis on attack and less on defense. Cessation of combat, withdrawal, the construction of positions, territorial fortification, coast defense, and landings, when dealt with at all, were handled in a rather sketchy manner.

Army supply and the transport service were treated by general staff officers especially assigned as instructors in these branches and usually at special supply and transport centers. As a rule, no closer contact occurred between the tactical and the supply and transport service instruction. These branches, whose decisive significance has become increasingly apparent, must be dealt with much more thoroughly in the future than in the past. Tactics, as an independent military category, can no longer be assigned any primacy.

The tactical principles of the engineer service, of the armored forces, and of the signal communication service were to be dealt with in these special branches, and co-operation between Army and Luftwaffe, in the Luftwaffe branch. With the exception of the Luftwaffe, instruction in these branches was frequently very elementary. It would be well, in the future, to choose the designations “engineer services” and “engineer tactics” and so on in order to make the purpose of these branches more evident. Armored forces instruction was first given during World War II as was also special training in artillery tactics and reconnaissance during the war in collaboration with the advanced artillery courses instituted in Berlin. This proved to be very profitable.

No especial place was given in the *Kriegsakademie* to operational schooling. Generally speaking, this was left for the

subsequent training of the general staff officers. Thus, in contrast with tactics, thinking in the domain of operations was not a universal acquisition. Instruction in military history was only an incomplete substitute for it. This latter instruction also suffered from a lack of competent instructors. Generally speaking, those points that were interesting as well as instructive were dealt with in military history. It was, however, applicable only to a limited degree for transposition to modern conditions. The problems of the modern battle of matériel were not dealt with at all. This was also the case with the relationships between political, economic, and military warfare. Save for exceptional instances, therefore, the instruction in military history possessed nothing but a purely historical value. A fundamental revision of this important domain is, therefore, needed for the future.

Study of the theory of organization would also be needed and, because of increasing technicalization, the study of "armament technique" is required since the tactical command, today, is largely dependent on the fulfillment of technical prerequisites which have to be taken into account in all operations. It goes without saying, that there will always have to be specialists who are indispensable to the command in problems involving their particular fields. Technical knowledge, however, in the framework of universally oriented general training, must be required of the future staff officer in order that technique may serve the interests of the command and not vice versa. This must be taken into account in the training of the staff officer.

Generally speaking, the staff officer who knew only his own arm of the service up to the time of the military area examination, had to become acquainted with the other branches of the service. The effort was made to meet this need by means of periods of detached service with the other

arms which could be spent during the 6 months of the summer season after the time of the military area examination or during the summer vacation months while the officer was at the *Kriegsakademie*—a solution which was of varied worth, depending on the pains the troop unit involved took with its "summer guest." Generally speaking, the staff officer represented a burden, since, during the short period of his detached service, he did not learn enough to be of use to the unit. Hence, these periods of detached service, because of their shortness, were none too beneficial either to the staff officer or the unit.

Further Training

Those staff officers who had successfully pursued the courses of the *Kriegsakademie* were first placed on detached service for from 1 to 2 years with the general staff, both to posts of the general staff with troops and with the central posts of the Army, to test their ability in practical work. It speaks well for the worth of the training at the *Kriegsakademie* that almost all, after a successful test period, could be transferred to a general staff. This test in practical general staff work before final transfer to a general staff, proved to be a beneficial practice. It should, to be sure, be followed, in the future, only by transfer to posts in the general staff with troops and in as close association with troops as possible since experience has shown that a period of trial in central posts easily alienates the officer from the troops and early marks him for special fields where he will then remain permanently.

It was doubtless a disadvantage where the young general staff officer had not had the responsibility of commanding a unit of his own. An effort should first be made to let the staff officer serve with troops as company commander, or as commander of some other troop unit, before his trans-

fer to a general staff, in order to give him an opportunity to prove himself as a responsible unit commander and to freshen and broaden his knowledge of troop duty. It is true that the general staff officer was transferred from time to time to duty with the troops as company, battalion, or regimental commander in order to be closely associated with them and to gain practical experience with them, but the experience as commander of a troop unit, which is so important to every officer, did not come until after the first few years as a staff officer. This is too late. The rapid buildup of the Army, with its great demand for general staff officers, interrupted these tours of duty with troops and proved disadvantageous to both the general staffs and the troops.

The training of the general staff officer did not cease after his transfer to the general staff, but was continued, on the one hand, by the daily general staff service in the most varied of posts and, on the other, by means of assignments, training trips, and other means. This continuing training, together with the close supervision which was given expression in annual estimates, gave an accurate picture of the worth of the personality, the peculiar talents, the mental capacities, the military knowledge, and special fitness of every general staff officer, so that a careful selection for higher general staff posts was possible. In spite of this, however, it must be asked whether a special training of general staff officers exhibiting qualifications for higher posts should be done in a course for higher troop commands, perhaps in common with line officers destined as higher commanders.

Experience has shown that a broadening of the horizon of the higher military commanders is necessary. Our sad experiences in the political domain, as well as the increased demands that are made on the higher officer in the military field, lead, perforce, to the necessity of our broaden-

ing not only our military knowledge, but also of our including with it all those other fields which now constitute the physiognomy of total war and exercise a decisive influence on strategic and operational decisions. The same requirement must be made of the general staff officer, as the helper and advisor of his commander, and must, therefore, be taken into account in the staff officer training of the future. Its objective must not only be the training of a highly qualified military specialist, but of an officer who also, outside of his military field, is acquainted with major facts and who knows that his military field is only a part of the whole which must fit in a rational way into this whole. In addition, the training must reveal to the staff officer the relationships of history, geography, political science, and economics to the military aspect of his profession, also the bonds imposed by international law, technical developments and their possibilities, and heighten his ability to discern the nature of, and applications for, propaganda, as well as the power of ideology. He must know the influences exerted by these fields on his military field, judge the vital requirements of these fields which have to be taken into account, and know how to include them in his own planning. He must, however, on the other hand, have the power to hinder any unjustified overlapping of these fields onto the military, narrowing, unnecessarily, the field of his responsibility. Only in this way, even in decisions meaning the life or death of an entire nation, for example, will the "no" of the soldier possess the necessary weight. In order to prevent an overevaluation of the military with its possible consequences of one-sidedness and narrowness, the same importance must be attached to the general portion of the training as to the military.

In the military field, training must not be limited to the creation of "tools" for the higher tactical commands, but it must also include an introduction to the principles

of operational command. This necessitates instruction in the peculiarities of air and naval warfare and, with it, instruction in Wehrmacht command. As in the Army, no branch of the service exists for itself alone and it is incumbent on the command to see to it that all branches co-operate in a rational and effective manner, so also in the Wehrmacht as a whole, no portion of it can lead its own existence any longer. It is indisputable, therefore, that the higher commands and the staff members of one portion of the Wehrmacht require a certain degree of knowledge of the other portions. Thus, the training of the staff officers must be more along the lines of Wehrmacht training than in the past.

It may be questioned whether all these fields can still be mastered by a single individual, or whether, for that reason, it would not be best to train specialists for each field. However this may be, the effort must also be made, in the future, to train staff members to be "general staff officers" and not "special staff officers," who will be able to survey the total situation with understanding even though they do not possess a detailed knowledge of everything. To be sure, later on in their careers a large proportion of the general staff officers will, of necessity, become experts in special fields because of particular aptness, but only a comprehensive general education can keep them from becoming out and out specialists and enable them to plan coherently with an understanding of the total picture.

The higher troop commander needs this knowledge to an especial degree. A large part of the general staff officers, exactly as in the past, will be promoted to higher troop command posts. It should, therefore, be the conscious aim in the further training of the older general staff officers to train not only highly qualified staff members, but also senior commanders. Since the higher commands will not be able to do without special training in the future

either, it would be well to require part of the training of senior troop commanders and older staff officers be done together. Problems and exercise trips will no longer suffice for this, but in view of the extensiveness of the fields of knowledge that have to be covered, special courses will be necessary. Starts were made in this direction in the *Kriegsakademie* and in the courses for higher troop commanders. For the future, *Höhere Wehrmachtakademie* (equivalent to the National War College) is proposed, to be attended by qualified personnel from all three branches of the Wehrmacht.

On the basis of the foregoing considerations, we arrive at the following (see chart on page 103):

The *Fahnenjunker* should first be detached only to his own service school, if possible, after 12 months' training in his unit. He should, therefore, take his first practical steps as a *Fähnrich*, and not as a second lieutenant. Later, when the young officer has had practice and experience, he should attend the officer candidate school which, in contrast to the service school, is common to all service branches of the Army. The young officer, more mature of age and more experienced in the military service, will get much more out of it than the *Fahnenjunker*, who, still practically a child, immature and lacking in experience, formerly was faced with concepts and problems which were far beyond his understanding. It will be possible, therefore, to teach considerably more at this officer candidate school than at the former one. While the first part of the training has to do with all fields of knowledge of importance to the troop officer, the second part changes, practically, over into a preparation for the entrance examination for the *Kriegsakademie*, which concludes the officer candidate school training.

While after the termination of the officer candidate school course, the majority of the officers return, well trained, to their

original arm, those who are suited for being staff officers do 2 years of detached service which, because of their longer duration, will be of greater worth both to the students and the units to which they have

portions of the Wehrmacht, in spite of orientation in the direction of co-operation of the entire Wehrmacht, will be conducted separately in many fields since now every portion of the Wehrmacht has

PROPOSED TRAINING OF STAFF OFFICERS

Years of service	Length of time (years)	Service grade	Place	Remarks
1	1	<i>Fahnenjunker*</i>	Troop unit	
2	1	<i>Fahnenjunker*</i>	Service school	
3	1	<i>Fähnrich**</i>	Troop unit	
4-7	3	Lieutenant	Troop unit	
8	1	Lieutenant	Officer candidate school	Graduation examination as entrance examination for <i>Wehrmachtakademie</i>
9	1	First Lieutenant	Detachment to principal arm	
10	$\frac{1}{2}$	First Lieutenant	Detachment to special arm	
	$\frac{1}{2}$	First Lieutenant	Luftwaffe	
11-13	3	First Lieutenant Captain	<i>Wehrmachtakademie</i>	During summer months additional detachments to other arms
14	1	Captain	Detachment to general staff	
15-16	2	Captain	Troop commander, company or similar unit	
17		Major	Transfer to general staff	
Later	$\frac{1}{2}$		Troop commander, battalion, regiment, or similar unit	
Later	$\frac{1}{2}$	Colonel	<i>Höhere Wehrmachtakademie</i>	For all three portions of the Wehrmacht. Before being granted a principal post, in common with the troop officers intended as senior troop commanders

**Fahnenjunker*: Officer candidate, from enlistment until reaching grade of *Fähnrich*

***Fähnrich*: Officer candidate—grade above *Fahnenjunker-Unteroffizier*

been detached and constitute entirely valid periods of unit service.

After the conclusion of the period of detached service, there follows transfer to the *Wehrmachtakademie*. Staff officer training, in the future, can be only Wehrmacht training. To be sure, the training of the staff officers of the individual

its particular task. All fields of knowledge, however, that somehow or other can be taught in common as, for example, that of political science, economics, psychology, and ideology, as well as the theory of operations, should be directed and taught to the three portions of the Wehrmacht together. Thus, in the future,

there can no longer be a separate *Kriegsakademie* for the Army, the Navy, and the Luftwaffe, but these three *akademien* must be combined from the standpoint of both spirit and locale. This naturally necessitates a judicious top Wehrmacht organization.

This *Wehrmachtakademie* would have to consist of:

1. The *Wehrmachtakademie* staff.
2. The Army *Kriegsakademie*.
3. The Luftwaffe *Kriegsakademie*.
4. The Naval *Kriegsakademie*.

It would be the task of the staff to direct and co-ordinate all fields of study that are common to the Wehrmacht. The training in these fields should be by courses whose classes are composed of students coming from the three portions of the Wehrmacht. Mess halls, social meetings, and trips through industrial plants, must be in common. This would contribute far more to a close, even comradelike contact between the staff officers of all the portions of the Wehrmacht, to free expression, and to mutual understanding, than periods of instruction concerning the other portions of the Wehrmacht. The exchange of instructors from the one to the other of the *Kriegsakademien* would offer much greater possibilities than the method formerly in use of detaching, for example, a Luftwaffe instructor to the Army *Kriegsakademie* and would probably reduce the necessary teaching force, especially in the nonmilitary fields. The commandant of the *Wehrmachtakademie* would receive his instructions from the chief of the general staff of the Wehrmacht command.

The *Kriegsakademien* of the three portions of the Wehrmacht should receive instructions for their special fields from the command of their own Wehrmacht branches, thus, the *Kriegsakademie* of the Army, from the chief of the Army General Staff. The commandant of the *Wehrmachtakademie* would have no influence in

these fields peculiar to each of the Wehrmacht portions.

The training at the *Wehrmachtakademie* would definitely require 3 years in view of the above indicated increased demands. During the summer vacation months, further detachments to other arms of the service are effected during the first 2 years of instruction, while during the summer 6-month portion of the third training year, a special semester of work at a university should be taken, during which economics and political science should be studied.

After the conclusion of their training, those who are qualified do a year of probationary service in their general staff, followed by 2 years of service with the troops as a unit commander. Not until this point has been reached does the transfer of the officer, who has now attained the grade of major, occur.

The staff members reporting for technical careers should attend the *Wehrmachtakademie* for 2 years before beginning this training at a technical college. The requirements for those applying for careers in economics and other allied fields would be similar.

In conclusion, a word yet concerning the location of the *Wehrmachtakademie*. It should be located close to a great university in order to be able to take advantage of the possibilities of a university and a large city. In addition to the installations necessary for instruction, it must also have quarters for married and single officers. The location of the *Kriegsakademie* in Berlin-Moabit was unfortunate, since it was hard to reach staff officers who scattered out over the enormous city when their duties were over. On the other hand, the necessary quartering of the officers and their families in Hirschberg during the war was a great advance which truly contributed, in spite of reduced time and more difficult conditions, in maintaining education and, above all, training, at a high level.

A Sound Decision

Digested by the MILITARY REVIEW from an article by Lieutenant P. Conkley in "An Cosantóir" (Ireland) February 1954.

ALL authoritative writing on leadership rates the capacity to reach a decision quickly very high on the list of attributes of the great leader. The records of the leaders who lack this capacity are not likely to echo in the hall of fame. For most men, then, who find themselves in command of troops, it is important that indecision, or reluctance to come to a decision, should be studiously avoided. But of still greater importance, perhaps, is that they should take every measure to ensure that their decisions, once reached, are—at the very least—sound.

Many people capable of reaching quick decisions on any problem do not seem to realize that in many cases this ability is actually a defect in character rather than a virtue. Too many people have fixed ideas on far too many subjects. Their minds are practically made up before they examine the many implications of a particular problem. The examination they do carry out is often perfunctory and of little value. Any aspect of the problem that cannot be made to fall in with their own prejudices is quickly classified as of little importance. The decisions reached in such cases are more the product of intuition rather than the logical conclusion drawn from a process of cold, calm reasoning.

Only the favored few are gifted with unerring intuitive powers. Hitler possessed them to a remarkable degree, but eventually these powers too, like so many others, failed him in his hour of greatest need.

His intuition said that the Normandy attack was only a diversion, that the real invasion would come farther to the north. This blunder made the task of the invading forces in the early, critical days all the easier. This happened, too, despite the

warnings and advice of those who had approached the problem in a more logical fashion and had drawn reasoned conclusions that were based on a detailed study of all factors likely to affect the situation as it existed prior to, and during, the first weeks of the invasion.

It is a notable fact that those who are wont to reach hasty—and so often faulty—decisions are frequently possessed of determination of a high order. Here you have a highly dangerous combination indeed, and one which has often proved exceedingly disastrous in battle. The capacity to persist in a chosen line of action is another of the attributes of the great leader. Determination and mental robustness are undoubtedly great assets. Where, however, these are allied to rashness and bad judgment, you have a potentially dangerous mentality—one which, in the commander of troops in battle, is to be sadly deplored.

It can hardly be denied that it is highly desirable, nay, even essential for all commanders to be capable of examining a situation reasonably and logically and from many and various angles; to be able to draw correct conclusions from every aspect of the situation so examined and, finally, to crown their mental efforts by reaching an accurate decision as to the most advantageous manner of carrying out their future tasks.

The process of reaching a decision in warfare must not be haphazard. It demands the exercise of a technique acquired through professional knowledge, patience, and practice. It must be remembered that in warfare the commander is pitting his wits against an opponent who is normally as quick-witted as he. In all operations certain problems of terrain, supply, and

weather have to be overcome. These, however, are merely passive in their opposition to the will of the commander. This cannot be said of the problem presented by his opponent.

While the commander is busy evolving his plan and, while so doing, endeavoring to read the mind of his adversary, that adversary is similarly engaged planning his next move and trying to read the mind of his opponent. This battle of wits is the principal reason why planning in warfare is so difficult and why plans so often go astray.

If we examine the approved method of making an estimate of the situation in the field of battle at any particular time, we will see how logical it is; how each step follows naturally and how the entire procedure is devised to ensure that the resultant plan will provide against all, or nearly all, eventualities. The possibility of the commander being surprised is, thereby, reduced to a minimum. It is a fallacy to believe that any plan devised by a human could be absolutely foolproof. What is possible is to reduce the risks taken to those of the "calculated" class which, due to the exigencies of the situation, are quite unavoidable.

The Aim

The first and most important step in planning is to have a clear, mental picture of the task ahead. This picture can best be obtained by deciding on a clear, concise "statement of the aim." It may be argued that every commander gets clear orders from above as to what his role will be and that all he has to do is carry out orders. But such orders usually set out in somewhat general terms what is to be done and rarely state explicitly how it is to be done; neither is it desirable that they should do so. The higher commander could scarcely be expected to have the time or the desire to tell his subordinates how they are to employ the troops under

their immediate control. It would be better indeed that each subordinate evolve his own plan to execute the orders given to him. This plan, being the child of his own brain, will be pressed more vigorously in its execution than any dictated course of action. The "statement of aim" must omit no essential—but neither must it include any unnecessary "trimmings." Such "trimmings" might well emerge as red herrings in his subsequent study of the general situation.

The Factors

Once the aim is fixed in the mind of the commander, his next step is to examine those factors which are likely to affect the aim. These factors are numerous and are likely to change somewhat from situation to situation. Generally speaking, what requires consideration comes under four main headings in all situations:

1. Enemy forces.
2. Own forces.
3. Area of operations (or ground general).
4. Time and space.

Pride of place is given to consideration of the enemy. Of the many factors likely to oppose the will of the commander in effecting his aim, the opposition to be expected from the enemy is likely to be the most important. While the other obstacles to be overcome can be expected to put up a passive resistance, his (the enemy's) will be extremely active. Enemy forces, therefore, receive early and very careful consideration.

Enemy Information

The commander is mainly dependent on his intelligence service for up-to-date information regarding the strength, composition, and disposition of the force opposing him. This information is usually grouped under the following subheadings: strength; composition; disposition; status of supply; morale; combat efficiency; and other considerations.

It has been normal practice to quote the enemy strength in terms of "equivalent units" when preparing an estimate of the situation. For example, the division commander usually thinks and plans in terms of enemy battalions and reduces or increases the number according to the relative strength and equipment of the force facing him as compared to his own unit. The battalion commander, for his part, would think in terms of enemy companies. It will be noted that in the list of subheadings mentioned above, status of supply, morale, and combat efficiency are also factors which could be taken into consideration when deciding on the "equivalent" value of enemy units. Supply, morale, and combat efficiency affect the usefulness of troops just as directly as do their armament and equipment. The suggestion is made that the intelligence officer or commander who keeps his finger on the pulse of the enemy, as it were, could quickly assess the enemy strength in terms of truly "equivalent units," taking his own troops as the standard, without any separate consideration of such factors as morale and combat efficiency. A note of warning may be necessary, however, to guard against overoptimism or excessive pessimism in assessing the comparative fighting efficiency of troops. What is required is a balanced, reasonable conclusion based on recent experience of the caliber of enemy personnel, brought up-to-date by the very latest information of those factors likely to affect their morale and physical condition in the interim.

The question may be asked as to how the composition of the enemy force facing the commander affects the issue and calls for such detailed consideration. That this may influence the commander in his final decision can be seen readily. For example, if the enemy is strong in firepower but relatively weak in manpower there is ample reason why, if all other things are equal, the operation—which we will sup-

pose is an attack—should be carried out under cover of darkness when his numerically superior force can get to close quarters with the enemy without paying the high price in casualties which a daylight advance under heavy fire might entail. The composition of the enemy forces, too, gives a good indication of the role these forces are playing within the larger pattern of the enemy scheme of defense or maneuver.

Enemy Dispositions

This is also true of enemy dispositions. These, if accurately known, may give valuable indications as to his present capabilities and, more important still, to his future intentions. Knowledge of enemy dispositions when properly utilized often makes possible the seemingly impossible. Weaker forces can tackle and defeat a more powerful enemy when given proper information in this regard; it enables an attack to be mounted against the points where the enemy is weakest and, if evasive action is called for, it enables a withdrawal to be timed and routed with the least disadvantage to our own troops.

When the known facts about the enemy have been set out, deductions and conclusions, likely to be of interest when the final planning stage is reached, should spring to mind. These will be all the more pertinent and helpful if the commander, when arriving at them, has his aim clearly before his mind. It is then that the advantage of having decided upon a clear and concise "statement of the aim" begins to be appreciated.

Consideration of "own forces" normally presents little difficulty to the commander. He will naturally relate his findings to those arrived at in respect to the enemy forces, thereby enabling him to strike a balance which will indicate, to some degree, possible trends of future operations.

The "area of operations" is the next factor listed. In the case of a battalion or

lower formation this could be more properly termed "ground general." Corps, and possibly division commanders, would find it imperative to include under this heading such additional points as weather conditions, population, and economics, in addition to the purely physical aspects of the terrain—hence the wider term "area of operations."

The battalion commander is normally concerned only with the following five aspects of the terrain: observation and fields of fire; cover and concealment; obstacles; terrain objectives; and avenues of approach or withdrawal.

The order in which these are considered depends largely on the nature of the operation in mind.

The purpose in considering the terrain is to try and visualize its possible bearing on the commander's own forces in the operation ahead and on the enemy forces in the courses open to them during the space of time for which the commander is planning. The ground must be considered in its state as at the time of planning, but thought must also be given to any alterations that may come about as a result of natural causes or of possible enemy action. Heavy rains may alter considerably the type of "going"; so, too, may enemy action. Artificial flooding can be achieved by the blowing of dams; and the depth of rivers and canals may be altered similarly.

Time and Space

The final factor to be considered before the final planning stage is reached is that of "time and space." This, in effect, means the relative mobility of the enemy and of our own forces. Could troops at present situated at this point reach that point by a certain time? Questions such as this are posed by consideration of "time and space" and they apply equally to the enemy and own forces. With regard to the enemy, the objective at this stage is to determine what forces the en-

emy could possibly have available to oppose an attack at the outset and what reinforcements could possibly arrive in time to influence the action. The commander must be in possession of reliable information as to the transport facilities available to the enemy forces. It is here that good intelligence pays dividends. The "time and space" factor is particularly vital in operations involving movement on a big scale. For Rommel in North Africa it must have assumed the utmost importance, as it no doubt did for his opponents in all their prebattle planning. The *Afrika Korps* achieved surprise many times by appearing where it could not possibly be—according to the calculations of Rommel's harassed enemies. It is safer to overestimate rather than underestimate enemy capabilities in this respect, particularly if faced by a Rommel or a Patton as distinct from a Montgomery.

Courses

Now that all the factors have been considered, the time is ripe to consider the courses open, first of all, to the enemy and subsequently to the commander's own forces. It is usual at this stage to run through the conclusions arrived at through consideration of the various factors and to set them out once more in the order in which they were reached.

The general lines of action open at any particular time are: to attack; to withdraw; to defend; and to reinforce.

If the mission of our forces is to attack and seize an objective, then it is mainly to the last two courses mentioned above that we will direct attention. It can be taken that the normal enemy reaction to an attack is to defend with forces already available or to reinforce with troops within reach. But even within the scope of these two general courses of action there may be upward of a dozen methods of carrying out this defense, or of bringing up and utilizing reinforcements.

All these courses must be considered, particular attention being focused on those most disadvantageous to our own troops in their coming task.

The planning stage is initially taken up by deciding on the courses of action open to the commander's own troops, each calculated to bring about the desired result. Each course must be set off against all the courses open to the enemy and that course which offers the best prospects of success with minimum losses to his own troops must be chosen. The benefit of having studied the situation in detail before deciding on this will be very apparent. The commander is no longer groping in the dark and trusting to luck for success in his efforts. Rather, he is choosing a line of action after due and impartial consideration of all the implications of his decision.

The Plan

The course decided on is the basis for the plan. In this is given, in a general way, an outline of the entire operation, setting out any exceptional role to be played by subordinate or supporting formations. The plan, in turn, provides the basis for the operation order which is issued either orally or in writing, according to the exigencies of the situation, well in advance of H-hour. It can hardly be denied that this plan, and operation order, will be all the more foolproof and less likely to result in failure because of the time and thought devoted to the systematic examination of the situation beforehand.

In practice, of course, much of the estimate of the situation on which the commander bases his plan is the work of the intelligence officer. Time does not permit the commander to carry out in full the somewhat tedious work involved. But it often happens, too, that the plan itself and the subsequent operation suffer as a

result. The commander who glances through the conclusions reached by the intelligence officer and then quickly makes up his mind as to the best course of action to pursue, can scarcely hope to arrive at as sound a plan as would the commander who finds the time to examine all factors and courses himself. The moral is that as much as possible of this work should be done by the commander who, with the extra skill and expertness acquired by practice, will quickly reduce the time required without suffering a possible deficiency in the soundness of his decision.

Conclusion

The process of making an appreciation of the situation as a preliminary to formulating a plan of action in warfare is, without doubt, a lengthy one. There will be occasions when to sit down and examine the situation on the prescribed lines would be criminal. Hasty decisions will very often be called for, but few will deny that such decisions are apt to be sounder when made by the commander who is familiar with the prescribed formula. Much of the examination of factors and courses can be done in the space of a few moments by one grown accustomed to thinking on these lines through constant practice.

What fateful significance may lie behind those words often uttered in warfare, "My decision is. . ." How many leaders utter them without a thought to the consequences should the decision be found wanting in any respect. Countless men's lives have so often hung on the slender thread of one man's decision. So, too, has the destiny of a nation.

So let us not treat lightly the training necessary to master the procedure prescribed to ensure the highest possible percentage of sound decisions on the field of battle.

BOOKS OF INTEREST TO THE MILITARY READER

PRELUDE TO DUNKIRK. By Major General Sir Edward L. Spears. 332 Pages. A. A. Wyn, Inc., New York. \$5.00.

BY COL GEORGE V. BRITTEN, *British Army*

This is the first of a 2-volume work, "Assignment to Catastrophe." General Spears was head of the British Army Liaison Mission to the French Army in World War I, and an old friend of Sir Winston Churchill. In 1940, when the military situation was desperate, Sir Winston appointed General Spears to be his personal representative with the French Government. General Spears spoke fluent French and personally knew well most of the leading Frenchmen of that time. He loved the French and was, if anything, biased in favor of France and the French. It is a sad story, vividly told. It is a valuable, firsthand account of events in those tragic days and a real contribution to history. This volume covers the period 1 August 1939 (the height of the "Phony War") to 31 May 1940 (the crisis of Dunkirk).

In this volume, two personalities stand out—Winston Churchill doing his utmost with words (having no other means) to inspire and sustain the French at a terrible moment, and Paul Reynaud, a brave and staunch man, doing his best—and more—to fight the defeatism, military and political, with which he, as Prime Minister, was surrounded and, in the end, engulfed. Winston's phrase, at that critical time, was "The partner who survives will go on." And so it was. Both France and Great Britain are free nations today.

THE MAGNIFICENT MITSCHER. By Theodore Taylor. 364 Pages. W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., New York. \$5.00.

BY CAPT RALPH J. BAUM, *USN*

This is a story of a quiet, rugged, and determined boy who grew up to become one of the pioneers of Naval Aviation and the leader of one of the most powerful naval weapons ever devised, the fast carrier task force. He never outgrew his early love of the outdoors as shown by his preference for duty with ships and planes and his dislike for assignments that tied him to a desk. His training was for combat and he became one of the best combat commanders the Navy has ever had.

The Magnificent Mitscher tells a double story—one is about Mitscher and the other about the development of Naval Aviation. Neither can be told well without including the other.

Mitscher became a believer in the usefulness of the airplane and was an integral part in many of the firsts in aviation, such as the first transatlantic flight and the first flight from the mainland to Hawaii. He was on hand during the stormy Billy Mitchell period, the later so-called battleship admiral period, and the supercarrier controversy. He was the second of those who could be classified as pioneers in Naval Aviation to reach 4-star rank. He became one of the less than 75 officers in the Navy's history who became a full admiral before retiring.

This book is of interest to the military reader as Mitscher's life is a lesson in leadership and aggressiveness.

THE FIRST AND THE LAST. By Adolf Galland. 368 Pages. Henry Holt & Co., New York. \$4.75.

By MAJ JOHN N. HIGHLEY, *USAF*

This is not a fictional adventure story, but a documentation of the rise and fall of the German fighter forces, written by a man who had dedicated his career, as a professional flyer, to the Luftwaffe. It is an interesting, behind the scenes, history of these forces during World War II. Here is a diary of how the German air forces were affected by the sometimes brilliant and sometimes stupid actions of Hitler and the German High Command.

The most significant thing about the book is that the reader will wonder why, with such an air potential, Germany did not put up a much harder fight than she did. He will soon realize that if it had not been for some of the inopportune decisions of the German leaders, the Germans would have come quite close to winning the war.

I SURVIVED. By Godfrey Lias. 255 Pages. The John Day Co., Inc., New York. \$3.75.

By LT EDWARD C. GILLETTE, III, *Arty*

I Survived is a story of a young German officer's years in Soviet prison camps. It is a candid look at the lives and personalities of the Russian people. It is hard to realize that a prisoner of war should have the opportunity to mingle with the people of the country in which he is imprisoned, but this was the case in the Soviet Union.

After the war his status as a prisoner was changed somewhat. The Soviets then needed workers of any nationality. The narrator is tried and unbelievably acquitted of charges of espionage against the State. Here we have a look into the political prison in Moscow, the Soviet methods of eliciting a "confession," and their so-called "trials." This book should be of interest to military personnel who are always faced with the possibility of a similar experience.

THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT. By John H. Ferguson and Dean E. McHenry. 1,056 Pages. McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York. \$6.00.

IDEAS AND ISSUES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION. Edited by Dwight Waldo. 462 Pages. McGraw-Hill Book Co., New York. \$5.50.

MOSTLY ALKALI. By Stephen Perry Jocelyn. 436 Pages. The Caxton Printers, Ltd., Caldwell, Idaho. \$10.00.

By LT COL CHESTER E. KENNEDY, *Armor*

This biography of Brigadier General Jocelyn details the 44-year career of an officer in the United States Infantry during the period 1863-1906. General Jocelyn's record, unmarked by meteoric rise or historic notice, is significant in that it mirrors the life and character of the typical Army officer of the time.

Through liberal use of quotations from Jocelyn's personal correspondence and journal, and many authentic photographs and sketches, the biographer maintains an intimate panorama of his military career. He casts occasional barbs at other combat arms and certain political and military figures of the period, these apparently in an effort to add additional luster to a record of service and devotion to duty which needs none.

To those who seek military color and background for the period, this book is high ground. Students of strategy and tactics may find it unrewarding.

THE STATESMANSHIP OF THE CIVIL WAR. By Allan Nevins. 82 Pages. The Macmillan Co., New York. \$2.25.

REBIRTH AND DESTINY OF ISRAEL. By David Ben Gurion. 539 Pages. Philosophical Library, New York. \$10.00.

THE UNDECLARED WAR. By William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason. 963 Pages. Harper & Bros., New York. \$10.00.

RETURN TICKET. By Lieutenant Colonel Anthony Deane-Drummond. 254 Pages. J. B. Lippincott Co., Philadelphia, Pa. \$3.50.

BY LT COL DALLAS A. PILLIOD, *Inf*

Return Ticket is the outstanding story of the author's experiences as a prisoner of war and his escapes. Told in a "Jack Webbian" style of underplay, tensely dramatic moments are developed in a most realistic and interesting manner.

Deane-Drummond parachuted into Italy on a raid early in 1941 and was taken prisoner. Twice he made ingenious and daring escapes; once from a prison and once from a military hospital. On the first escape he was caught but a few hundred yards from the Swiss frontier. On the second escape, the Swiss frontier was safely crossed to freedom.

In describing his sojourn in the Italian prison camps the author presents the various personalities of his fellow officer prisoners. His sketches of their diverse mental attitudes toward responsibilities of the individual and to country are enlightening and worthy of note.

Upon returning to England, he joined the 1st Airborne Division and made the drop on Arnhem. After 6 days of alternate fighting and hiding, he again became a prisoner, this time of the Germans. He secreted himself in a cupboard in a room which was used by his captors for interrogation of British officers. The cupboard was so small it was impossible to sit down, yet, he remained in the cupboard for 13 days awaiting the opportunity to escape. Only once during this period did he want to disclose his location and this was to throttle a fellow officer who was talking freely to his interrogators. When he escaped from the cupboard, he was assisted back into the British lines by the courageous Dutch underground.

Return Ticket is not only an interesting adventure in pleasurable reading, but also contains a valuable lesson for the military reader.

THE NEW WARFARE. By Brigadier C. N. Barclay. 65 Pages. Philosophical Library, New York. \$2.75.

BY LT COL THOMAS O. BLAKENEY, *Armor*

There is much logic and commonsense packed into this small book. Brigadier Barclay puts into coherent and unemotional print what probably has been the random thoughts of many since the "cold war" was recognized to exist.

The New Warfare does not describe a war of the future; rather it develops the theme that current world conditions amount to war—the new warfare. This new warfare is not the total shooting war, but is "another kind of warfare—a war of limited shooting, sometimes by proxy, and involving elaborately prepared campaigns of threats, propaganda, and subversive activities." The author writes that conditions of this decade should be described as a limited war which may turn to a total shooting war, but more likely will persist for a long time under present conditions.

He proposes only one solution to the free world's problem. This is a 3-barreled solution which calls for: fighting "the new warfare" with determination and skill; being ready to fight and to win a World War III of a shooting kind, if it comes about; and being ready to negotiate at any time to improve relations.

The New Warfare is highly recommended reading matter for military and civilian.

THE UNEDUCATED. By Eli Ginzberg and Douglas W. Bray. 246 Pages. Columbia University Press, New York. \$4.50.

THE RUSSIANS IN FOCUS. By Harold J. Berman. 209 Pages. Atlantic-Little-Brown & Co., Boston, Mass. \$3.00.

THE UNITED STATES AND ITALY. By H. Stuart Hughes. 256 Pages. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. \$4.00.

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
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